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THE TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE: "JUST STAY
ON THE GOOD ROADS, AND YOU'VE GOT NOTHING
TO WORRY ABOUT*
Phillip Allen White**
Indian Law is a law for Indians, intended to control them, and not
a law of Indians. If you look between the pages of Felix Cohen's
text... or any other major work on Indian affairs law, you see
that (1) it is not written or made by Indians; (2) it does not speak
to tribal traditions; and (3) it advocates barriers to tribal
governments and traditional ways.'
The Muses care so little for geography.'
The title promises a discussion of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. But in the
spirit of full disclosure, this is also about territorial sovereignty and jurisdictional
authority. For in the end, the tribal exhaustion doctrine is not much more than
a poor surrogate for a more principled view of territorial sovereignty. Indeed,
if tribes were merely afforded a reasonable equivalent to the geographically-
defined scope of subject matter jurisdiction enjoyed by states, there would be
no need for anything like an exhaustion doctrine. Instead, we have a
circumstance in which virtually any tribal controversy involving a non-Indian
can be, after some measure of appropriate procedures are followed, transformed
into a federal dispute.' In those cases, the focus is not the parties and the
*This is Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia's advice regarding the way in which one might
cross an American Indian reservation relatively free from worry about being haled into tribal
court. See Steve Lash, Justices Map Alternate Route for Determining Tribal Court Jurisdiction
in Non-Indians' Personal Injury Suits, WEsrs LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, at 14,191, available
in 1997 WL 4267.
**J.D. candidate, The University of Montana School of Law; B.A., 1995, Montana State
University. The author cannot adequately express his gratitude to the faculty, staff, and to his
classmates at the University of Montana School of Law for the best introduction to the study of
law for which anyone could ever hope. Special thanks to fellow University of Montana law
student Danna Jackson, and to University of Montana School of Law Professors Cynthia Ford,
David Aronofsy, Greg Munro, Ray Cross, and Kathleen Magone for the inspiration they have
provided (whether they knew it or not). Professor Darrel Bratton of the University of San Diego
School of Law deserves no small credit. Finally, this article is dedicated to my children, Tony,
Kris, and Jessica, for all their love and patience.
First-prize winner, 1996-97 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. Robert Yazzie, Law School as a Journey, 46 ARK. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1993).
2. OSCAR WILDE, Sententiae, in A CRITIC IN PALL MALL 48 (1919).
3. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp 213 (D.
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dispute they must resolve. Rather, the focus becomes a frustrating argument
between the tribal court, fervently guarding whatever it is that remains of tribal
sovereignty, and a non-Indian party, who argues just as zealously that such a
thing as tribal sovereignty has probably not existed since sometime in the
fifteenth or sixteenth century.4
Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984) (while a challenge to tribal court jurisdiction
presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which may ultimately allow relitigation of the
dispute in federal court, the disappointed party must nevertheless exhaust all available tribal
remedies before coming to federal court) rev'd, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
4. As Indian law moves into the twenty-first century, Professor Barsh suggests that
"[t]erritorial integrity and economic self-determination are points on which federal decisions and
international norms conflict most sharply." Russel Lawrence Barsh, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook
of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Edition, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799, 805 (1982) (book review). In the
generally accepted view, all United States land titles ultimately rest on the "doctrine of
discovery" - the notion that British explorers established a monopoly on the purchase of native
lands. ld. (citing FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 487-89 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982)) [hereinafter COHEN, 1982 E).].
Originally, the notion of a so-called "naked" title subject to unextinguished native "occupancy"
rights, was "little more than a convenient conceptual handle used to describe the coexisting
interests of natives and colonists." Barsh, supra, at 805-06 (citations omitted). But by the end
of the nineteenth century, the discovery -doctrine had become a primary source of Congress's
power to confiscate tribal territories "at pleasure." Id. at 806; see also United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) (relying upon "the exclusive right of the United States to
extinguish Indian title [that] has never been doubted"). Compensation under the Fifth
Amendment was required only if the claiming tribe's aboriginal right to the soil had been legally
recognized prior to the confiscation. Barsh, supra, at 806 (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 3411 U.S. 272,288-89 (1955)). "The revised Handbook," writes Professor Barsh, "embraces
these principles uncritically." Id. (citing COHEN, 1982 ED., supra, at 491).
But while the United States clings tenaciously to the notion of terra nullius - i.e., that the
"first settler" could claim "empty lands" - this particular species of "legal fiction" has been
soundly criticized by the International Court of Justice. Id. (citing Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J.
6 (advisory opinion, May 22, 1975) (where two member states each claimed lands still occupied
by unorganized tribal peoples, both claims vitiated on the ground that neither state had acquired
the aboriginal rights by acceptable bilateral means)). Thus, notes Professor Barsh, United States
Indian law
contravenes modem international legal norms on at least three points: (1) tribes
have not been permitted to choose their political status by democratic means; (2)
tribes' exercise of self-government can be limited or abolished unilaterally by
Ccngress; and (3) tribal territory can be disposed of unilaterally by Congress, even
to the point of rendering tribes incapable of subsisting without foreign aid.
Id. But if. as the 1982 Handbook implies, tribes:
derive their political character from their original status as states and peoples, then
Congress has no legitimate authority to intervene in their affairs except as
provided expressly by treaty. On the contrary, Congress has an affirmative duty
to afford tribes an opportunity to chart their own destiny. This is not a duty of
trusteeship or protection, but one of noninterference.
Id. Thus, the 1982 Handbook's contention that U.S. Indian policy is somehow in harmony with
modem international law is "puzzling." Id. Plenary power is nothing more than a
"nineteenth-century doctrine injected into a twentieth-century situation, and it flows from a




On the other hand, we do not see many cases brought by reasonable persons
contesting the authority of the United States within its own territory! Nor are
many cases filed by parties arguing that, upon crossing from Montana into
Idaho, they ought to still be governed by the traffic laws of Montana.' Still,
somehow, we cannot seem to get past the idea that the boundaries of Indian
reservations are fundamentally different.7
self-determination. Id. at 806-07 (citation omitted).
5. Indeed, the authority of the United States government in this regard is virtually absolute.
See, e.g., Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) ("The authority
of the United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its
inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity. By reason of that authority, it is
entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right to enter and to bring into the
country whatever he may carry."); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17
(1977); (acknowledging a "plenary" customs power much broader than the state's authority to
search and seize under the Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272-73 (1973) (approving automobile searches at "functional equivalents" of the border based on
the undoubted power of the federal government to exclude aliens from the country, and to
effectuate "routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our
borders"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (travelers may be stopped "in
crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in").
6. And since, at this writing, there is no specified speed limit in Montana, it could prove an
enticing proposition. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 339 n.5 (1981) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("The State does have an interest in the safety of motorists who use its roads. This
interest... extends to all nonresident motorists on its highways."); cf Wagner v. State, 889 P.2d
1189, 1190 (Mont. 1995) ("Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over
federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation
respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal
legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.") (citing
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976)).
7. This, of course, was not always the case. Once upon a time, the boundaries of Indian
country were seen as being much like the boundaries of any modem State. Just as California
cannot independently enter a treaty with Mexico, an Indian tribe could not enter alliances with
foreign nations. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). And just as Montana's
adjudicatory and regulatory powers are concurrent with her borders, so too were an Indian tribe's.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) ("Mhe several Indian nations [are]
as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.").
For an especially well-reasoned and researched commentary on the historical aspects of tribal
courtjurisdiction, see SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW AND THE UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994). In part,
Harring's work suggests a fascinating proposition - that, while Anglo law has carefully kept its
treatment of African-Americans and Native Americans far apart,.case law that predates even the
so-called seminal Cherokee cases, illustrates that much erosion of Indian legal rights was
precipitated by Southern concerns over what effect sovereign Indian nations like the Cherokee
might have on states' rights generally, and on the future of slavery in particular. If that is really
the case, these two seemingly distinctly American tragedies may in fact be much more the result
of one ill-intended policy than is generally believed.
No. 1]
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Just how different they are is the crux of a case in which the United States
Supreme Court is expected to render a decision by the summer of 1997. That
case - Strate v. A-1 Contractors' - is an exhaustion case of the most
egregious kind. In 1991, the plaintiffs in that case sued in tribal court, which
found that it had jurisdiction under the tribal code, as well as under general
principles of tribal sovereignty. The defendants appealed to the Northern Plains
Intertribal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and remanded the case to the tribal
court for trial on the merits."0 But rather than return to tribal court, the
defendants went to federal district court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
prohibiting further action against them in tribal court." And as is far too
common, the ensuing federal court challenge to the tribal courts jurisdiction has
completely muddled the underlying issue: the simple adjudication of a
straightforward tort case. If the parties ever return to the real issue here, it will
have been nearly seven years since this injury occurred.
For all those reasons, the Supreme Court's pending decision in A-i
Contractors may determine nothing less than whether the tribal exhaustion
doctrine adds anything to the notion of tribal self-governance and self
determination, or whether it is simply a procedural exercise. 2 In that sense, A-
1 Contractors is poised precariously at the apex of nearly thirty years of
jurisdictional wrangling. 3 The Supreme Court has finally been moved from its
decade-long silence regarding tribal sovereignty vis-h-vis civil adjudicatory
8. CV-N-AI-92-24, 1992 WL 696330 (D.N.D. Sept. 16, 1992), affd, No. 92-3359, 1994
WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S.
Ct. 1404 (1997). This article was completed and submitted after oral arguments before the
Supreme Court in A- Contractors, but before the Supreme Court rendered judgement. In the
interest of fair play, I have not altered the body of the document in response to the Court's
subsequent action. I do, however, claim the liberty of appending an epilogue to the original
article. See infra notes 461-73 and accompanying text.
9. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) (en bane), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404
(1997) (citing Fredericks v. Continental Western Ins. Co., No. 5-91-A04-150, slip op. at 1.24(d)
(Fort Berthold Tribal Ct. Sept. 4, 1991).
10. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), a~fd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
It. Id.
12. As disappointing as such a holding would prove, it would not be unprecedented. In
1980, after a decade of contentious and emotionally charged litigation below, the Supreme Court
finally held that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994),
was nothing more than just that sort of limited procedural requirement. In Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curianm), the Court held that "[iun
the present litigation there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of
its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more."
Id. at 22F.
13. The conventional view is that the tribal exhaustion doctrine is a jurisprudential
experiment scarcely a decade old - dating from the Supreme Court's edict in National Farmers
Union Inr. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). This article is dedicated, in part,
to illuminating the far older history of that doctrine.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
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power - moved in part by a growing rift between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, 4 and probably as much by the rancor of lower courts forced to deal
with that split as well.s Still, the rather unusual procedural posture in Strate
v. A-i Contractors - the primary plaintiff and all defendants in the underlying
tribal court action are non-Indians'6 - may only result in a decision that
merely adds a bit of definition to the contours of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
But the decision may also prove to be the most significant pronouncement on
tribal court authority by the United States since National Farmers Union.'7 For
14. See infra notes 309-427.
15. See, e.g., infra note 400.
16. The Honorable William Strate, named defendant in the federal action, is an associate
tribal judge of the Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation. Judge Strate is named in this challenge to his court's jurisdiction along with the tribe
itself, as well as with the tribal court plaintiffs: Benedict, Kenneth, Paul, Hans Christian, Jeb, and
Gisela Fredericks. While Gisela Fredericks, the injured party, is not a tribal member, her five
adult children who are named in the complaint are members. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, No.
CV-N-Al-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *1 (D.N.D Sept. 16, 1992), affid, No. (2-3359, 1994 WL
666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
It ought also be noted at the outset, however, just how value-loaded the innocuous-sounding
term "member" can be. Professor Dussias notes that the Court habitually uses the term "member"
rather than "citizen" when discussing Indians. See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-based and
Membership-based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision,
55 U. PIrr. L. REv. 1, 93 (1993). Professor Barsh points out that the term "'Member' generally
refers to one of the individuals composing a society or association, or a kinship or sociological
unit, while 'citizen' generally refers to a member of a state." Id. Thus, using the sociological term
"member" when referring to Indians may proactively impair tribal sovereignty. Id. Moreover,
voluntary associations may govern members, but generally have no authority over nonmembers.
Id.; see also Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 55-56
(1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court often treats tribes as sovereigns when the tribes would
benefit far more from being treated as property owners, and often treats tribes as voluntary
associations when they would benefit instead from being treated as sovereigns). But see United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good
deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations .... '").
17. 471 U.S. 845 (1984). If the number of amici weighing in on a case is any gauge, A-]
Contractors is surely significant. Four amicus briefs have been filed supporting the tortfeasor
respondents and urging the Court to deny tribal court authority over non-Indians absent consent:
(1) the State of Montana (joined by Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming), see
Amicus Brief of the State of Montana et al., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. (1997) (No. 95-
1872), available in 1996 WL 709324 (arguing that since tribal courts are not restrained by the
Federal Constitution, jurisdiction is the "only" restraint on tribal courts, and that the sweeping
territorial view of tribal jurisdiction urged by the petitioners would "radically reshape traditional
notions of state sovereignty");
(2) the Council of State Governments (joined by the National Conference of State
Legislatures, National Governors' Association, National Association of Counties, U.S. Conference
of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, and the National League of Cities,
see Amicus Brief of the Council of State Governments et al., A-I Contractors (No. 95-1872),
available in 1996 WL 709325 (arguing that basing tribal jurisdiction on such a tenuous "but for"
No. 1]
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if the worst happens - if the significant federal judicial "bootstrap""
established in National Farmers Union is finally melded together with the
severe view of implicit divestiture set out in Montana v. United States,"9 the
causation arising from a consensual contactee's travel on a highway would "sweep into tribal
court any cause of action based on the contractor's mere presence");
(3) Lake County, Montana, joined by the Flathead Joint Board of Control of the Mission,
Flathead, and Jocko Valley Irrigation Districts, see Amicus Brief of Lake County, Montana et al.,
A-] Contractors (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 709326 (asserting the interests of irrigators
on the Flathead Indian Reservation, which has a very significant proportion of non-Indian
landowners, and arguing that tribes are not analogous to states because they "have no
constitutional standing as sovereigns, lack any constitutional constraints in governing, and, as a
result of their status within the United States, exercise limited, quasi-sovereign powers over
internal matters subject to the plenary power of Congress");
(4) the American Trucking Associations, Inc., the American Automobile Association, and
Burlington Northern Railroad Company, see Amicus Brief of the American Trucking Association
et al., A-I Contractors (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 711202 (arguing that excessive
damage awards and "serious" due process and equal protection problems may interfere with
interstate commerce via the highways and railroads that cross Indian reservations).
Coincidentally, the Burlington Northern Railroad Co. is presently pursuing appeals in a tribal
court judgement totaling $250 million, awarded to five plaintiffs for injuries arising from a train-
crossing accident in 1993 on the Crow Indian Reservation. See Red Wolf v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., Civil Case No. 94-31 (Crow Tribal Ct. 1996).
Four arnicus briefs have been filed supporting the tribal petitioners:
(1) the United States, see Amicus Brief of the United States, A- Contractors (No. 95-1872),
available in 1996 WL 666742 (arguing for deferral of challenges to the appropriateness of remedy
until tribal procedures are exhausted);
(2) the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Reservation, Ho-Chunk Nation, St. Croix Band of Chippewa Indians and Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe, see Amicus Brief of the Assinibone and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation, et al., A- Contractor (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 658760 (arguing that
the authority of a sovereign to adjudicate civil disputes involving persons who enter their
reservations to reside, do business, or even to visit, and which arise within that sovereign's
territory, is essential);
(3) the Shakopee Midewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe,
Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and Red Lake Band of Chippewa, see Amicus Brief of the Shakopee
Midewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, et al., A-] Contractors (No. 95-1872), available in
1996 WL 658737 (arguing that tribes have a legitimate interest in accidents occurring on
reservations because "[u]nsafe conduct such as negligent driving has the potential to damage
property on the reservation or cause injury or death" - activities which "threatenol and has a
direct eflect on the health and welfare of the tribe");
(4) the Northern Plains Tribal Judges Association, see Amicus Brief of the Northern Plains
Tribal Judges Association, A- Contractors (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 658740 (urging
reversal on the ground that not doing so would eviscerate tribal court authority and "invite
jurisdictional chaos into Indian country and defeat important tribal and federal interests").
18. See Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1135 (1995) ("First and foremost, the
tribal exhaustion rule has become a jurisdictional bootstrap, creating federal question jurisdiction
for many disputes previously found to be outside the purview of the federal courts.").
19. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that the bed of the Little Big Hom River became
the property of the State of Montana upon admittance to the Union and the Crow Tribe had no
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
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result may be a significant chilling of tribal civil adjudicatory activity.
Generally, this article will defer to the many exhaustive studies that chronicle
the exhaustion doctrine in the years following National Farmers Union - but
with one important exception. Because almost all miss one crucial point: the
very source of the exhaustion doctrine is grounded in a prudential mind set that
was probably not all that concerned with preserving tribal sovereignty, tribal
self-government, or tribal self determination.' This article will examine the
fountainhead of the exhaustion doctrine as it is found in the annals of habeas
corpus as well as in judicial review of administrative agency actions. The first
section is devoted to that theory, and to the resulting tensions that continue to
plague the tribal exhaustion doctrine. The second section briefly surveys the
exhaustion doctrine as it was eventually made mandatory upon lower federal
courts by the Supreme Court. The final section discusses present-day
developments of the rule (including a discussion of the pending Supreme Court
decision in Strate v. A-i Contractors), critiques the exhaustion doctrine - ever
mindful, of course, that virtually all tribal adjudicative authority now exists
solely at the sufferance of Congress and a benevolent Supreme Court' - and
ultimately suggests alternatives that might better promote the proclaimed goals
of tribal self-government and self determination.
L Exhaustion Conceived
A. Preliminary Observations on Tribal Sovereignty
A venerable legal maxim teaches that "hard cases make bad law."' Surely,
few cases are as hard as those in which one sovereign presumes to assert its
authority over the citizens of another. Sovereignty has been described as the
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in that watercourse).
20. In fairness, the legal actors involved did often seem to have a well-intended concern for
individual Indians.
21. See, e.g., Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965) (tribal jurisdiction may be altered
by express declaration of Congress); see also Nell Jessup Newton, In the U.S. Supreme Court:
Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Personal Injury Actions Between Non-Indians, WEST'S LEGAL
NEws, Dec. 30, 1996, at 13,812, available in 1996 WL 738536 (suggesting that even though the
respondents in Strate v. A-I Contractors stop short of calling for outright reversal of the
exhaustion doctrine and thus tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians, it would "not be surprising
if some of the conservative members of the Court do not press them on this point").
22. Supreme Court Justice John Harlan's actual quote was: "take care for the general good
of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law." United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49
(1878) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan apparently gleaned the phrase from East India Co.
v. Paul, 13 Eng. Rep. 811, 821 (P.C. 1849). But another jurist notes that this akin to saying that
"[hlard thinking is bad for the brain." Pennsylvania v. Gregory, 406 A.2d 539, 542 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (Hester, J., dissenting). Judge Hester believes that hard cases, when faced up to, can
require a court to rethink the law and perhaps even to state the case more clearly. Id. Insofar as
a lot of "hard" cases have left their imprint on the topic at hand, this article argues that Judge
Hester's proposition has yet to yield much fruit.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
hallmark of any "culturally distinct people within defined territorial limits...
connot[ing] legal competence . . . [and] the power of a people to make
,governmental arrangements to protect and limit personal liberty by social
control."' And a "basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to
enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether
citizens or aliens. '' 4
In essence, then, Strate v. A-1 Contractors merely continues an extraordinary
struggle by Indian tribes for legal self-determination - sovereignty, in other
words -- a struggle that includes mileposts like Williams v. Lee z a 1959
23. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 54-55 (1987).
24. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
25. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated the proposition
eloquently:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the rightrof the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial
thlt respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction
with an Indian took place there .... The cases in this Court have consistently
-guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress
recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so
ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do
it.
Id. at 223 (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1903)). This language seems
all the more remarkable in light of the Court's writings just a few years earlier. In one case, the
Court seemed to dismiss the continued validity of the old treaties, stating that
[elvery American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were
deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded
millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a
sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).
Still, deference to tribal courts did not come without a whole new set of problems. Under the
Williams doctrine, state courts were, from time to time, faced with the "no forum" problem -
of deciding how to proceed in the absence of a tribal forum. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at
1131. Some courts believed that under such circumstance, jurisdiction reverted automatically to
the state court. Id. (citing State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, 552 P.2d 1394, 1398 (Mont.
1976); Wildcatt v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 870, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); County of Vilas v.
Chapman, 361 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Wis. 1985)). Other courts maintained strict adherence to
Williams and abstained from asserting jurisdiction even where no tribal forum seemed available.
Id. at 1131-32 (citing Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P.2d 522, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) ("The
fact that the record here does not disclose whether the tribal court does in fact provide a forum
for the recovery for personal injuries is of no moment."); Schantz v. White Lightning, 231
N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1975); accord COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 4, at 250 & n.62; William
C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 227
(describing the "chaos prevailing in the current division of jurisdiction between state and tribal
courts")).
Finally, some courts simply decline to follow Williams in every circumstance. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Cook, 566 P.2d 846 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (asserting jurisdiction over a dispute
involving tribal land on the reservation where all parties before the court were non-Indians); Little




Supreme Court holding that the non-Indian owner of a trading post located in
Indian country' could take legal action against a Navajo couple who owed him
money - but only in Navajo Tribal Court. And while it is certain that few
mainstream Americans note such legal developments, the implications often lie
closer to home than many might think. For not only does Indian law affect
Indians who live on and off reservations, it also affects non-Indians living on
or near the reservations.27 Modem federal Indian law may even influence non-
Indians who merely engage in consensual relationships with a tribe or its
members through commercial dealings, contracts, or leases.' Likewise, Indian
law may bear upon non-Indians whose conduct is deemed a threat or significant
influence upon a tribe's political integrity, economic security, health or
court judgement against Indian defendant on the reservation); Old Elk, 552 P.2d at 1398 (holding
that an Indian may not commit a crime off the reservation and then retreat to the reservation to
escape culpability); Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d 893, 897 (Mont. 1974) ("The myth of
Indian sovereignty has pervaded judicial attempts by state courts to deal with contemporary
Indian problems [and sluch rationale must yield to the realities of modem life, both on and off
the reservation"); Natewa v. Natewa, 499 P.2d 691, 693 (N.M. 1972) (refusing to find exclusive
jurisdiction in the tribal court to determine child support obligations on ground that an appellant
"cannot interpose his special status as an Indian as a shield to protect him from obligations that
result from his marriage to appellee which had been entered into off the reservation"); accord
Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1974); Paiz v. Hughes, 417 P.2d 51, 52 (N.M.
1966).
Finally, there is mounting evidence that state courts can (erroneously) be seduced by the
federal exhaustion doctrine. See, e.g., Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d
379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (adopting the posture of federal courts facing tribal assertions of
jurisdiction and holding that as a matter of comity and in the interest of supporting the role of
the tribal court as part of a tribe's self-governance of reservation affairs, a non-Indian plaintiff
must exhaust tribal remedies and allow the tribal court to address the question of its own
jurisdiction and of sovereign immunity in the first instance; but apparently anticipating an
opportunity for subsequent appellate review of the tribal court's ruling).
26. This term was apparently coined for use in King George Ill's Royal Proclamation Act
of 1763, which addressed matters of colonial government and settlement. See Wilkinson, supra
note 23, at 89. As a legal term of art, Indian country is presently defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1994) ("[T]he term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including all rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependant Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through same."). Adoption of this criminal code definition to
civil matters was sanctioned in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
27. See Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law Into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course,
46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1243, 1249 (1996) (asserting the need for the inclusion of some Indian law
in the basic first-year Civil Procedures course, and setting out a plan for accomplishing that goal).
Having attended the University of Montana School of Law - and taken first-year Civil
Procedures with Professor Ford - this observer wholeheartedly supports her recommendations.
Indeed, her introductory lectures on Indian law did much to animate this project.
28. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
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welfare 9 Oddly enough, the truly glaring ambiguity regarding the influence
of Indian law upon non-Indians is the one that, to the cursory observer, probably
makes the least sense intuitively: that it is altogether unsettled whether a non-
Indian's mere presence on an Indian reservation gives rise to the tribe's authority
over that person. Nevertheless, because of the evolution of Indian law, and
because of the increasing interaction between Indians and non-Indians, "the
potential impact of Indian law throughout the country is enormous.""
B. A Brief Comment on the State of Federal Indian Law in Our Time
For nearly a century preceding Williams, the prevailing view was that both
the federal government and the states were superior to the tribes.3 Indeed,
29. It.
30. Ford, supra note 27, at 1249-50. Professor Ford also points out that this escalating
interaction is not just a phenomena of the western states. Id. (citing Robert A. Williams,
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 237 (1989)).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886) ("But these Indians are
within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the people within these limits
are under the political control of the government of the United States, or of the States of the
Union. There exists within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two."). In the wake of such
precedent, state law now has an enormous impact in Indian country. Professor Laurence thinks
this may even be the "thorniest" problems of modem-day Indian law, Robert Laurence, A
Memorandum to the Class, in Which the Teacher Is Finally Pinned Down and Forced to Divulge
His Thoughts on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 ARK. L. REv. 1, 21 (1993) [hereinafter
Laurence, Memorandum], essentially the result of assimilationist policies such as allotment which
brought lrge numbers of non-Indians onto the reservations, and most with no purpose there
having anything to do with their Indian neighbors. This was a marked change from the era
predating allotment, when reservations were fairly homogeneous territories with clearly defined
boundaries; and where most non-Indians were present expressly to engage in some form of
intercourse with the Indian inhabitants. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 88. The primary engine
of that chalge was the General Allotment Act of 1887. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat.
388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1994)).
A primary thrust of allotment was the destruction of tribalism itself. President Theodore
Roosevelt thought of allotment as a "mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass...
[acting] directly upon the family and the individual." See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 4 & n.69.
The operation of allotment lay in the transfer of tribal lands into private hands - to both
Indians as well as to non-Indians in the form of "surplus" lands. And it did accomplish that quite
well: under that "civilizing" program, Indian land holdings were reduced from 138 million acres
in 1887 to 52 million acres by the time allotment was ended by the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 8-9.; cf COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 4, at 614. Most
of the allotted land that eventually passed out of trust status ended up in non-Indian hands -
often at a fraction of its value due to "fraud, sharp dealing, mortgage foreclosures, and tax sales."
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 20 & n.71.
The resulting checkerboard land ownership pattern on many reservations is a primary cause
of the "regulatory nightmare" that many modem tribal governments must now deal with. See
Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1135 n.58. And largely due to the presence of large non-Indian
populations on modem reservations, state and local governments now provide much of the civic
infrastructure: schools, police and fire protection, and social services.




Supreme Court decisions of the late nineteenth century made clear that the law
viewed tribal sovereignty as little more than an historical anomaly?2 One
observer goes so far as to suggest that the only force standing between such
views and the reality of "modem" Indian law was "remarkable" legal scholarship
and tenacity of Felix S. Cohen, who worked diligently to preserve the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty so that it could be resuscitated by cases like Williams v. Lee.33
Laurence notes, "[t]he sovereignty of Indian tribes is not only priceless, but especially vulnerable
to state intrusions." Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation
Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589,
619 (1990) [hereinafter Laurence, Enforcement]. Indeed, the subject of this article - of virtually
the entire argument about when and if a tribe retains civil jurisdiction over any non-Indian -
arises from this most fundamental controversy.
32. See, e.g., Montoya v. United States 180 U.S. 261, 350 (1901). In Montoya, the Court
clearly set out its view of the Indian culture, stating:
The North American Indians do not and never have constituted "nations".
Owing to the natural infirmities of the Indian character, their fiery tempers,
impatience of restraint, their mutual jealousies and animosities, their nomadic
habits, and lack of mental training, they have as a rule shown a total want of that
cohesive force necessary to the making up of a nation in the ordinary sense of the
word. As they had no established laws, no recognized method of choosing their
sovereigns by inheritance or election, no officers with defined powers, their
governments in their original state were nothing more than a temporary submission
to an intellectual or physical superior, who in some cases ruled with absolute
authority, and, in others, was recognized only so long as he was able to dominate
the tribe by the qualities which originally enabled him to secure their leadership.
In short, the word "nation" as applied to the uncivilized Indians is as much of a
misnomer as to be little more than a compliment.
Id. at 265. But for an alternative - and more deferential - treatment of "traditional" Indian law,
highly recommended is KARL N. LLEWELLYN & EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLIcr AND CASE LAW IN PRIM1TIVE JURISPRUDENCE (3rd ed. 1973).
33. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 57-58. During the 1940s, when Cohen, a respected
legal scholar in several areas of law, first wrote on the subject, the relative dearth of scholarly
writings on Indian law certainly helped elevate the status of the truly comprehensive Handbook.
Id. at 58. That it was published under the aegis of the Department of the Interior certainly added
credibility as well. Id. Cohen argued that tribal sovereignty is "[p]erhaps the most basic principle
of all Indian law." FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (Univ. of N.M.
photo. reprint 1971) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN, 1942 ED.]. The powers that are lawfully vested
in an Indian tribe are general powers. Id. Those powers were not delegated to the tribes by
Congress. Id. Rather, they are the inherent powers of a "limited sovereignty that has never been
extinguished." Id. And while those sovereign powers have been limited and qualified in certain
respects - preventing treaties with foreign nations, for example - the balance of those powers
providing for the internal sovereignty over a tribe's internal relations remain intact. Id.
Some observers are less generous towards Cohen, however. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 4.
Professor Barsh asserts that Cohen's views on sovereignty were really an uncredited paraphrase
of Lord Mansfield's two-century-old comments on the political status of conquered peoples -
an obsolete imperial British doctrine superimposed on contemporary American problems. Id. at
801 n.6 (citing Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047-48 (K.B. 1774) (criticizing the
conquest doctrine, long considered, along with the status of "infidels," as a legal basis for
common law colonial slavery); see also Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 311 (K.B. 1769)
(Lord Mansfield's discussion of the political status of conquered peoples in Jamaica); Anon.
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But neither were federal and state judiciaries transformed by the Williams
decision into a unified body of support for tribal sovereignty. For while it is
unlikely that a foreign nation would ground a jurisdictional discussion in the
primitive origins of Anglo-American courts - on medieval notions of dispute
resolution that depended primarily upon divine guidance and elicited wagers of
law,' and that encouraged trial by physical combat and ordeal" - the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals undertook the cultural equivalent of just
such an inquiry six years after Williams. In that respect, Colliflower v.
Garland" is a virtual chronicle of one court's struggle to adjust to the new
Memorandum, 2 P. Wins. 75, 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (Ch. 1722) (discussing Barbados, which being
"found" and settled rather than conquered, required some different rationale to explain its legal
relationship to the Crown); Dutton v. Howell, I Eng. Rep. 17 (H.L. 1693).
34. A wager at law was an assurance that a party would "make his law" - that she would
take an oath before God in open court refuting an alleged debt. Moreover, the accused would
produce eleven neighbors ("compurgators") who would avow upon oath that they believed in their
consciences that the affiant was telling the truth. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1579 (7th ed. 1995).
The real value of the practice was probably that it showed that the oath-taker had good standing
in the community. Author's notes of a lecture in Pretrial Advocacy presented by Greg Munro,
Law Professor at the University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Fall 1995)
[hereinafter Munro].
Of cou'se, while a foreign nation might not invoke such memories, that does not deter private
citizens from suggesting the nefarious origins of any given court when it suits their purposes.
For instance, while commenting on the jury's murder verdict in the so-called au pair trial of
Louise Woodward, British legal expert Stephen Jakobi remarked, "Massachusetts, home to the
witch-hunt - we have a lot of problems here." Terry McCarthy, A Stunning Verdict, TIME, Nov.
10, 1997, at 68.
35. This was generally known as the Judicium Del or "judgement of God." Such "trials"
were a halmark of early Saxon and English law. See Munro, supra note 34. Whether an ordeal
was by fire or water, the key to exculpation was divine intervention. Id. If the ordeal was by fire,
the accused was forced to handle a red-hot iron, or to walk barefoot and blindfolded over nine
red-hot plowshares laid lengthwise at unequal distances. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed.
1995). The hot-water ordeal consisted of plunging the accused's arm up to the elbow in boiling
water. Id. Common to the heat-related ordeals was that innocence was established if the "trial"
produced no evidence of injury. Id. The final form - ordeal by cold-water - was reserved
primarily for lower ranking citizens. Id. (citation omitted). The suspect was thrown into a pond
or river of cold water. Id. If she floated without attempting to swim, she was deemed guilty. Id.
If she sank, she was deemed innocent. Id. Either "verdict," no doubt, proved detrimental to the
accused's health and well-being.
Most of these practices were ended in 1215 by decree of the Fourth Lateran Council.
Subsequent "improvements" over the next several centuries included the development of the lay
jury system. However, for several centuries the court could openly coerce a jury under threat of
fine or imprisonment. Munro, supra note 34 (citing Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007
(C.P. 1670) (wherein the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas stated, in ordering the immediate
discharge of a juror who had been jailed by a trial judge for bringing in a verdict of not guilty,
that "(t)he writ of habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again
to his libeity, if he have been against law deprived of it")). Early juries often heard several cases
before being allowed to retire. Id. Jurors were also frequently forbidden food or drink until they
reached a verdict. Id.




legal landscape that Williams helped to create:37 a case that arose in 1963 when
37. Note that Williams is significantly different from Colliflower in that the latter involved
a criminal action. Nevertheless, the ongoing ebb and flow regarding the policy of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians is actually one of the few constants of federal Indian law. Most
treaties reserved tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians found within Indian country. But
in 1882, the Supreme Court upheld state court criminal jurisdiction over the murder of one non-
Indian by another non-Indian in Indian country, even though Congress had never granted such
authority to the States. See McBratney v. United States, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). The Court justified
that holding on the ground that Colorado had entered the Union on an "equal footing with the
original States in all respects whatever." Id. at 624. And while subsequent cases vitiated the
"equal footing" rationale, see, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382-84 (1905), the
Court steadfastly refused to reconsider McBratney. Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 88 & n.4 (citing
New York ex reL Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 501 (1946) ("[N]o emphasis has been placed on
whether state or United States courts should try white offenders for conduct which happened to
take place upon an Indian reservation, but which did not directly affect the Indians.")).
Two years after McBratney, the Court refused to recognize federal jurisdiction in a murder
case against an Indian perpetrator and Indian decedent. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883). The matter was thus the exclusive province of the tribal courts. Id. But while Crow Dog
seemed a major victory for tribal sovereignty, Congress granted exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians and Indians in Indian country to the United States government in 1885. See
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
This jurisdictional "evolution" continued with Congress's enactment of Public Law 280. Act
of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (§ 7 repealed and reenacted as amended 1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360
(1994)). Originally, Public Law 280 permitted certain enumerated states to unilaterally assert civil
and criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes. As amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
tribal consent became a prerequisite to such a jurisdictional assertion by a state. See 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326 (1994). Not surprisingly, Public Law 280 was widely resented by many Indian
peoples. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 49 & n.80.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Court again struck down
the tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even if the infraction occurs on a reservation
and even if an analogous argument of "lack of consent" to jurisdiction by a non-resident citizen
in a state court - or even by a citizen of another nation such as Panama's ex-President Manuel
Noriega - would be patently absurd. The Supreme Court later extended that holding to divest
tribal courts of criminal subject matter jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in what Professor
Clinton calls a "masterpiece at bringing together deeply felt national political rhetoric to justify
a fundamentally paternalistic conception of limited tribal governance." Robert N. Clinton,
Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonialized Federal Indian Law,
46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 151 (1993) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)) [hereinafter Clinton,
Redressing the Legacy].
Congress has since overridden Duro by expressly granting jurisdiction over non-member
Indians to tribal governments. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)-(4) (1994)).
Professor Laurence notes that in effecting that cure, Congress, aware of Justice Kennedy's opinion
that congressional recognition of tribal jurisdiction could ultimately lead to subjecting the tribes
to the "constraints of the Constitution," see Duro, 110 U.S. at 2060-61, "tried hard to make sure
that it was not delegating jurisdiction to the tribes, but was rather acknowledging it - precisely
so that constitutional restrictions would not attach." Laurence, Memorandum, supra note 31, at
12 (emphasis added). The effectiveness of that aspect of Congress's so-called "Duro-fix" has yet
to be fully tested in subsequent litigation. Most important in the context of this article, of course,
is that Duro has no civil corollary. See Ford, supra note 27, at 1249 n.22.
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Madeline Colliflower, a Gros Ventre Indian from northern Montana's Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation, appeared in federal district court to request a writ
of habees corpus.39 That writ was required, Ms. Colliflower argued, because
Sheriff Garland of Blaine County, Montana, acting under order of the Fort
Belknap Court of Indian Offenses, had wrongly arrested and imprisoned her.4"
These acts allegedly violated her constitutional rights to counsel, to trial, and to
be confronted by any witnesses against her.4' The federal district court
38. The Gros Ventre are one of the I I tribes that now consider Montana their permanent
home. WILLIAM L. BRYAN, JR., MONTANA'S INDIANS YESTERDAY AND TODAY 4 (1985). Those
11 tribes reside on seven reservations that make up nine percent of Montana's land area. Id. at
6. Some tribes, like the Gros Ventre, share a reservation with one or more tribes who were once
traditional enemies. Id. at 30-31. Others, such as the Little Shell Band, who were essentially in
the wrong place at the wrong time - that is, when reservations were created - have no
reservation at all. Id. at 98-99.
39. Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 370-71.
40. The Secretary of the Interior authorized Courts of Indian Offenses in 1883 and directed
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to adopt both substantive and procedural regulations to be
applied in the courts. The Courts of Indian Offenses are often called CFR courts because the
Code of Federal Regulations contains their governing rules and procedures. Margery H. Brown
& Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development of Contemporary
Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 217 & n.8 (1991) (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-.98 (1991)).
Although Congress never expressly authorized the CFR courts, some find congressional
authorization in the 1921 Snyder Act ("the employment of... Indian police, Indian judges") and
in the continuing appropriations Congress made for the courts. Id. at 217 (citing Snyder Act, ch.
115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)). CFR court judges were chosen by
the reservation's Indian agent (forerunner of today's BIA Superintendent), and these judges were
generally tribal members. Id. at 217-18. But these courts were notably Anglo-American in
character. Id. at 218. Many Indian people denied their legitimacy. Id. Nevertheless, Courts of
Indian Offenses were influential until the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 218 & n.23 (citing
BROOKINGS INST., INST. FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRA-
TION 772, 769-73 (Lewis Meriam ed. 1928); Robert T. Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal
Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 49, 64 (1970-71) ("Formal tribal courts with written codes, though products of the Indian
subjugation during the nineteenth century, have become part and parcel of Indian self-government
today")).
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (1994) (also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act for its sponsors, Sen. Burton K.
Wheeler of Montana and Rep. Edgar Howard of Nebraska), was intended to revitalize tribal
governments. But see Brown & Desmond, supra, at 218 n.25 (discussing "other," perhaps
unintended, effects of the act). When a tribe adopted a constitution and codes of law, the tribe's
court changed from a Court of Indian Offenses, or CFR court - a federal instrumentality - to
a tribal court, an institution of tribal self-government. Id. at 218-19 (citing United States v. Red
Lake Band of Chippew Indians, 827 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1987)). Most tribes have made that
transition -- only 21 of the approximately 200 total tribal and Alaska Native courts were CFR
courts by 1991. Brown & Desmond, supra, at 219 n.31-32 (citing Hearings on H.R. 972 Before
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. (Apr. I1, 1991) (statement of
Ronald Eden, Director, Office of Tribal Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs).




concluded that it had no jurisdiction and denied the petition.4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit court devoted much of its opinion to its version
of the history of the tribal judicial fora.43 Circuit Court Judge Duniway, writing
for the panel, pointed out that these Indian courts were neither the kind of court
provided for in the Constitution, nor the kind that only Congress has the power
to "ordain and establish."' Instead, they were
a tentative and somewhat crude attempt to break up superstitious
practices, brutalizing dances, plural marriages and kindred evils, and
to provide an Indian tribunal which, under the guidance of the
agent, could take cognizance of crimes, misdemeanors and disputes
among Indians, and by which they could be taught to respect law
and obtain some rudimentary knowledge of legal processes.
Notwithstanding their imperfections and primitive character these
so-called Courts [were] a great benefit to the Indians and of
material assistance to the agents.4
And, according to Judge Duniway, this essential nature of the Fort Belknap
Tribal Court persisted even after enactment of the IRA.-
The judge considered the notion of tribal sovereignty as well. However,
because treaties were broken, lands were taken by force, and because the United
States imposed new, more restrictive treaties on Indians who were confined in
ever smaller reservations - often far from their original homes - Indians had
been reduced to the status of wards, dependant on the United States not just for
their daily food, but for all their "political rights."' Arising from the tribes'
"weakness and helplessness" - largely the result of their dealings with the
federal government - was a federal "duty of protection."' Plenary power over
the "remnants of a race once powerful" was therefore justified by that duty to
protect." And that power must reside in the federal government simply
because "it never has existed anywhere else, the theatre of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States, it has never been denied, and
because [the federal government] alone can enforce its [own] laws on all the
tribes."4 In short, Chief Justice Marshall's notion of the Indian reservation, as
a distinct nation, exempt from the law of the territory in which it was situated,
had "yielded to closer analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent
developments, with diverse concrete situations." Therefore, unless forbidden
42. Id. at 370.
43. Id. at 371-73.
44. Id. at 373 (quoting United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3).
45. Id.




50. Id. at 376 (citing Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962) (striking
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by federal law, Judge Duniway concluded that the reservations were presumed
subject to the jurisdiction of the surrounding state or territory.5'
The tribal court countered that it had exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
offenses because it was, not a court of a state or of the nation, but that of a
separate sovereign to which the federal Constitution did not apply. The Ninth
Circuit court, however, discounted that claim,'concluding that
[I]n spite of the theory that for some purposes an Indian tribe is an
independent sovereignty, we think that, in the light of their history,
it is pure fiction to say that the Indian courts functioning in the Fort
Belknap Indian community are not in part, at least, arms of the
federal government.52
In Judge Duniway's view, what was dispositive was that the tribal court was still
governed by an administrative body.' Therefore, the Fort Belknap Tribal Court
was nothing more than a creation of the federal Executive, imposed upon the
Indian community. The tribal court was still, at least in part, controlled by the
United States government.' Since the tribal court was akin to a federal agency,
a federal court would logically have jurisdiction to probe that court's detention
of Ms. Colliflower.55 That, Judge Duniway openly admitted, might not have
been the situation one hundred years before.' But in light of the mere "vestige
of sovereignty" that the Gros Ventre Tribe retained, the district court was
ordered to reconsider Ms. Colliflower's application.'
down the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to authorize fishing in a manner contrary to
state law by Tlingit Indians)).
51. It. (citations omitted).
52. kle at 378-79.
53. I. at 373 (citing H. REP. No. 2503, 82nd Cong. tbl. I at 48 (1953)).
54. hI. at 379.
55. hI.
56. id.
57. h. The Ninth Circuit's notion that Fort Belknap's tribal court was more an administrative
agency than court of law has not escaped notice by other observers. Professor Skibine of the
University of Utah notes that in Colliflower, the Ninth Court held tribal courts were "indeed like
administrative tribunals." See Alex Tallehief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts'
Jurisdictional Detenninations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between
Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REv. 191, 193 n. 11 (1994). But Professor
Skibine concludes - apparently on the ground that tribal court review is not now governed by
the Administrative Procedures Act - that the Ninth Circuit's novel view must have died shortly
thereafter. It.
Professor Clinton reaches a similar conclusion, but on different grounds. See Robert N.
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841, 857 (1990)
[hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts] (stating that tribal courts are not of the transnational
sovereignty, federalism or administrative models; rather, they should be accorded a new
category -- a "tribal model of intergovernmental relations"). Yet another observer believes that
the courts have effectively created a new branch of the federal judiciary in which tribal courts
have assumed a role of federal court "adjuncts," similar to tax, military or territorial courts. See
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
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C. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
Had the federal courts' seeming reluctance to embrace the deference to tribal
courts mandated by Williams v. Lee existed in a political vacuum, the Supreme
Court's attempt to bolster the tribal judiciary might have been in vain. But at
about the same time as the Ninth Circuit was deciding Coliflower, proponents
of federally-promulgated Indian civil rights were preparing an ambitious
legislative program.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).5 The ICRA
responded to Supreme Court decisions holding that the United States
Constitution and the federal Bill of Rights were inapplicable on Indian
reservations,59 and to allegations of tribal abuse of individual Indians.m
Congress set out an abridged version of the Bill of Rights along with protections
gleaned from the Fourteenth Amendment,6 and provided a writ of habeas
Phillip J. Smith, National Farmers Union and Its Progeny: Does It Create a New Federal Court
System, 14 AM. INDIAN LAW REV. 333, 348-49 (1989).
Finally, Professor Reynolds sets out what is perhaps the most comprehensive critique to date
of the interface between post-National Farmers Union exhaustion cases and the existing body of
administrative review law. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1119 (citing 2 KENNETH CULP DAvIS
& RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.2 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing
challenges to agency jurisdiction in the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
specifically addressing judicial inconsistency evident in that body of law)). Indeed, it appears that
National Farmers Union's infamous twenty-first footnote was drawn from the rules pertaining to
exhaustion of administrative remedies. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 n.21 (1985) (carving out exceptions to the exhaustion requirement
where a jurisdictional assertion is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,
where the action violates express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction).
58. Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 202, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994)). In fact, however, an interest in individual Indian civil rights had been
evident since at least 1961. See, e.g., Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. 53 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961).
59. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not compel the tribe to employ a grand jury in tribal prosecutions because the
"powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the [federal]
Constitution"); see also Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35
(10th Cir. 1959) (stating that Indian tribes "have a status higher than that of the states," and that
the First Amendment has no effect upon an Indian nation).
60. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court of the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation, 244 F. Supp. 474, 478 (D. Mont. 1965) ("A failure to comply with the
requirements of due process in many tribal and Indian courts has been disclosed in recent
congressional investigations and has resulted in corrective legislation now pending in Congress.").
61. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). The statute states:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall:
(i) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
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corpus for "any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe."'
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine
of $5,000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Id. It must be noted however, that the Navajo Nation Council enacted its own Bill of Rights even
before Congress enacted the ICRA. See Navajo Tribal Council Resolution No. CO-63-67 (Oct.
9, 1967) (codified as amended at NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-9 (Equity 1995)). Due
process had, by 1968, been a part of Navajo tribal law for nearly a decade. See Navajo Tribal
Council Resolution No. CJA-18-60 (Jan. 22, 1960) (codified as amended at NAVAJO NATION
CODE tit. 16, §§ 1401-1403 (Equity 1995)). The Navajo Bill of Rights is described as "more
expansive and protective of individual rights than either the ICRA or the Bill of Rights within
the United States Constitution." See Hearings on Section 329, H.R. 3662 Before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs Concerning Civil Jurisdiction Within Indian Country 104th Cong.
(Sept. 24, 1996), available in 1996 WL 10831410 (unpaginated) (testimony of Herb Yazzie,
Attorney General of the Navajo Nation). The Navajo Nation Bill of Rights extends to freedom
of speech, freedom of religious expression, freedom of the press, NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 1,
§ 4 (Equity 1995), the right to assemble peaceably and petition the government for redress, id.,
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, id. § 5, the right to keep and bear
arms, id. § 6, the right to counsel and the right to trial by jury, id. § 7, the right to be free from
double jeopardy and the right to be free from self incrimination, id. § 8, the right to be protected
from cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail and fines, id. § 9, the right to due process
of law and to equal rights and protection under the laws to all persons, irrespective of gender, Id.
§ 3, and the protection of private property rights. Navajo, id. § 8. These rights apply to all
persons, irrespective of race, Indian nation affiliation, gender or religion - even to the extent that
nonmember citizens of the Navajo Nation may even serve on civil juries in Navajo tribal courts.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994). Congress settled on this less intrusive remedy over an earlier
proposal that federal courts would review de novo all convictions obtained in tribal courts. Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69 & n.24 (1978). During hearings held in 1965, even
those who agreed generally with the intent of the review provision believed that de novo review
would impose unmanageable financial burdens on tribal governments, needlessly displace tribal
courts, and deprive those courts of all appellate jurisdiction. Enactment of review by writ of
habeas corpus was urged in the alternative. Id. (citation omitted).




Congress intended the ICRA to "secur[e] for the American Indian the broad
constitutional rights afforded to other Americans," and by that to "protect
individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments."'
Thus, the ICRA set up a tension between two "distinct and competing pur-
poses" - between protecting tribal members against excesses of the tribe, and
promoting the "well-established federal policy of 'furthering Indian
self-government."'" The Act's final language was thought to be tailored to "fit
the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments. '
Other facets of the ICRA seem to manifest varying degrees of Congress's intent
to protect tribal self-government.'
But the ICRA is perhaps most significant to the exhaustion doctrine because
of the dramatic way it opened the federal courthouse doors to a new class of
civil litigant. And for nearly a decade, parties - whether Indian or non-
Indian - who wished to avoid tribal courts and governments, found that
invocation of the ICRA might permit a full hearing on the merits in a federal
district court.
proposals for federal review of alleged violations of the Act arising in a civil context. lad at 67.
Initial proposals required the Attorney General to "receive and investigate" complaints of
deprivations of an Indian's statutory or constitutional rights, and to prosecute such cases
accordingly. IL at 67-68 & n.25 (citing S. 963, 89th Cong. (1965)). This proposal, while it might
have had a screening effect on frivolous or vexatious lawsuits, was nevertheless bitterly opposed
by several tribes, and was subsequently dropped from the final version. Id. Also rejected was the
Interior Department's proposal that would have authorized that Department to adjudicate civil
complaints concerning tribal actions, with review in the district courts from final decisions of the
agency. Id. at 68 & n.26 (citation omitted).
63. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
President Johnson also urged congress to pass the ICRA as part of a legislative and administrative
program intended to further tribal "self-determination," "self-help," and "self-development." Id.
at 62 & n.ll (citing 114 CONG. REc. 5518, 5520 (1968)).
64. Id. at 62.
65. Id. at 62-63 & n.13 (citations omitted). In light of those considerations, the ICRA did
not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor did it require jury trials in civil cases or
appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases. Id at 63-65.
66. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994). Some supporters have hailed this as the most
important part of the Act. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 63 & n.15. When Colliflower was
decided, the formulation of Public Law 280 did authorize certain states to assume civil and
criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, but only upon an explicit assumption of that
jurisdiction by the state. Title III of the ICRA amended Public Law 280 to require prior consent
of a tribe before a state could assert civil or criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323(b) (1994).
Title II of the ICRA provided for "educational classes for the training of judges of courts of
Indian offenses." See id. § 1311(4). Courts of Indian offenses were also created to administer
criminal justice for those tribes lacking their own criminal courts. See generally WILuAM
HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 104-25 (1966).
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D. Tribal Exhaustion Unfurled: Dodge v. Naka 7
The first reported federal case arising under ICRA originated on the Navajo
Indian Reservation. This case also probed the nexus between ICRA's new
statutory scheme, and the Ninth Circuit's discovery in Colliflower regarding the
striking similarities between review of tribal courts and review of mere
administrative bodies. And when the dust finally settled, one federal district
court judge's ideas presaged a significant shift in the federal judiciary's view of
tribal courts.
In this case that arose just a few months following the ICRA's enactment,
Judge Walter Early Craig wrote at length "in an effort to reveal some of the
problems concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts inherent in the...
[Indian Civil Rights] Act," and also about the extent to which that Act required
that his court depart from "long established principles and policies."' The
67. 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
68. Id. at 26. It appears that previously, federal judges had proven fairly reluctant to assert
jurisdiction when a tribal forum existed. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v.
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that, in suit brought to
invalidate tribal election held to amend the tribal constitution and bylaws and to poll the tribal
membership for this collective opinion as to disposition of certain pending tribal claim awards,
the federal court was without jurisdiction, because the IRA only provides the authority and
procedures whereby an Indian tribe may organize and adopt a constitution and bylaws - it does
not creat.- federal jurisdiction; the instant action arose out of plaintiffs' membership in the
Chippewa Tribe of Indians rather than out of the federal constitution or laws); Prairie Band of
the Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that a suit
involving an attempt by some tribal members to restrict distribution of federal award monies to
only those descendants of tribe as it existed at time of the underlying treaty was a private suit
concerning tribal membership in which the federal court would not interfere); Littell v. Nakai, 344
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that, in action by tribe's general counsel against Chairman of
Navajo Tribal Council to enjoin alleged interference with performance of retainer contract, no
federal question or diversity jurisdiction existed where the substance of the controversy centered
upon construction of the retainer contract rather than upon the statutory basis of that contract;
while exclusive tribal jurisdiction may be altered by express congressional action, absent such
alteration, the tribal courts had exclusivejurisdiction); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern
Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that, where daughter of a full-blooded
tribal member instituted federal action alleging wrongful denial of membership and benefits of
membership, the complaint did not present a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); United
States ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 244 F.
Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965) (holding that a non-Indian lessee's allegation that ejectment from the
reservation by the Blackfeet Tribal Court was a taking of property without due process of law and
equal protection of law in violation of Fourteenth Amendment did not create a controversy arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of United States, and that the controversy was an internal
matter of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe and could be determined solely in the Blackfeet Tribal
Court). But see Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation v. Barta, 146 F. Supp. 917
(D.S.D. 1956) (holding that, in action by tribe for collection of tax levied by tribe upon
nonmembers leasing tribal land, in view of fact that Oglala Sioux Tribe functions under
provisions of IRA and federal statute, the district court had jurisdiction as a controversy arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States).
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underlying controversy arose when Theodore Mitchell, executive director of
Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, Inc. (DNA), was excluded from the
reservation by order of the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council."
The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, alleging violations of the United States
Constitution and various acts of Congress.7' The thrust of the plaintiffs'
jurisdictional argument was that Collflower had fundamentally altered the
nature of tribal "quasi-sovereignty"'  - in effect, that Worcester'4 and
69. DNA was, and remains, a part of the legal services corporation that was originally
formed under the Office of Economic Opportunity. Although conservative-led funding cutbacks
continue to plague the legal services program, Congress' recent aim of eliminating the programs
through funding cutoffs seems to have stalled. Instead of the draconian cuts scheduled for this
year and next, Congress has actually increased funding by approximately one and one-half
percent. James E. Cohen, Directing Attorney of California Indian Legal Services, Remarks Before
the NALSA Chapter at the University of San Diego School of Law (Nov. 13, 1996).
70. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 20.
71. Id. Although Mitchell was not a member of the Navajo tribe, the suit was also brought
on behalf of a class of DNA's Navajo clients, DNA itself, and eight Navajo members of DNA's
board of directors. The plaintiffs' allegations included claims arising under:.
(1) 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a)-(b) (West 1968) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. An alternative writ or rule nisi
may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.") (Judge Craig dismissed
this claim for lack of jurisdiction.);
(2) Id. § 1361 (stating that the district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff");
(3) Id. § 1343(1) (stating that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of civil actions
based upon acts done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 1985);
(4) Id, § 1343(4) (stating that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction over "any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights").
The jurisdictional allegation that would prove the most significant to future actions was the
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring original jurisdiction on the district courts for actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States where the matter in
controversy exceeds in value the sum of $10,000). In assessing this claim, Judge Craig drew the
broadest possible conclusion - that "[a] case in law or equity ... may truly be said to arise
under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the
construction of either." Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 21 (quoting Cohens v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)).
The plaintiffs also alleged various constitutional claims. All were dismissed, except as against
defendant BIA Superintendent Holmes, who, Judge Craig concluded, was amenable to suit under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in his capacity as an agent of the United States.
Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 22-23.
72. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
73. The prefix "quasi" might be read here as pejorative. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1245 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that the term "quasi" indicates "mere appearance or want of reality
or having some resemblance to a given thing").
In practice, courts and commentators have applied the term to Indian tribes and nations. See,
e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (stating that upon their incorporation
within the United States, the Indian tribes yielded some sovereign powers; Congress, through the
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Kagama'5 were no longer good law.76 Judge Craig agreed that the Ninth
Circuit had "expressed some doubt" about that proposition, but that it had not
directly challenged notions of tribal sovereignty.' Rather, Judge Craig noted
exercise of plenary power has removed other sovereign powers; and the result is a state of quasi
sovereignty, unique and limited in its character, existing only at the sufferance of Congress, and
subject to complete defeasance); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49.58 (1978) (holding
that although Congress has the power to authorize civil rights actions to redress all constitutional
violations, it elected instead to honor the quasi sovereignty of the Indian nations; because the
culture and structure of the tribes differ greatly from those of state and federal governments, the
tribes are in the best position to evaluate their members' rights in accordance with tribal custom;
thus, while section 1302 of the ICRA establishes guidelines for tribal forums to follow, it does
not authorize suits to enforce those guidelines other than by writ of habeas corpus); United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (recognizing the quasi
sovereignLy of Indian nations in holding that they possessed the sovereign exemption from suits);
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Const. Co., Inc. 986
F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that inherent in quasi sovereignty of the Fond du Lac Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa is the tribe's power to make its own substantive law in internal matters
and to enforce that law in the tribe's own forums); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566
F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that the powers of quasi sovereignty inhere in an Indian tribe
due to its unique position within the federal system); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 361. F.2d 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966) ("Indian nations, as an attribute
of their quasi-sovereignty, are immune from suit, either in the federal or state courts, without
Congressional authorization.") (citations omitted); Shubert Const. Co., Inc. v. Seminole Tribal
Housing Authority, 490 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that Congress, in
formulating the ICRA, chose to honor the quasi sovereignty of the Indian nations); Robert T.
Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian
Bill of Rights, 3 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 49 (1970-71) (stating that prior to the ICRA, the
civil liberties of the Indians in relation to their tribal governments was uncertain in view of the
fact that tribal governments possessed a measure of quasi-sovereignty and were not directly
subject to the Constitutional Bill of Rights).
However, the term has also been applied to territorial possessions as well as the states proper.
See, e.g., People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1937) (stating that Puerto
Rico has the full power of local self-determination, the power of taxation, the power to enact and
enforce laws all with an autonomy similar to that of the states - i.e., many of the attributes of
quasi sovereignty possessed by the states - "[a]nd, so far as local matters are concerned, as we
have already shown in respect of the continental territories, legislative powers were conferred
nearly, if not quite, as extensive as those exercised by the state legislatures"); Ruiz Alicen v.
United States, 180 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir. 1950) (stating that the territory of Puerto Rico
possesses; many of the attributes of quasi sovereignty possessed by the states); see also Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 542 (1985) (stating that states enjoy "quasi
sovereignty"); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) ("When a state enters the market
place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty, pro tanto, and takes on the
character of a trader."); State of Ohio ex rel. Fisher v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 856 F. Supp.
1229, 1234 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that states enjoy a "quasi sovereignty").
74. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
75. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). In Kagama, the Court upheld the federal
prosecution of crimes committed by Indians as set out in the Indian Country Crimes Act, ch. 341,
§ 9, 223 Stat. 385 (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. 1153 (1994)).
76. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 22-23.




the Ninth Circuit had carefully distinguished Ms. Colliflower's case from the
facts in cases like Kagama.? Judge Craig could not accept the plaintiffs'
contention that Colliflower provided new authority for federal court jurisdiction
to review the defendants' conduct in light of the federal Bill of Rights.79 Only
if the implicated tribal institutions functioned as an arm of the federal
government would Colliflower compel such a conclusion.' But if that were the
case, there would not be merely an "inroad on Navajo tribal sovereignty, it
would end it."" Rather, Judge Craig believed that
[I]n the face of those decisions holding that the internal and
social affairs of the Navajo tribe were exclusively within the
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed, subject only
to action on the part of Congress, this Court declines to now
decide that these affairs have always been subject to adjudi-
cation in this Court as controversies arising under the
Constitution of the United States ......
In assessing the defendants' contention that the ICRA only protected the
rights of Indians against excesses of their own tribal governments, Judge Craig
agreed that the legislative history supported a view that non-Indians could
invoke the ICRA's protections.' That, in turn, established pendent federal
jurisdiction.8' Nevertheless, Judge Craig noted that Mitchell's otherwise valid
claim still did not vest the federal court with subject matter jurisdiction: federal
jurisdiction failed because the plaintiffs had never presented their claims to the
Navajo Tribal Court.'
Judge Craig noted - and without citing any precedent to support that
decision - that there was an implied prerequisite to invocation of ICRA claims
in federal court. Under that implied condition precedent, a plaintiff must first
exhaust remedies available within the tribal framework.' Reasoning that
several factors militated in favor of such a requirement, Judge Craig focused on
the 'strong Congressional policy to vest . . . Tribal Government[s] with
responsibility for their own affairs.""' Clearly, the ICRA seemed to place the




82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 24-25.
84. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1994) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person to recover
damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the
protection of civil rights, including the right to vote")).
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primary responsibility for the vindication of rights allegedly violated by a tribal
government upon the tribe's own courts." Moreover, Judge Craig believed that
the federal courts' imposition of that responsibility might well enhance the
development of an "independent" Indian judiciary, and help reconcile the ICRA
with federal policy.89 He was also concerned about intervening in "local"
conflicts.' Finally, an overarching consideration was the judge's recognition
that, while the instant case was "spectacular" in its allegations, it would also
establish a rule that would affect future cases?'
Neve-theless, Judge Craig also felt that several factors argued against an
implication of such a condition precedent in this case. First, not all these
defendants were amenable to suit in the Navajo Tribal Court Second, Judge
Craig believed that Congress was "greatly concerned" with untoward dismissals
of civil actions from the federal district courts where individuals sought redress
under the ICRA. Finally, the need for (federal) judicial economy could not
be ignored: establishing a broad exhaustion requirement in all ICRA cases
would probably result in a multiplicity of federal lawsuits."
88. Id. It should be noted that tribal courts of the Dodge era were not the equal of present-
day tribal courts. While there is probably no definitive and objective study of that subject, a
frequently cited contemporary article did offer a glimpse into the prevailing view - albeit from
the "outside." See Note, Indian Bill of Rights, 82 HARV. L. RaV. 1343, 1344-45, 1371 (1969)
(discussing the less than ideal conditions in the tribal justice system - conditions largely
attributed to a lack of finances and education - including defendants denied legal counsel,
revocations of membership rights, takings of private property for public use, and ejectment of
non-Indians from reservations for posing a perceived threat to a tribe's cultural practices).
89. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 25 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959)).
90. let It is unclear, however, what Judge Craig might have considered a non-local case.
Perhaps, however, he was using the term "local" in the same way that some courts refer to
"internal" tribal affairs. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth.,
816 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (ordering tribal exhaustion where a trespass suit involved
a "purely internal tribal controversy").
91. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 25.
92. 1i. at 25-26.
93. hi. at 26. Indeed, the tension between concerns for individual rights and tribal
sovereignty seems to be the fundamental controversy that exhaustion addressed after Congress
enacted the ICRA. While any legitimate sovereign government seeks to meet the needs of its
citizens by" protecting law and order, the environment, and economic interests", governmental
actions may also cause disputes over the scope of a government's power, "the exercise of that
power and the rights of individuals ...." Tribal Sovereign Immunity Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs (Sept. 24, 1996) (statement of Douglas B.L. Endreson). Endreson
suggests that it falls upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity to protect such a government's right
to decide "in its own courts, or by actions of its legislature, or through other institutions of its
government ...how to address and resolve these disputes." Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 25.
Moreover, that applies to all government, whether federal, tribal, or state. Id.
94. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 25. For instance, Judge Craig noted that in this case, upon
dismissal from federal court: (1) two defendants would be entitled to dismissal insofar as the
complaint relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but they would remain subject to federal action insofar
as the complaint relied upon the treaty with the Navajo tribe; (2) another defendant would remain




Attempting to balance these conflicting considerations, Judge Craig held that
the ICRA claims were ripe for adjudication, despite the plaintiffs' failure to seek
redress in Navajo Tribal Court." For while Judge Craig would have required
that these plaintiffs exhaust available tribal remedies under some other set of
circumstances, the "proper utilization of the resources of the federal courts"
outweighed any policy that favored vesting the Navajo Tribal Government with
responsibility for their own affairs, or of fostering an independent Indian
judiciary, or even of reconciling the ICRA with recognized federal policy.'
But in the end, one can only wonder whether the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Colliflower - a decision that melded together habeas review and something a
lot like an analogue to judicial review of an administrative determination -
might have inspired Judge Craig's ideas regarding exhaustion. It was, after all,
well-settled law that hopeful litigants were required to exhaust administrative
remedies before applying for judicial review.' And when read together with
the exhaustion requirement found in virtually every common-garden variety of
habeas corpus action - not coincidentally, the only remedy expressly set out
in the ICRA - might not Judge Craig have extracted this "implied condition
precedent" from those existing bodies of law? An exhaustion requirement would
plausibly give effect to the legislative intent that seemed to underlay the ICRA.
That such a policy might ultimately lighten the federal docket - at least under
more favorable circumstances - would have been equally appealing. But
whatever the impetus, any remedy that seemed to further a worthy public policy,
and which also supported the economical use of a busy federal judiciary, would
not likely go unnoticed.
E. An Inchoate Exhaustion Doctrine
Still, Judge Craig's invention did not gain immediate acceptance. Nor did
other courts discover such an implied condition within the ICRA: cases decided
in the years immediately after Dodge noted no such exhaustion requirement."
decide in favor of any of the defendants, the plaintiffs would still be entitled to return to federal
court to relitigate the matter. And since the claims against all the defendants involved essentially
the same factual allegations, the district court would either have to postpone the trial on the issues
properly before it, or hear much of the same evidence repeatedly. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 26.
97. See infra notes 275-97 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972)
(reversing a district court's holding that it had no power to hear a dispute in the absence of
express congressional authority conferring jurisdiction, where Rosebud Sioux tribal member
claimed that she should be permitted to run for tribal office because she met all qualifications
except that she was an employee of Public Health Service); Settler v. Yakima Tribal Ct., 419
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970) (stating that federal courts may limit
the exclusive authority of an Indian tribe to regulate Indian fishing if such regulations are so
summary or arbitrary as to "shock the conscience"); Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization
v. George, 348 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying relief, in suit by Indian rights organization
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Nevertheless, when the federal courts did eventually discover the exhaustion
rule, it became a powerful tool - albeit one that might cut for or against
federal jurisdiction."
Ultimately, the courts that picked up on the exhaustion argument did so in
response to increasingly frequent allegations of voting rights violations in tribal
elections or to charges of wrongful denial of tribal membership rights."m And
seeking equitable relief and monetary damages against officials of the Seneca Nation of Indians
for alleged damages arising from negotiations over factory site on the reservation, on the grounds
that it was unlikely that those plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of their claim); Loncassion
v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971) (asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) on
the "fedend question" concerning the rights created under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1994), in civil action where Zuni tribal member instituted negligence action arising
from shooting by a tribal police officer); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971)
(holding that, where the alleged refusal to seat tribal elected members to the tribal council was
not based on provisions of the Winnebago constitution, the action was an enforceable civil action
in the federal court under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)); Spotted Eagle v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969) (asserting pendent jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), in complaint stating a claim under the ICRA, where members brought action
to enjoin use of Blackfeet tribal jail and to require tribal judges to grant the same rights that state
and federal court defendants enjoy).
99. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir. 1973)
(stating that Dodge and its progeny suggest that exhaustion is not an "inflexible requirement", and
that a reviewing court must balance strengthening the tribal courts - and through that,
preservation of the tribe's cultural identity - against the needs of individual litigants).
100. In 1986, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission undertook an extensive review of the tribal
justice system and of the guarantee of civil rights for those subject to it. David Phelps, U.S. Panel
Begins Review of Indian Judiciary, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 12, 1986, at 3A,
available at 1986 WL 4762370. The study was called "long overdue" by the commission staff
and commission chairman Clarence Pendleton, who expressed concern over the lack of activity
in this area by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs. Civil Rights Commission Hears
Testimonyfrom Indian Affairs Official Ross Swimmer, Others (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights),
PR NEwswiRE, Jan. 29, 1988, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS File [hereinafter
Commission Hears Testimony]. Chairman Pendleton noted that 1988 committee hearings held on
the subject of ICRA enforcement were the first such hearings in the twenty year history of the
Act, and were apparently "thrown together.., in 10 days." Id. The chairman bemoaned the fact
that the Senate did not receive testimony from disparate points of view, and especially from
Indians who have alleged tribal violations of their individual rights. Id. In a background memo,
staff set out alleged complaints that tribal courts ignored the rights of the accused, meted out
justice unevenly and were inordinately subject to tribal political pressures. Id. According to the
commission's staff, the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota was "one of the many reservations
where Indians complain that they are denied basic civil rights, including the rights to lawyers, bail
and jury trials." Id. The view from outside the reservation in this regard can be exceedingly
harsh. For example, R. Dennis Ickes, a former Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of the
Interior, slated that while Congress intended to confer specific rights upon individual Indians with
the ICRA, the Supreme Court subverted that goal in 1978 with its Santa Clara Pueblo decision.
See Commission Hears Testimony, supra. Swimmer likened the reservations under the ICRA to
the "Gaza Strip," completely without "enforcement mechanism, according to the Supreme Court."
Id.
Nevertheless, Joseph Myers, a lawyer who directed a 1977 study of tribal courts for the




while some courts had long avoided that class of controversy out of deference
to tribal sovereignty,' the federal courts must have been sensitized by the
civil rights struggles of the 1960s generally and by the federal voting rights
cases in particular." Moreover, the early cases epitomized a fundamental
tension underlying virtually every jurisdictional dispute. For while many federal
judges seemed sensitive to the benefits of deferring to the tribal institutions,"
they also harbored a strong sense of duty to the parties deemed to be properly
before them. 4 Thus, in cases where an evolving policy favoring the evolution
Justice Center, has said that most of the nation's 144 tribal court systems work well - that
"[a]lthough many tribal courts are functioning admirably on limited resources, lack of support and
vacillating policies over the years have created overall needs of staggering proportions." But see
Phelps, supra. Myers reported that problems exist only on a few reservations, including Red Lake
in Minnesota and Rosebud and Cheyenne River in South Dakota. Id. Myers was critical of recent
"sensationalism" in the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and the Washington Post in highlighting
those problems. Id.
101. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967) (action to invalidate tribal election and to poll tribal membership arose out
of plaintiffs' tribal membership rather than upon the federal constitution or laws; no federal
question jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Prairie Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe of
Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966) (action
alleging that attempt by some Indians to restrict distribution of monetary award to certain tribal
descendants was a private suit concerning tribal membership in which the federal district court
had no jurisdiction); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958) (action by daughter of tribal member alleging
wrongful denial of membership raised no claim arising under or requiring interpretation or
construction of constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; the federal district court had no
jurisdiction); Patterson v. Council of Seneca Nation, 157 N.E. 734 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1927).
102. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (a complaint alleging that a state
apportionment statute deprived plaintiffs of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action rather than nonjusticiable political question;
the political question restriction is applicable only to issues arising between the branches of
government, not between the federal and state governments). Some believe, however, that Baker
may have ultimately led to the Court's reevaluation of the political question doctrine in order to
diminish the resulting "friction" between the branches of the federal government. See GEOFFREY
R. STONE Er AL., CONSTrtMIONAL LAW 133 (3d ed. 1996).
103. In Dodge, the court noted that an exhaustion rule would further a "strong Congressional
policy to vest Navajo Tribal Government with responsibility for their own affairs." Dodge v.
Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (quoting Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir.
1965). Such a requirement would place primary responsibility for the vindication of rights
allegedly violated by tribal governmental agencies upon the tribe's own courts. Id. Imposing that
responsibility might also enhance the development of an "independent Indian judiciary." Id.
104. Chief Justice Marshall set out this view early in the nation's history. See Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the Constitution"). This view has been remarkably persistent. See, e.g., Iowa Mut.
Ins. Cos. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 22 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The mere fact that a case
involving the same issue is pending in another court has never been considered a sufficient reason
to excuse a federal court from performing its duty 'to adjudicate a controversy properly before
it") (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)); Colorado
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of an inchoate Indian judiciary conflicted with their traditional duty, federal
judges were reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction - and especially so when the
allegations brought against the tribal governments appeared to have merit.
Federal judges increasingly agreed to wade into the political thicket of cases
brought by an Indian against another Indian - cases that went to the very heart
of self-government, self determination, and tribal sovereignty. For better or
worse, these were the very cases that would firmly establish the tribal
exhaustion doctrine in its original incarnation.
In McCurdy v. Steele," a fairly typical case of the genre, brought plaintiffs
embroiled in an intratribal dispute to federal court. These members sought
"official" recognition as the rightfully-elected governing Business Council of the
Goshute Tribe." Their complaint alleged that the tribe's election board had
refused to certify winners in a tribal election."7 The plaintiffs had already
appealed to various BIA officials, but such an appeal could not be considered
until the election board certified the winning candidates." District Court
Judge Aldon Anderson reasoned that "the Indian Civil Rights Act is properly
considereA in the context of federal concern for Indian self-government and
cultural autonomy: Its guarantees of individual rights should, where possible, be
harmonized with tribal cultural and governmental autonomy."" However, the
judge also believed that those guarantees "might be adapted to the Indians
through the application of general rules of fairness rather than strict rules of
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) ("Abstention from the
exercise of Federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule"); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ("When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it
has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction .... The right of a party plaintiff
to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied") (citations omitted);
Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ("'[Ihe courts of the United States are
bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which
their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of
another jurisdiction.'") (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court has not been altogether adamant about this requirement. See, e.g.,
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1721-22 (1996) ("Though we have thus
located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts sitting in equity,
we have not treated abstention as a 'technical rule of equity procedure' .... Rather, we have
recognized that the authority of a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends
to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief.") (internal citation omitted).
105. 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974). "Whether or
not write-in candidates should be permitted to run at the election of the Business Council would
seem to be a question well within internal tribal matters, political matters, and upon which the
Goshute Tribe should make a decision before intervention by the federal courts." McCurdy, 506
F.2d at 656.
106. McCurdy, 353 F. Supp. at 632.
107. Id.
108. Id.





The defendant tribe responded with, inter alia, Judge Craig's exhaustion
"condition precedent" (although without citing Dodge or any other authority for
that matter)."' Even if the district court had jurisdiction under the ICRA, the
tribe contended, the federal proceeding was inappropriate since the plaintiffs had
not exhausted tribal remedies. Judge Anderson agreed that an exhaustion
requirement seemed consistent with "the apparent congressional intention,
reflected in the [ICRA], to preserve the integrity of tribal governmental
structure."". But since there was no Goshute judge empowered to hear such
a case, and since the matter would likely then come before the defendant
business council itself, Judge Anderson considered the available tribal remedies
wholly inadequate."' Under those circumstances, the judge would not order
exhaustion."4 Instead - and despite his concern for "tribal cultural and
governmental autonomy" - Judge Anderson decided to adjudicate the claims
before him, although "in light of tribal practices and circumstances.." 5 Equity
would be served, the judge assured the parties, because "[e]ssential fairness in
the tribal context, not procedural punctiliousness, [was] the standard against
which the disputed actions must be measured.""' 6
This reappearance of exhaustion was especially significant because, with
McCurdy, the exhaustion idea finally found a firm toehold."' Moreover, the
timing was prodigious. In the 1970s, a veritable deluge of cases alleging tribal
election and membership abuses was on the horizon."' But the courts did not
110. Id. at'633 n.5 (citation omitted).
11l. Id. at 636.
112. Id.
113. Id. Judge Anderson did note, however, that the tribe regularly referred penal matters
to a Shoshone judge. Id.
114. Id. Judge Anderson apparently found no Indian law precedent for that conclusion.
Instead, he looked to the increasingly ubiquitous ground of administrative and habeas review. Id.
(citing Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 670-71 (1972) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies
does not bar federal declaratory and injunctive relief brought by plaintiffs contending that state
welfare regulation governing eligibility for Aid to Dependent Children contravenes the Fourteenth
Amendment and Social Security Act); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639,640 (1968) (exhaustion
of state administrative remedies not required in habeas corpus action brought by state prisoner
under Civil Rights Act)).
115. Id. at 640.
116. Id.
117. Note too that as this district court was deciding McCurdy, the Supreme Court seemed
to validate Judge Anderson's sentiments, but in a very different kind of controversy. In
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (striking down a state income
tax where the income was earned on the reservation by a member residing on the reservation),
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, seemed to discount "platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and ... looked instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits
of state power." Id. at 172. Under that view, tribal sovereignty was now but a "backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id.
118. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. Ed Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98, 101
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restrict the exhaustion rule to only overfly political controversies. As the tribes
continued to recover from the effects of allotment, and then termination, federal
courts invoked the exhaustion doctrine broadly, in a range of disputes that
mirrored the increasing complexity of legal disputes arising in Indian country.
Besides discussing exhaustion in most cases brought by Indians against non-
Indians, the courts also required exhaustion in cases brought by non-Indians
against Indians,"9 in property disputes," personal injury suits,"' contractual
(8th Cir. 1976) (alleged winners of tribal election not required to exhaust tribal remedies; that
requirement is not an "iron-clad" condition precedent); Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404
F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (8th Cir. 1976) (candidate for tribal presidency had already exhausted tribal
remedies since the tribal council had ruled, the council refused to waive tribal immunity to permit
the tribal court to hear the issue, and the appellate court was not functioning). Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th
Cir. 1975) (exhaustion not discussed); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cerl.
denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) (contestants of election for council presidency made every
reasonable attempt to exhaust their tribal remedies); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700,702 (8th
Cir. 1973) (in action alleging that the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe's election procedures violated the
one-man, one-vote principle, the exhaustion requirement was met upon plaintiffs claimed that
there were no tribal remedies available; the district court was justified in designing an elaborate
apportionment plan and vacating six council seats, but it was ultimately the tribe's responsibility
to design an acceptable apportionment plan and election rules); Oliver v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
424 F. Supp 487 (D.S.D. 1977); Pomani v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 418 F. Supp 166 (D.S.D.
1976); Brunette v. Dann, 417 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Idaho 1976) (ineffectiveness and futility cannot
excuse failire to exhaust remedies where a party deliberately bypassed tribal remedies); Williams
v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp. 1194 (D.S.D. 1975) (exhaustion deemed
futile in action to enjoin implementation of tribal election results); White v. Tribal Council, Red
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1974) (exhaustion ordered).
Federal courts seemed capable of extending this logic to incredible lengths. For example, in
Jacobson v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the
plaintiff (a female Indian community member) challenged the constitutionality of provisions of
the tribal constitution and bylaws which, inter alia, excluded women from holding office in the
tribal council. The district court held that she should have sought a constitutional amendment as
part of the obligation to exhaust tribal remedies.
119. See, e.g., Hickey v. Crow Creek Hous. Auth., 379 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (D.S.D. 1974)
(a non-Indian well-driller was barred from asserting an ICRA claim where the underlying dispute
was purely contractual, the defendant housing authority had contractually consented to suit in the
Navajo Tribal Court, and the plaintiff had failed to exhaust available tribal remedies).
120. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975)
(exhaustion of tribal remedies ordered by the district court - then virtually ignored - in suit
by non-Indians to gain access across Indian lands to recently built resort lodge); Johnson v.
Lower Elwha Tribal Community of the Lower Elwha Indian Reservation, Wash. 484 F.2d 200,
202 (9th Cir. 1973) (exhaustion considered but deemed unnecessary in suit by Indian claiming
that he wa.,; denied due process on cancellation of his assignment of reservation land where no
tribal court existed and neither the tribe's constitution nor its by-laws gave express consent for
the tribe or its members to sue and be sued in any court system); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1143-46 (8th Cir. 1973) ("It is apparent from a reading of Dodge
and McCurdy that an exhaustion requirement has generally been recognized"; the district court's
dismissal for want of exhaustion of tribal remedies was legitimate, but if the tribal court did not
reach the merits of the controversy, the federal court could hear and decide the case with finality);
Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D.S.D 1975) (upholding tribal court
[Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
No. 1] COMMENTS 95
disputes,'" wrongful employment termination," and child custody cases."U
jurisdiction over tribe's suit against non-Indian lessee of tribal land); Clark v. The Land and
Forestry Comm. of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 380 F. Supp. 201 (D.S.D. 1974)
(in a dispute over a grazing permit, plaintiff failed to exhaust several tribal remedies; refusing to
become a "general clearing house" for tribal cases, the court set out a test for waiving exhaus-
tion - that judicial waiver of the exhaustion requirement should only be considered in "extreme"
circumstances such as (1) when the requirement would work irrevocable and immediate harm to
the individual, (2) when the individual's claim would be severely diminished; or (3) 'where a
proper tribal forum does not exist). But see Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978)
(the federal courts do not act as appellate tribunals for tribal divorce courts, and they lack any
general power to review and oversee the tribal Courts in their resolution of questions concerning
the authority and power of tribal Courts themselves; exhaustion not discussed).
121. See, e.g., Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619, 623 (D.N.D. 1973) (exhaustion required
in suit brought by one tribe member against another to recover for damages resulting from an
automobile accident that occurred within the boundaries of the reservation). But see Schantz v.
White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (exhaustion of tribal remedies not required where
tribal remedies are apparently non-existent or, at best, inadequate). However, Schantz may be
exceptional because the non-Indian plaintiff was faced with a tribal jurisdictional statute that
required plaintiffs to be "resident or doing business on the Reservation for at least one year prior
to the institution of the proceeding." Id. at 69 (citing Code of Justice of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe, § 1.2[c] (July 1973)). The code also limited the tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction
to actions with less than $300.00 in controversy. Id. at 69 n.2. Schantz thus illustrates what
Professor Pomnersheim terms the "no forum problem." See Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible
of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 347 & n.4 (1989).
That problem exists when a tribal court determines that it does not have jurisdiction, but where
there is no basis for state or federal jurisdiction as well. Id. Professor Pommersheim believes that
such problems are primarily the result of tribal constitutional provisions that are overprotective
of non-Indians - provisions that "reflect the drafting handiwork of the Bureau of Indian Affairs."
Id. at 339.
122. See, e.g., Hickey, 379 F. Supp. at 1003 (barring suit by non-Indian well-driller where
the dispute underlying the ICRA claim was purely contractual).
123. See, e.g., Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (exhaustion is a matter of
comity, not an inflexible requirement and the exhaustion of "futile" remedies is not required, but
the district court erred by reaching merits of the suit without determining whether requirement
of exhaustion of tribal administrative and judicial remedies had been met); Takes Gun v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 448 F. Supp. 1222 (D. Mont. 1978) (exhaustion only applies to ICRA claims
when it appears that a meaningful tribal remedy exists; where the tribe had not adopted a law and
order code but rather was served by a Court of Indian Offenses, the tribal court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction and no affirmative attempt at exhaustion was required).
124. See, e.g., United States e. rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (exhaustion was applicable, but it did not preclude a father lacking
meaningful tribal remedies from petitioning for writ of habeas corpus in an attempt to regain
custody of his children). Note, however, that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25
U.S.C. § 1915 (1994), now gives tribal courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in custody
cases that may result in the termination of the Indian parental rights. See id. §§ 1903, 1911. The
Act also establishes presumptive priority in tribal court in adoption and foster-care proceedings.
Id. §§ 1915(a)-(c).
According to one commentator, the ICWA was largely a response to an untenable situation
during the 1970s wherein the adoption rate for Indian children was as high as eight times the
national average, and where up to ninety percent of Indian children were placed in non-Indian
homes. Directing Attorney of California Indian Legal Services James E. Cohen, Remarks Before
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There was really but one common thread connecting all these kinds of actions:
there were no procedural or substantive limits placed on the federal courts by
either Congress or the Supreme Court.' But that all changed in 1978 when
the Supreme Court finally drew a line. Whether or not that was a line drawn
in the sand, is probably still open to debate.
F. Santa Clara Pueblo: The Eye of the Storm
The 1977 term of the United States Supreme Court was a milestone in
federal 'Indian law. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,'" the majority
opinion worked to undermine tribal sovereignty - suggesting instead that tribal
authority had always been grounded in federal delegation.'" Holding that an
the NALSA Chapter of the University of San Diego School of Law (Nov. 13, 1996). This
situation was virtually decimating some tribes during the 1970s. Id. The Act expressly recognizes
the interest of the child's community, in addition to the interests of her immediate family in
custody decisions. However, the Act also vests jurisdiction with the states out of deference to
those courts' long-standing involvement in family law matters. Id. Unforeseen, however, was the
present-day backlash by states against federal meddling in state matters. Id. Thus, many state
courts now find exceptions to the ICWA where the parties are "urbanized" Indians who did not
reside on a reservation. Id. The California Appellate Courts, for instance, are split on that
question. Id.
Recently, Congress attempted to write just such an exception into an amendment of the ICWA,
but that move was blocked largely by the efforts of Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Id. Senator McCain has been widely recognized as a friend
to tribal sovereignty and Indian programs generally. See, e.g., Jim Myers, Nickles Gives Up Chance
for Post On hIdian Affairs, TULSA TPtm., Dec. 6, 1996, at Al (quoting Dora Young, principal chief
of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma). As Senator McCain prepared to move on from this post,
there were very real fears that he would be succeeded by Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.). However,
as of this writing, it seems likely that Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R.-Colo.), a member of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Montana, will assume the chair. See Campbell Will Head-Indian
Committee, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Dec. 9, 1996, at A-23. This is all a result of Senator
Gorton's decision to bypass Indian Affairs in favor of chairmanship of an aviation subcommittee
where he can influence issues affecting the Seattle-based Boeing Corp. Id. Senator Campbell's
appointment has been well received by a number of Indian leaders. Id.
125. Several guidelines were suggested by the lower federal courts, however. See, e.g.,
O'Neal, 482 F.2d at 1143-46 (setting out a three-part test: that in assessing any exhaustion
question, a court should ask (1) what, if any, tribal remedies existed? (2) should an exhaustion
requirement generally be applied in cases such as this? and (3) if exhaustion is generally required,
is it appropriate to require exhaustion in this case?) (if the tribal court does not reach the merits
of the controversy, the federal court may hear and decide the case with finality); Takes Gun, 448
F. Supp. el 1227 (upon allegation of failure to exhaust, the burden of proving exhaustion falls
upon the plaintiff); Clark v. The Land & Forestry Comm'n of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Council, 380 F. Supp. 201 (D.S.D. 1974) (exhaustion should only be considered in "extreme"
circumstances such as (1) when the requirement would work irrevocable and immediate harm to
the individual, (2) when the individual's claim would be severely diminished; or (3) where a
proper tribal forum does not exist).
126. 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
127. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 6; see also supra note 37 (discussing the potential




Indian tribe lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians for criminal offenses committed
on its reservation, Justice Rehnquist resurrected language from an early-
nineteenth-century concurring opinion that sought to limit tribal sovereignty by
prohibiting tribes from "governing every person within their limits except
themselves."'" Oliphant, suggests one observer, marked the "historic low ebb"
of the tribal sovereignty doctrine."
But just sixteen days later, the Court seemed to reverse course. In United
States v. Wheeler," Justice Stewart's opinion set out an argument favoring a
view of tribal sovereignty as an inherent power that predated the Union, rather
than as Oliphant's purported delegated grant of authority.'31 In holding that
successive prosecutions of an Indian defendant in tribal and federal court were
not barred by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy, Wheeler
became the first Supreme Court opinion grounded in inherent tribal sovereignty
since Talton v. Mayes.3 '
Then, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," the Court turned its attention
towards the ICRA. Holding that the only judicial remedy available under the
ICRA was the writ of habeas corpus," Justice Marshall wrote that the
"[c]reation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights ...
however useful it might be in securing compliance.., plainly would be at odds
with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-government."'' 5 And since
the culture and structure of the tribes differs so greatly from those of the state
and federal governments, the tribes were best able to evaluate their own
members' rights, in light of their own tribal customs."
Santa Clara Pueblo's effect was especially dramatic in disposing of those
cases that persisted in challenging tribal election and governance procedures in
judicial forums. While before Santa Clara Pueblo, allegations of election abuse
would have been cognisable in the federal courts after appropriate tribal
remedies were exhausted, Santa Clara Pueblo ended that practice.'37 As one
128. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (emphasis by the Court) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring)).
129. See Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 61.
130. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
131. Id.
132. 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not compel the
tribe to employ a grand jury in tribal prosecutions because the "powers of local self-government
enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the [federal] Constitution . ); see also
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 61.
133. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
134. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994).
135. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64.
136. Id. at 71.
137. See, e.g., Learned v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribe, 596 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(the federal court does not have jurisdiction over ICRA claims brought by an Indian who was an
unsuccessful candidate for election to tribal committee and who alleged irregularities in the
election process); Sahmaunt v. Horse, 593 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (the district court
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Sac & Fox tribal judge described the post-Santa Clara Pueblo legal landscape:
[Iln the evolution of tribal governments as sovereign governments,
the: tribal judicial forums must be the paramount mechanism for the
enforcement of the substantive provisions of the Indian Civil Rights
Act. As Tribal constitutions and governing documents become
increasingly important, and as tribal forums take on unprecedented
responsibilities, the tribe's own protection of individuals' liberties
and rights that may be violated by the tribe itself must be assigned
a high priority."
After Santa Clara Pueblo, the nascent tribal exhaustion doctrine effectively
disappeared along with the attendant federal cause of action grounded in the
ICRA -- even if attacks on tribal governments continued virtually unabated.'
But in civil cases that did not arise under the ICRA, Judge Craig's implied
condition held no sway."4 And even ,as the notion of tribal exhaustion
lacked juisdiction in action brought under the ICRA where the dispute was an intertribal
dispute involving only Indian parties and where there was no showing that tribal remedies
, were unavailable); McCormick v. Election Committee, 1 Okla. Trib. 8, 12 (Sac & Fox C.I.O.
1980).
138. McCormick, 1 Okla. Trib. at 19-20.
139. A 1977 study of tribal courts for the American Indian Lawyer Training Program
reported that "[although many tribal courts are funetioning admirably on limited resources,
lack of support and vacillating policies over the years have created overall needs of staggering
proportions." Phelps, supra note 100, at 3A, available in 1986 WL 4762370, at *5. Between
1978 and 1988, the civil rights division of the Justice Department received about 45
complaints about tribal justice. Id. For example, in 1981 on the Rosebud Reservation in South
Dakota, a tribal judge was suspended by the council and jailed after granting a petition to
postpone an election based on claims that candidates tried to buy votes with liquor and food.
Id. And as late as 1986, Justice Department attorney James Schermerhorn said that "[w]hile
sufficient anecdotal evidence exists to suspect noncompliance with the ICRA is a problem on
some res-.rvations, we lack a comprehensive .. . understanding of how the ICRA is
implemented by tribal governments." Id.
140. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Cardin v. Do La Cruz, 671 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1983) (federal court had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331; noting that, as in Oliphant, the governing principles were drawn from the
federal common law, the federal district court had jurisdiction over a suit in which a non-Indian
contested the Quinault Indian Tribe's building, health and safety regulations); Swift Transp. Inc.
v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982) (a civil defendant was entitled to declaratory and
injunctive relief against Indian officials who asserted jurisdiction over a tort claim arising from
an automobile accident on a U.S. highway that passed through the Navajo Indian Reservation;
a question of whether the Navajo Indian Tribal Court had jurisdiction over the non-Indian plaintiff
presented a federal question within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); United Nuclear Corp. v.
Clark, 584 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1984); UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 359-
61 (D.N.M. 1981) (the federal court had jurisdiction because of the federal question presented;
"[the power to try and to assess civil penalties is the power to invade other liberties which the
United States has an interest in protecting for its citizens against 'unwarranted intrusions';
whether it was a factor that the Navajo Tribal Court may have evolved into a "sophisticated"




withered, the Supreme Court handed down several more landmark Indian law
decisions. Washington v. Confederated Bands of the Yakima Nation.' upheld
the State of Washington's assertions of partial jurisdiction over a reservation
under the optional formulation of Public Law 280. The following year,
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation' upheld
a state sales tax for on-reservation sales to nonmembers. Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe" seemed to suggest an even broader view of tribal
sovereignty - that "[n]onmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain
subject to the tribe's power ... to place conditions on entry, on continuous
presence, or on reservation conduct . . . a nonmember who enters the
jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later
exercise its sovereign power.M4
It was, however, a landmark 1981 case that may prove to have the most
impact on tribal sovereignty in the modem era. In Montana v. United States,'45
the Supreme Court set out a general rule disfavoring tribal legislative jurisdiction
over nonmembers, and two exceptions that might redeem tribal jurisdiction in
some instances. But while, on its facts, Montana addressed only tribal
regulatory power,'" the case soon spilled over into challenges to tribal
Congress to weigh in "deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try
non-Indians").
141. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
142. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
143. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
144. Id. at 144.
145. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Under Montana, a tribe lacks regulatory jurisdiction over non-
Indians on non-Indian owned fee land unless that authority was delegated to the tribe: (I) by
Congress through statute, (2) by the President with advice and consent of the Senate through a
treaty, or (3) where that power has been retained by the tribe as an element of inherent
sovereignty even after the tribe became a quasi-sovereign. The third circumstance - the source
of the important Montana exceptions - states that to qualify as an element of inherent
sovereignty, civil jurisdiction over the actions of non-Indians on non-Indian fee land depends
upon either (1) the non-Indian having entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements; or (2) the
non-Indian's conduct being a threat or having a direct effect on the political integrity, economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id.
146. After 15 years of contradictory opinions in the lower courts regarding the breadth of
the limits to inherent tribal sovereignty set forth in Montana, we may finally be on the verge of
a binding answer to this crucial question. In A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir.
1996) (en banc), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997), the Supreme Court decided to consider whether
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in applying Montana to determine whether implicit
divestiture can extinguish tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over a civil tort action between two
non-Indians arising on a state highway crossing Indian trust land within an Indian reservation.
See United States Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief at *1, 1996 WL 656356. If Montana is held
to be applicable, the Court will then decide whether the Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation has civil jurisdiction over a personal injury claim
brought by a non-Indian resident of the Reservation with strong ties to the tribe, against a
non-Indian contractor that had a subcontract with the tribe's corporation to perform work on the
No. 1]
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adjudicatory jurisdiction.47 When taken together with the federal courts'
growing reliance on section 1331 federal question jurisdiction as a basis for
hearing reservation-based lawsuits, a reanimated tribal exhaustion doctrine
seemed unavoidable.
II. Exhaustion Revisited
A. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians4'
In hindsight - and especially considering the muddled state of federal and
tribal jurisdiction after Montana - it was probably not that remarkable when
a defendant in a tribal court controversy came to federal district court in 1983,
seeking an injunction to stave off the Crow Tribal Court's enforcement of a
default judgement, in a case that had already become a "procedural
nightmare."'49 The underlying controversy arose a year earlier when a Crow
Indian student at Lodge Grass Elementary School was struck by a motorcyclist
in the school's parking lot.'5" Lodge Grass Elementary was within the exterior
boundaries of the Crow Reservation, but on land owned by the State of
Montana." The child suffered a broken leg. Sage's guardian brought suit
Reservation. The plaintiff in Strafe seeks to recover for damages suffered in an automobile
accident on a state highway on a federal right-of-way crossing Indian trust land on the
Reservation. Id.
147. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp 213
(D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845, 852 n,12 (1985)
(citing Montana in a challenge to tribal court jurisdiction); see also State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp.
1455, 144 (D. Nev. 1996) (resolution of challenges to tribal court jurisdiction "requires an
examination of the nature and applicability of the Supreme Court's holding in Montana.")
The fundamental difference between regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction has proven to be
a vexatious problem, however. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Legislative jurisdiction] refers to the authority of a state to make
its law applicable to persons or activities and is quite a separate matter from jurisdiction to
adjudicate"). But see Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressing
skepticism about the existence of any meaningful difference between adjudicatory and regulatory
jurisdiction).
Professor Reynolds notes that the Court has yet to consider whether exhaustion should apply
where the tribe allegedly lacks legislative jurisdiction rather than adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1110 & n.99. By failing to draw the distinction between the tribal
powers Montana and National Farmers Union were each meant to address, the National Farmers
Court only succeeded in creating yet anotherjurisdictional uncertainty. Id. at 1129-30. This issue
is further muddled because the Court, along with many lower courts, uses the term "regulatory
jurisdiction" when they really seem to mean "legislative jurisdiction." Id. (citing South Dakota
v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 769, 685-86, n.6 (1993); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984)).
148. 560 F. Supp 213 (D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S.
845 (1985).
149. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853.
150. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp at 214.




against the school district in tribal court, requesting $150,000 for pain and
suffering, and $3000 for medical expenses. Process was served by Mr. Dexter
Falls Down on Mr. Wesley Falls Down, the latter being the School Board
Chairman for Lodge Grass School District No. 27." But Wesley Falls Down
apparently did not notify anyone that suit had been brought." Therefore, no
one notified National Farmers Union Insurance Company (the school district's
insurer) and no investigation or defense was raised. Twenty-one days later,
default judgement was entered in tribal court." But when the insurer was
finally notified, it did not seek its remedy in the Crow courts.55 Rather, the
company filed suit in federal court."5
In adjudging the claims before him, District Court Judge James Battin'"
first noted that the plaintiff initially claimed a violation of section 1302 of the
ICRA.rs Based on settled law, wrote Judge Battin, that his court "may" have
been without jurisdiction on those grounds.' But because he believed that the
tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the tort claim between Leroy Sage and
the School district in the first instance, there was no need to pursue that
allegation." Nevertheless, Montana had provided a new basis of the federal
152. Id at 214.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Note that under tribal law, a party could move to set aside a default judgement at any
time within 30 days. Crow Tribal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d).
156. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp. at 214.
157. Judge Battin, who figured prominently in a number of important Indian law cases, died
on September 27, 1996. James Battin served as Montana's representative in Congress, and was,
along with Bob Dole, one of 1961's congressional "freshmen." Judge Battin became President
Nixon's first appointment to the federal bench in 1969. See Loma Thackeray, Former
Congressman Judge Battin Dies After a Long Career: Cancer Ends Judge Battin's Long Fruitful
Career, BILUNGS GAzEurE (Billings, Mont.), Sept. 28, 1996, at IA.
In addition to National Farmers Union, Judge Battin's controversial decision in Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), was also upheld by the Supreme Court. The judge heard a
series of controversial cases concerning coal leases on the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.
The thrust of those cases was that the Interior Department both ignored the social and economic
interests of the tribes, and also realized far below market value for the leases. The net result of
the coal lease cases was the Interior Department's reassessment of its procedures and policies, and
ultimately, Interior Secretary James Wait's resignation. See James Coates, Court Cooling Watt's
Massive "Fire Sale" of Western Coal, SEATrLE TIMES, June 16, 1985, at A-17. Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court upheld Judge Battin in these landmark cases, he often expressed his
concern over the Court's "vacillations" regarding Indian law. See Judge Battin Dies, supra, at
A-2.
158. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp at 215. Section 1302 sets out, inter alia, due
process and equal protection requirements. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1994).
159. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp. at 215 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978); Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474
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common law. 6' Focusing on Justice Stewart's implicit divestiture t
161. Id. at 216-18 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
162. Implicit divestiture invalidates any exercise of tribal power deemed inconsistent with
the tribe's domestic dependent status. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191,208-10 (1978). The Supreme Court has invoked implicit divestiture infrequently - but with
profound effect - when a tribe has sought to assert authority "inconsistent with the overriding
interests of tile National Government."' Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1093 (quoting Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980)). The
doctrine has been used to deny a tribe's power to transfer property, Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823) ("[D]iscovery gave [the United States Government] an exclusive
right to e:tinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest"), to engage
in relations with foreign governments, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)
(describing the "irresistible [federal] power, which excluded [tribes] from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer"), and to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians and non-member Indians. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1093 (citing respectively
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679
(1990)).
In Montana, implicit divestiture prevented the Crow Tribe from regulating hunting and fishing
by non-Indian landowners within the borders of the Crow Reservation. The Court applied that
formulation of implicit divestiture at the decade's end in one of the Court's more convoluted
opinions to deny the Yakima Nation zoning power over property lying within the so-called "open
areas" of its reservation. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 428-30 (1989).
In three consolidated cases, a deeply divided Supreme Court considered whether the Yakima
Indian Nation could exercise zoning authority over fee lands owned by nonmembers located
within the boundaries of the Yakima Reservation. Id. at 414. The parties to the litigation, as well
as the dintrict court and the court of appeals, treated the reservation as if it were effectively
divided into two parts: a "closed" and an "open" area. One petitioner, Philip Brendale, part Indian
but not a member of the Yakima Nation, had sought a development permit from the County of
Yakima to develop fee land located within the "closed" part of the Yakima Reser-vation -
largely pristine forest land off-limits to the general public since 1972. Id. at 415-17. Another
petitioner, Stanley Wilkinson, sought similar permits from the County of Yakima for land located
in the reservation's "open" area - primarily rangeland, agricultural land, and developed
residential and commercial land. Id. at 415-19. The developments were impermissible under the
Yakima Nation's land-use ordinance. Id. at 418. The Yakima Nation filed separate actions in
federal district court seeking declaratory judgements and injunctions upholding its right to impose
its zoning and land use laws on fee land owned by non-Indians within reservation. Id. at 419.
The district court held that the Yakima Nation had exclusive zoning authority over the
Brendale property. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 744, 747 (E.D. Wash.
1985), aO'd in part, rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). That
court concluded, however, that the tribe had no authority over the Wilkinson property. Id. at 758.
Relying on Montana, the district court found no evidence of any consensual relationship between
the Yakima Nation and Wilkinson or Brendale. Id. at 757. But upon detailed findings of fact, the
court concluded that Brendale's proposed development posed a threat to the political integrity, the
economic security and the health and welfare of the Yakima Nation. Id. at 744,
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed as to the Brendale property
but reversed as to the Wilkinson property. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th
Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The court concluded that zoning ordinances by their very
nature attempt "to protect against the damage caused by uncontrolled development, which can
affect all of the residents and land of the reservation." Id. at 534. Zoning ordinances are within




the community. Land-use planning is a "major goal" of zoning regulations. Because fee land is
scattered throughout the reservation in a checkerboard pattern, denying the Yakima Nation the
right to zone that land would destroy its "capacity to engage in comprehensive planning, so
fundamental to a zoning scheme." Id. at 536. The matter was remanded to the district court for
findings of fact on the respective interests of the Yakima Nation and Yakima County in regulating
the Wilkinson property. Id.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, formed
a plurality with Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor with respect to the Wilkinson property,
reversing the judgement of the court of appeals. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432 (1989). Justice White believed that Montana and
Wheeler supported the principle that where a tribe's treaty power to exclude nonmembers of the
tribe from its lands has been abrogated, subsequent civil jurisdiction over nonmembers must be
affirmatively delegated by Congress. Id. at 426-28. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor,
formed a plurality with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan, Justice
Marshall, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy to affirm the judgement of the court of appeals as
to the Brendale property. Id. at 432-33. Justice White dissented as to the Brendale judgement,
while Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, filed a dissent in the
Wilkinson judgement. Id, at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that Justice
White's reading of Montana's "general principle" ignores the settled presumption in favor of tribal
civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on a reservation. Id. at 450-51 (citing Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Civil jurisdiction over ... activities [of non-
Indians] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute")). See also Singer, supra note 16, at 55-56 (arguing that the Supreme
Court often treats tribes as sovereigns when the tribes would benefit far more from being treated
as property owners, and often treats tribes as voluntary associations when they would benefit
instead from being treated as sovereigns).
Professor Cross of the University of Montana School of Law notes that the doctrine of
implicit divestiture is little more than a "pastiche of a few, scattered historical sources" - of
early treaties, a later-revoked United States Attorney General's opinion regarding tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and one mistaken lower court opinion that misinterpreted a
territorial statute. See Raymond Cross, When Brendale Met Chevron: The Role of the Federal
Courts in the Construction of an Indian Environmental Law, I GREATER N. CENT. NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1, 25-26 (1996) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, this "doctrine" allowed Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Oliphant, to convince himself and the majority of the Court
that "the contemporary exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be inconsistent
with their historical status as 'domestic dependent nations."' Id.
As for the doctrine of federal plenary power, the Court has found this concept far easier to
define. It is quite simply that "[Tribal sovereignty] exists only at the sufferance of Congress and
is subject to complete defeasance." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). See alo
Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1094-95 (assuming the validity - or at minimum, the continued
existence, of - the doctrine of plenary federal power); see also Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 671 (1989);
Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 365, 383-84
(1989) (arguing that the most important structural protection of tribal sovereignty is the allocation
of paramount power to the federal government rather than to the states); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing White
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219 [hereinafter Williams, Indian Jurisprudence];
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439
(1988) [hereinafter Williams, Eurocentric Myopia] (asserting that the plenary power doctrine
works to deny Indians true self-determination); Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the
Designated Hitter Rule and 'The Actual State of Things", 30 ARIz. L. REv. 459 (1988)
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argument from Montana, Judge Battin ruled that his court had federal question
jurisdiction to decide whether the tribal court had exceeded the lawful limits of
its jurisdiction." By merely contesting the scope of a tribal court's civil
jurisdiction over a non-Indian, the plaintiff, believed Judge Battin, had
adequately stated a section 1331 federal question." And the proper gauge of
that question was United States v. Montana."6 Under that test, Judge Battin
decided that the tribal court had no jurisdiction" - that tribal interests were
not threatened by eliminating tribal jurisdiction to try this single tort."67 Nor
was civil jurisdiction over a tort committed by a non-Indian necessary to protect
tribal self-government, economic security or the health and welfare of the
tribe." As consolation, however, Judge Battin noted that even though the
Crow courts did not have jurisdiction over this case, young Leroy Sage would
not be left without a forum: the state courts of Montana should be both willing
and able to hear the case.'6
The court of appeals reversed Judge Battin's ruling and vacated the
injunction." Rejecting any notion of Montana's applicability, Judge Fletcher
delivered the panel's divided decision. In the Ninth Circuit's view, while under
Montana, a challenge to the tribe's regulatory jurisdiction does present a federal
question, an assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction should not.' Judge Fletcher
found the notion that a tribe!s adjudicatory authority "must be coextensive with
its regulatory authority" to be "untenable."'" On the contrary, he noted that
"cases are commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to
regulate the subject matter of the disputes."'" In short, the Crow Tribal Court
[hereinafter Laurence, Eurocentric Myopia); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians:
Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 195 (1984) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never held federal legislation in the area of Native American affairs to be beyond the
scope of Congress' plenary power and proposing a theory of protection for tribal sovereignty from
congressional interference based on the Due Process Clause). But see generally Robert Laurence,
Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations: An Essay in
Reaction lo Professor Williams's Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. Rav. 413 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence,
Algebra] (arguing that plenary power with tribal sovereignty is better than no tribal sovereignty
at all).
163. National Farmers Union, 560 F. Supp at 215 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
164. Il
165. Id. at 215-16.
166. lId
167. ld. at 217.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 217-18 (citing Montana Supreme Court cases for the proposition that a district
court of Montana should not be reluctant to take jurisdiction over this tort claim simply because
there is an Indian plaintiff).
170. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th
Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
171. Id. at 1323.





did have subject matter jurisdiction. Recalling Congress's intentions towards the
tribes as expressed in the ICRA, and as interpreted by the Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo, the panel also declined to adopt Judge Battin's notion that this action
was grounded in the federal common law. At bottom, the proper forum for
determining tribal court jurisdiction - at least in the first instance - was the
tribal court itself."lS
Writing separately, Judge Eugene Wright rejected the majority's view that
there was a fundamental difference between regulatory and adjudicatory
jurisdiction, at least for purposes of grounding a cause of action in the federal
common law. 76 But Judge Wright, recognizing the common policy ground he
shared with the majority, raised a procedural issue virtually forgotten since
Santa Clara Pueblo - that the plaintiffs ought to exhaust available tribal
remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts." Here, the Crow Tribal
174. Id. at 1323.
175. Id. at 1324. The Ninth Circuit court did not, however, provide a clear procedural
framework along with its reversal. Instead, it alluded to the possibility that young Sage might
seek to enforce his default judgement in Montana District Court. Of course, National Farmers
Union Insurance Company could always raise the jurisdictional argument again in collateral
action. Id. at 1324 n.6.
176. Id. at 1324-25, (Wright, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result).
177. Id. at 1324-26. On occasion in those years lying between Santa Clara Pueblo and
National Farmers Union, federal courts did on occasion return to the exhaustion rule. See, e.g.,
Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D. Utah 1985) ("[E]xhaustion of tribal
remedies is [not just] a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction, but instead [requires] that tribal
remedies, if existent, are exclusive"); Citizens League for Civil Rights, Inc. v. Baker, 464 F.
Supp. 1389, 1391 (W. D. Wis. 1978) (a complaint by nonmember of Indian Band who owned
property on and around reservation brought action against tribal governing board under the ICRA
failed to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege exhaustion of tribal remedies). But
far more common were cases where courts found reason to avoid any exhaustion requirement.
See, e.g., A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 676 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir.
1982) (where company sued tribe and county sheriff under various Civil Rights Acts alleging
conspiracy to put the company out of business, the court of appeals refused to consider
exhaustion since the district court did not rule on these issues, and they were not briefed on
appeal); White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984) (tribal court had exclusive
jurisdiction in suit brought under the ICRA by non-Indian plaintiffs who, without seeking relief
from Indian tribal council, alleged that the tribe by intimidation compelled plaintiffs to sell their
property within the exterior boundaries of the reservation to the tribe); Local IV-302 Int'l
Woodworkers Union of Am. v. Menominee Tribal Enter.'s, 595 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(noting an exhaustion component to jurisdiction in enjoinment action by union alleging tribal
enterprise's failure to honor terms of a collective bargaining agreement, but not reaching that issue
where the alleged wrongs were actually committed by the tribal court, and where the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over tribal enterprise); Swift Transp. Inc. v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185,
1194 n.7 (D. Ariz. 1982) (ordering permanent injunction against tribal court in suit by motor
vehicle operator and his employer seeking declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction in
civil action arising out of motor vehicle accident that occurred on a U.S. highway on the
reservation, and noting that "(u]nder the circumstances of this case, the Court will decline
defendants' request to abstain from ruling on the issues in the case and to require plaintiffs to
exhaust their tribal remedies."); Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 522 F.
No. 1]
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Court never had an opportunity to rule on the challenge to its jurisdiction. And
provisions for just such a challenge were expressly set out in the Crow Tribal
Code."7 Judge Wright did not, however, suggest that the tribal court be made
the "first and last arbiter of its own jurisdiction.""' Setting out the hypothetical
of a tdbad court asserting jurisdiction in a case brought by a non-Indian against
a non-Indian arising outside a reservation's boundaries, the judge worried that
under the majority's holding, only a lack of seizable property within the
reservation boundaries would limit the tribe's jurisdiction."m
Supp. 521, 530-31 (D. Utah 1981) (noting in suit by lessees to oil and gas mining leases on
Indian tribal land seeking order directing approval of certain communitization agreements that
"[t]he rule prior to Santa Clara . . .requir[ed] that a plaintiff exhaust tribal remedies before
bringing a federal action under the Indian Civil Rights Act," but concluding that post-Santa Clara
Pueblo, federal jurisdiction would exist only if no tribal remedy exists); Wells v. Philbrick, 486
F. Supp. E.07 (D.S.D. 1980) (in a suit by an Indian involving a child custody dispute brought
against tribal council alleging bad faith refusal to appoint judges to the tribal appeals court, the
court held exhaustion inapposite where the only remedy available to vindicate rights under the
ICRA is habeas corpus); Johnson v. Frederick, 467 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.D. 1979) (complaint by
incarcerated Indian alleging that tribal judge and social workers on reservation had violated his
constitutional rights by denying him visits and correspondence with his children; failed to state
cause of action against either tribal judge or social workers where the exclusive federal remedy
under the [CRA is a habeas; all other enforcement actions must be brought in the tribal courts).
See also Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (D. Alaska 1978)
(dismissing action brought by a Tlingit Indian against individuals who had prevented her from
removing culturally significant artifacts from village where village council, which had not
consented to the action, noting similarity of reasoning to cases that required exhaustion of tribal
remedies under the ICRA).
178. National Farmers Union, 736 F.2d at 1324-26.
179. Id. at 1325.
180. !d. at 1325-26. In the real world, of course, Indian tribes are subject to many restraints,
First and foremost, tribal courts must comply with their tribes' own constitutions and codes, See
United Strites Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the Northern Plains Tribal Judges Association in
Support of Petitioners, (1996 WL658740). They must also comply with federal statutes and court
decisions governing the extent of a tribal court's civil jurisdiction. Id. (citing National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (the extent to which a tribal court may
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is a question of federal law)). Tribal courts must also
consider state statutory and case law because, in many cireumstances, tribal decisions require
collateral enforcement in state court to have any effect. Id. (citing S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §
1-1-25 (allowing South Dakota courts to consider enforcing tribal court orders - but only upon
petitioning party's establishment by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the tribal court had
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, (2) thejudgment was not fraudulently obtained, nor
was it obtained without due process, (3) the judgment complies with the laws, ordinances and
regulations of the jurisdiction from which it was obtained; and (4) the judgment does not
contravene the public policy of the state of South Dakota); North Dakota Supreme Court Rule
7.2 (requiting North Dakota courts to award full faith and credit to tribal court orders provided
certain circumstances are met)).
In light of his fears regarding unrestrained tribal courts, the exhaustion rule Judge Wright
contemplated seems to have been far narrower than the rule decreed by the Supreme Court, See
National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857 (restricting exhaustion to challenges to a tribal court's




The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reinstated the injunction. 8 '
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens cobbled together Judge Battin's
conclusions regarding federal question jurisdiction,"' the Ninth Circuit's
formulation regarding just who ought to determine that jurisdiction - at least
in the first instance" - and Judge Wright's suggested exhaustion
requirement.8 The result was a decision that, on balance, seemed to raise
more questions than it answered."su
Under the Supreme Court's variant on exhaustion, a party raising a challenge
to a tribal court's jurisdiction must first do so in the appropriate tribal forum."
tracked the rule set out in the earlier line of cases. See, e.g., Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
404 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D.S.D. 1975) ("Thus, the general exhaustion requirement allows the
tribe to complete, within the tribal system of government, an ongoing process of deciding an issue
initially, and deciding that issue again on rehearing or on appeal, and allows the tribe to reach
a final decision without premature intrusion by outside authority").
181. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857.
182. Id. at 852. According to Justice Stevens, the question of whether an Indian tribe
"retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of
a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law." Id.
183. Id. at 853-55. Rejecting National Farmers's argument that a logical extension of
Oliphant would render "exhaustion as a matter of comity ... manifestly inappropriate," the
Supreme Court adopted Judge Wright's view, holding that "the existence and extent of a tribal
court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which
that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or
judicial decisions." Id. at 855-56.
184. Id. at 856-57.
185. Professor Reynolds poses a number of troubling questions. For instance, when Justice
Stevens discussed the application of the rule in a "case of this kind," did he mean that exhaustion
is appropriate only in personal injury cases arising on a reservation? See Reynolds, supra note
18, at 1122. Or in cases in which a tribal court has issued a default judgement and the losing
party has failed to appeal that holding through the tribal court system? Id. Did the Court mean
to affect only cases in which a tribal court has begun proceedings prior to the filing of the federal
lawsuit? Id. Or any case in which tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction is not "automatically
foreclosed" by Congress, by established judicial rule, or by the federal government's longstanding
practice and understanding? Id. And what was the qualitative standard of review contemplated
under Justice Stevens's "further judicial review" comment? Id. (citing National Farmers Union,
451 U.S. at 856-57). Finally - and arguably, of utmost significance - did the Court mean to
articulate a difference between challenges to tribal adjudicatory and tribal regulatory authority?
Id.
Taken individually, each case [decided after National Farmers Union] presents a
defensible stance about the proper accommodation of tribal and federal court
power. Viewed together, however, the cases produce uneven and inconsistent
applications of what is itself an uncertain principle.
Id. at 1118-19.
186. National Farmers Union, 481 U.S. at 856. The tribal court's first duty is to determine:
(I) whether it is empowered by tribal law to hear this particular kind of case; and (2) whether
its judicial authority is limited by federal law. State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Nev. 1996).
If a party who would challenge tribal jurisdiction jumps the procedural "gun" and institutes
federal action before the tribal court has had an opportunity to render that decision, the federal
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Only then would a federal court hear a challenge to "either the merits or any
question concerning appropriate relief."'" In Justice Stevens's view, that rule
would realize several goals. First and foremost, it would breathe life into
Congress's oft-expressed commitment to tribal self-government and self-
determination. Exhaustion would also help ensure the orderly administration of
justice in the federal courts by first allowing the tribal court to develop a full
record." It also lowered the risk of future "procedural nightmares" by
requiring that a federal court stay its hand until the tribal court could determine
its own jurisdiction and to rectify its own errors. The rule would encourage the
tribal court to explain why it believes the action is cognisable in its own
forum." Finally, exhaustion would ultimately provide other courts with the
benefit of the tribal courts' expertise in the event of further judicial review."'
For all those reasons, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision pending the
defendants' exhaustion of remedies in the Crow tribal courts. 9' In the interim,
the Court noted that "it would be premature for a federal court to consider any
relief."'
'2
Leroy Sage's claim was soon tested under this new version of exhaustion,
and the tribal court responded comprehensively to the doctrine as set out by the
Supreme Court. The Crow trial court carefully analyzed the Crow Treaty of
1868, various statutes and patents relating to the allotment and alienation of
court may either dismiss the challenge outright, or merely hold it in abeyance. National Farmers
Union, 471 U.S. at 857. That question would still be addressed in the first instance by the federal
courts. Id.
187. National Farmers Union, 451 U.S. at 856.
188. Id. at 856-57.
189. Id.
190. See Brown & Desmond, supra note 40, at 249-50 (citing National Farmers Union, 451
U.S. at 856-57). When viewed together with the Court's "develop a full record" discourse, this
seems to drive home the idea that Justice Stevens contemplated further federal judicial review as
a matter of course. Presumably, a reviewing tribal appellate court would not need the expertise
of the court below to explain the tribal law. Justice Stevens also set out several cautionary
guidelines - outright exceptions to the exhaustion rule to be applied where the exercise of tribal
jurisdiction is meant to "harass" or is "conducted in bad faith," where an action is "patently
violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions," or where "exhaustion would be futile because of
the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 856 n.21. To date,
these exceptions have not received much attention. Professor Reynolds suggests this may be
because courts have found other ways to avoid the exhaustion requirement. See Reynolds, supra
note 18, at 1125. Moreover, courts that have relied on the exceptions "frequently misunderstand
their scope." Id.
191. National Farmers Union, 451 U.S. at 857.
192. Id. As noted, the Supreme Court left it to the district court's discretion whether the
federal action should be "dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the development of
further Tribal Court proceedings." Id. But clearly, the Court's language anticipates that
subsequent relief of some kind would probably be appropriate.
193. See Brown & Desmond, supra note 40, at 250 n.203 (citing Sage v. Lodge Grass Sch.




tribal lands, and federal support for the Lodge Grass School." The tribal court
considered the tribe's interests in the student body, the governing board, and
public services provided to the school. Still, nowhere in that analysis did the
tribal court find any suggestion of "alteration, divestment, or diminishment of
tribal sovereignty over civil actions arising from the conduct of the Defendant
committed inside the Crow reservation against a tribal member.""19 Finally, the
tribal court took a special umbrage with Judge Battin's opinion that an injury to
one of the tribe's children was not related to the tribe's "essential interest in [its]
health, welfare and safety."'"
Failing in the trial court, the school district sought relief in the Crow Court
of Appeals, again raising jurisdictional and procedural challenges." That court
affirmed the tribal court's ruling,' and elaborated on the issues of territorial,
subject matter, and personal jurisdiction." The thrust of the appellate court's
ruling was that the school district's property had never been removed from
reservation status." The appellate court also pointed to consensual
transactions between the Crow Tribe and the Lodge Grass School District,'n
and the tribe's interest in its health, welfare and economic security as dispositive
factors under Montana?' Finally, the Crow Court of Appeals distinguished
adjudicatory jurisdiction from regulatory power, holding that the former was not
limited to only those areas in which governmental regulation was
permissible.'
B. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante0
The Supreme Court spoke again on the exhaustion/jurisdictional nexus two
years later, when the question arose whether exhaustion should be required
when federal jurisdiction was grounded in diversity of citizenship.' Edward
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 6.
197. See Sage v. Lodge Grass Sch. Dist. No. 27, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6035 (Crow Ct. App.
1986).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 6037 (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (reservations were not
diminished by allotment; emphasizing strong continued tribal presence after "opening" of
reservation)).
200. Id. at 6038-39.
201. Id. at 6039.
202. Id. at 6040 (quoting Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978)).
203. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
204. Although the Court had not yet addressed the federal diversity-tribal court nexus, the
issue had been extensively litigated below. In R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth.,
719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), the Ninth Circuit court
summarized its position. From a conceptual base grounded in Williams v. Lee, the court noted
that federal diversity adjudication in a matter where a tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction would
be no different than the state court's action in Williams v. Lee. See R.J. Williams Co., 719 F.2d
at 983. And the Ninth Circuit believed that tribal courts were "generally the exclusive forum for
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LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, was employed by a Montana
corporation operating the Wellman Ranch.' The ranch was within the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, and the ranch's owners were also tribal members
residing on the Blackfeet Reservation in northern Montana. Iowa Mutual
Insurance Company was the ranch's insurer. After Mr. LaPlante was injured in
a cattle truck accident on the reservation, agents representing Iowa Mutual were
repeatedly unsuccessful in their attempts to settle the claim.' LaPlante
ultimately filed a complaint in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, seeking damages
against Iowa, Mutual and its agent for bad-faith refusal to settle.10
After two separate pleas for dismissal in tribal court, Iowa Mutual filed suit
in federal district court, seeking declaratory judgement that the tribal court had
no jurisdiction in the matter, as well as injunction barring further tribal court
proceedings.r The complaint alleged section 1332 diversity of citizenship, as
well as section 1331 federal question jurisdiction. The district court
dismissed the suit, and appeal followed. However, National Farmers Union was
decided while appeal was pending, and the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
district court. The district court, in turn, dismissed without prejudice pending
exhaustion of tribal court remedies. 20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed but also
reserved significant power, noting that "[w]e merely permit the tribal court to
initially determine its own jurisdiction. The tribal court's determination can be
the adjudication of disputes affecting the interests of both Indians and non-Indians which arise
on the reservation." Id. Since a federal court sitting in diversity operates as an adjunct to the state
court, both courts are barred from acting by the same policy towards Indian tribes. Id. (citing
Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d at 489, 489 (9th Cir. 1965)). However, the Ninth Circuit also
recognized that a tribal court could decide to not assert its jurisdiction. Id. at 984. Tribal
jurisdiction might also be absent where the tribe's constitution or bylaws simply do not provide
for it. Id. In such cases, it would be untenable to suggest that the federal court sitting in diversity
is divested ofjurisdiction. Id.; accord Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1982) ("It would be inappropriate to permit a federal court to exercise its diversity jurisdiction
over a state-law controversy which Williams v. Lee prohibits the state courts from entertaining").
205. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id. at 12-13.
210. it Iowa Mutual also requested a declaration by the district court that it had no duty
to defend or indemnify the Wellmans or the Wellman Ranch based on the substantive content of
the applicable insurance policies. Id. The district court dismissed that action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction as well, noting that a Montana state court would lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the same suit if it were brought by a domestic insurance company. Id. (relying
on R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983)). Because
federal courts sitting in diversity operate solely as adjuncts to the state court system, there was
no federal jurisdiction in Montana. Id. (citing Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538
(1949)); accord Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, 705 P.2d 1117 (Mont. 1985) (Montana state
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over suit between Indian and non-Indian arising out of
on-reservation conduct). Unless the tribe decided to not exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, the




reviewed later "with the benefit of tribal court expertise in such matters......
On review, the Supreme Court extended National Farmers Union's
exhaustion requirement to cases arising under federal diversity. While the same
policy considerations that animated National Farmers Union required deference
to the tribal court and to the Blackfeet Tribe proper,"' Justice Marshall's
reasoning centered on the fact that tribal courts were nonexistent when Congress
first vested diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. Since the statutory
language and legislative history of the diversity statute did not mention tribal
courts, wrote Justice Marshall, Congress could not have intended that particular
intrusion on tribal sovereignty.2 3 Nevertheless, Iowa Mutual ultimately
affirmed the availability of federal diversity jurisdiction in cases arising in tribal
court."4 But just as National Farmers Union merely held federal action in
abeyance until after a tribe's court system is finished adjudicating a dispute,
Iowa Mutual only defers the defendant's ultimate removal of the controversy to
federal court. It does not preclude i0 5
Still, Justice Stevens, author of the National Farmers Union opinion, thought
the Iowa Mutual majority went too far. Rather, he believed that a federal court
ought to exercise its diversity jurisdiction in every case that meets the statutory
requirements. Justice Marshall's "anomalous" position, wrote Justice Stevens,
required a federal court to step aside when an action was pending in tribal
court - even though it could reach the merits of the very same case if
originally brought in a state court.2 6 That would imply that the "sovereignty
of an Indian tribe is in some respects greater than that of [a state]. 21 7
211. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 13..
212. Id. at 9, 16. Justice Marshall explained that "[e]xhaustion is required as a matter of
comity, not as ajurisdictional prerequisite." Id. at 16 n.8. Likening that requirement to principles
of abstention set out in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
819 (1976), Justice Marshall explained that even where there is concurrent jurisdiction in both
the state and federal courts, federal courts should stay their hand out of deference to state courts
"in certain circumstances."
213. Id. at 17-18 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332). But see Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1103 &
n.73 (1995) (citing Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 347-51 (1989), to support her proposition that Justice
Marshall's historical analysis may cast doubt on the continued vitality of the role diversity
jurisdiction plays as a jurisdictional "gap-filler").
214. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18-19.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. Perhaps the more significant distinction, however, is, as Professor Clinton points
out, that when a state court rules that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy, the
matter can be reviewed on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court if the alleged
jurisdictional defect raises a federal question. See Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 57, at 150-
51 (describing the exhaustion doctrine as a reflection of "the ultimate colonialist distrust of
leaving the final resolution of [causes of action arising on reservations] to tribal governance").
Thereafter, full faith and credit principles operate to prohibit a new action in federal court.
But the applicability of full faith and credit for tribal court judgements itself remains
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unresolved. In WiLson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Mont. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-35145,
1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997), the district court struggled with this most basic
question. Ultimately, Chief Judge Hatfield decided that, earlier Supreme Court language that
seemed to support full faith and credit notwithstanding. Id. at 1193 (citing Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211, 247 (1872); United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103
(1856) (al3lackfeet Tribal Court judgement was enforceable only under the principle of comity)).
But since 1he judge concluded that his court was without jurisdiction to order enforcement under
the full faith and credit statute, the more "'perplexing" question was where he might find
jurisdictional authority for invoking comity principles. Id. at 1190. Ultimately, he settled on the
notion that "an action prosecuted for the purpose of seeking recognition and enforcement of a
judgment entered by an Indian tribal court presents a 'federal question' within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1331." Id. at 1192.
Nevertheless, under either National Farmers Union or Iowa Mutual, the Court's willingness
to displace tribal court judgements allows a federal district judge to nullify the final judgement
of an Indian tribe's highest courts by merely taking issue with the tribal court's view of its own
subject matter jurisdiction. But see Conference of Western Attorneys General, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK (1993). The editors note that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual actually
address discrete concerns - that the exhaustion doctrine set out in National Farmers Union is
"grounded in respect for the right of one court to resolve questions of its jurisdiction without
interference from another court," while the deferral doctrine set out in Iowa Mutual is grounded
more in the "substantive notion that tribal courts, not federal courts, should be the arbiters of
tribal law." Id. at 126. The editors suggest that the failure to grasp this distinction has led to
confusion over these two disparate issues. See also Joseph Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us
Most: A Critique of the American Indian Law Deskbook, 24 N.M. L. REv. 315, 325-27 (1994)
(criticizing the DESKBOOK for advancing the editors' political agenda by focusing inordinately on
the narrow view of sovereignty presented in the legislative authority cases while ignoring the
Court's endorsement of tribal sovereignty as reflected in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual").
These ambiguities are not helped at all by the disagreement regarding adjudicatory versus
regulatory jurisdiction, which is especially apparent when one lays Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18
(suggesting a presumption of tribal jurisdiction in noting that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute") alongside Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (affirming "the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe"
except in certain narrowly prescribed exceptions). However, Professor Reynolds suggests that
these seemingly contradictory holdings are reconcilable. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1135. One
must simply construe National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual as cases that decided tribal court
adjudicatory jurisdiction, while Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432 (1989) (refusing to allow the tribal zoning power over
non-Indians who owned fee land in certain portions of the reservation), are focused upon the
tribe's regulatory jurisdiction over non-members. Id. In Brendale, the tribe argued that National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual supported broad tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Id. at 422-23. Justice White was unconvinced. Id. at 427 n.10. But then, the Court had already
declined to make out that very distinction when it reviewed the Ninth Circuit's National Farmers
Union opinion. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1322 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Instead, the Court "positioned National
Farmers within the broader dispute over the scope of tribal power" by distinguishing it from
Oliphant instead of Montana. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1129-30 (citing National Farmers




Il. Habeas Corpus and Judicial Review of Administrative Actions
While a concept not openly discussed in the reported cases, there is a
common thread here nevertheless. From the Ninth Circuit's view of tribal courts
in Madeline Colliflower's habeas corpus action, to the attempts made by some
federal courts to afford some measure of deference to tribal courts, to rigorous
application of the ICRA during the 1970s by federal judges in cases that ranged
from disputed grazing rights to fundamental rights claims regarding tribal
governance, the results seem to have been informed by a long-recognized
rule - that by drawing from judicial review in habeas and administrative
actions, an exhaustion doctrine evolved that interjected a dubious tension into
the tribal-federal-state jurisdictional mix.
A. Habeas Corpus
The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by an individual in custody upon
the legality of that custody? The traditional function of the writ is to obtain
release from allegedly illegal custody! 9 Although English common law
provided several forms of habeas corpus by the end of the 16th century, the
most important, and the one referred to by the simple term habeas corpus, was
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum:m  the "Great Writ."'" Upon achieving
independence, Americans incorporated the writ of habeas corpus into the
Suspension Clause of their new Constitutiont and it was included in the first
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.m
The form of habeas corpus referred to here is a means of challenging
physical confinement by executive direction m  by court order t  or by a
private party. Traditionally, however, judicial review was quite limited.
The reviewing court confined its inquiry to determining only whether the
committing court had jurisdiction in the matter.'m But the writ has since
evolved into a much broader remedy - available to challenge any allegedly
unlawful confinement, even when imposed by a court of competent
218. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
219. Id.
220. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 n.5 (1963).
221. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it").
223. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81-82.
224. See, e.g.,*Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); Exparte Milligan, 77 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866); Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1856).
225. See, e.g., Fay, 372 U.S. at 391; Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
226. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Rex v. Clarkson, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B.
1721).
227. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973).
228. See, e.g., Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); Exparte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 38 (1822).
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jurisdiction.' 9 Thus, federal habeas corpus review can now be invoked to
challenge an allegedly defective indictment, ' alleged confinement in the
wrong institution," alleged denial of constitutional rights at trial, alleged
unlawful detention by the military,' allegedly unlawful revocation of parole
and subsequent unlawful reincarceration, or even an allegedly invalid guilty
plea. "s Nor is the modem view of habeas corpus - described by Justice
Stewart as a "logical extension of the traditional meaning and purpose of habeas
corpus"" - restricted only to instances of physical restraint. Thus, an
individual released post-conviction on bail or on her own recognizance is now
considered the kind of custody contemplated by the federal habeas corpus
statute. A parolee is considered confined as well.' And once habeas
corpus jurisdiction has attached, it is not defeated by the prisoner's subsequent
release. 3 9
Relief available to a reviewing judge under habeas corpus is similarly broad:
it is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody, but may address
future confinement and obtain future releases as well.' Courts believe this is
in keeping with the intent of the federal habeas corpus statute which does not
deny the federal courts power to fashion appropriate relief other than immediate
release. Therefore, shortening the length of confinement as well as outright
discharge from confinement lies within the "core of habeas corpus."42 In
short, since 1874, the habeas corpus statute has directed the courts to learn the
facts and dispose of the case summarily, "as law and justice require.""24
The "specific" nature of the federal habeas corpus statute is preemptory
229. 11reiser, 411 U.S. at 485 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405-09 & n.17 (1963);
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (challenging custody on
ground that the statute under which prisoner was convicted was unconstitutional); Exparte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874)).
230. See, e.g., Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
231. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
232. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
233. See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
234. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
235. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
236. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973).
237. rd. (citing Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973)).
238. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
239. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
240. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (a prisoner may invoke habeas corpus to attack
the second of two consecutive sentences while still serving the first).
241. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487.
242. Id. at 66-67 (citing Rev. Stat. § 761 (1874), superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 2243; cf. Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S.
335 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968)).




when confronted by a "general" statute such as the Civil Rights Act., Thus,
where it is held applicable, habeas corpus is considered an exclusive remedy.'3
And since 1886, such a determination has led to the requirement that a state
prisoner challenging his conviction must first exhaust all available state
remedies.' This policy is essentially an attempt to "avoid the unnecessary
friction between the federal and state court systems that would result if a lower
federal court upset a state court conviction without first giving the state court
system an opportunity to correct its own constitutional errors."' In the
alternative, giving state courts the first crack at remedying their own mistakes
may simply avoid "the unseemly spectacle of federal district courts trying the
regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordinate jurisdiction."'
Whichever the case, the exhaustion requirement now applies to state
administrative actions at least as much as it does to state judiciaries.' That
view is "rooted in considerations of federal-state comity"' - in "proper
respect for state functions" that has as much relevance to state administrative
agencies as it has for state judicial action '
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
245. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
246. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) ("The injunction to hear the case
summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require' does not deprive the
court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it.
That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of
government, between the judicial tribunals of th6 Union and of the states, and in recognition of
the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict
between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the constitution.").
Interestingly, however, when transferred to the tribal setting, the exhaustion requirement is
not always zealously prosecuted. See, e.g., Necklace v. Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 554 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977). In that case, an Indian woman
confined in a state hospital pursuant to tribal court order petitioned the federal district court for
habeas corpus under the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Id. The petition was dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies. Id. An appeal followed. Id. The tribe argued that the dismissal may be
sustained on the theory that Necklace must also exhaust her tribal remedies. Id. The Eighth
Circuit Court held that exhaustion of state remedies was inapposite where the petitioner was not
in custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court. Id. Nor was comity at issue since North
Dakota's role was limited to providing facilities for her confinement. Id. While, "as a matter of
comity... tribal remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before a claim is asseried in federal court
under the Indian Civil Rights Act; however, the requirement is not an inflexible one. Id. (citing
Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1976); Janis
v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1975); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482
F.2d 1140, 1144-48 (8th Cir. 1973)). While there appeared to be informal procedures available
in the tribal courts, the laws of the Three Affiliated Tribes contained no formal habeas corpus
procedure. ld. Under those circumstances, petitioner was not required to exhaust tribal remedies.
Id.
247. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963)).
248. Honorable John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172-73
(1948).
249. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491.
250. Id.
251. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); cf. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court
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Such purported ideals of deference notwithstanding, the federal writ of
habeas corpus has always been a controversial and emotion-ridden subject.m
And in spite of the beneficial impact on applicants truly deprived of
fundamental constitutional rights, the writ of habeas corpus may be
[tlhe most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation
between the federal courts and the states .... Commentators are
critical of its present scope, federal judges are unhappy at the
burden of thousands of mostly frivolous petitions, [and] state courts
resent having their decisions reexamined by a single federal district
judge .... .'
Even in a time when the scope of the writ was very narrowly confined, there
were protests against "the prostitution of the writ of habeas corpus, under which
the decisions of the State courts are subjected to the superintendence of the
Federal judges."'  Under the modem, more expansive interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, habeas corpus is often viewed as an affront to state
sensibilities when a "single federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner
whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a state."'
B. Judicial Review of Administrative Actions
Like the writ of habeas corpus, the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine is essentially a judicial creation.' The common law still controls
many applications of the doctrine, and in the United States, Justice Holmes set
out the nascent view of this rule at the turn of the twentieth century - that
before the courts can be called upon, the preliminary sifting process
provided by the statutes must be gone through with ... and any
attempt to disregard and override the provisions of the statutes and
the rules of the Department, and to swamp the courts by a resort to
them in the first instance, must fail.
In time, however, Justice Holmes's view gave way to discretionary and, often
of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
252. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURIS. 2D,
at ch. 12, § 4261 (1988).
253. Id.
254. Note, FederalAbuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 25 AM. L. REV. 149, 153 (1898).
255. Charles Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review ofState Court Convictions, 50 GEo.
L.J. 755 (1962). Chief Judge Desmond of the New York Court of Appeals wrote that the attitude
toward habeas corpus of state judges and law officers ranges "from rage and horror to dignified
regret." Id.
256. Major William T. Barto, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions After
Darby v. Cisneros, 1994 SEP. ARMY LAW. 3, 7 & n.65.
257. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 166 (1904) (denying relief to an applicant
barred frcm the United States who sought a writ of habeas corpus because he had not exhausted




uneven applications of the doctrine. s Thus, in McKart v. United States,'
the Supreme Court again affirmed the importance of the exhaustion doctrine in
the administrative setting. However, Justice Marshall's majority opinion went
beyond simple adherence. Instead, he announced an exhaustion balancing test:
that in determining whether or not to require exhaustion, the governmental
interests supporting the exhaustion requirement must be weighed against the
burden on the individual.' One observer notes that McKart "captures the
fundamental inconsistency in the judicial application of the exhaustion doctrine;
the opinion begins by reaffirming the vitality of the doctrine but subsequently
finds a basis for not applying it in the instant case."'" Over time, the situation
has become such that in determining when administrative exhaustion will be
required, "[n]o simple principle governs, unless it is that judicial discretion
governs."'
C. A Most Insidious Transference"
The various doctrines requiring exhaustion - whether administrative, habeas-
grounded, or tribal - do offer obvious advantages to any overloaded court. The
exhaustion doctrine undeniably promotes judicial economy (at least for the court
in the procedural posture to impose the obligation). Under any exhaustion
regime, some number of controversies will be resolved without any extrinsic
judicial intervention at all.' Exhaustion also reduces the likelihood of
piecemeal and interlocutory appeals.a It facilitates judicial review by
enhancing the prospect that the record produced by the administrative process
will be useful and complete.6 Exhaustion might enhance an agency's
effectiveness by encouraging adherence to that agency's own appeal
258. A number of exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies has produced a "large body of inconsistent and confusing case law." See Reynolds,
supra note 18, at 1128 & n.193 (citing KENNETH CU.LP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 15.5-15.7 (3d ed. 1994)). Those exceptions include the
constitutional right exception, waiver exception, and other "unacknowledged" exceptions. Id.
259. 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
260. Id. at 197.
261. Barto, supra note 256, at 5.
262. Id. (quoting Kenneth C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 26.1 at 434
(1989)).
263. Any Freudian reference is unintended.
264. See, e.g., McKart, 395 U.S. at 195 ("Certain practical notions of judicial efficiency
come into play as well. A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the
administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may
never have to intervene."); see also Barto, supra note 256, at 4.
265. Barto, supra note 256, at 4.
266. Compare McKart, 395 U.S. at 194-95 ("Particularly, judicial review may be hindered
by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record") with National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v, Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) ("The orderly administration
of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the
Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed").
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procedures.a Finally, exhaustion allows a reviewing judge to mollify concerns
that her court is about to run roughshod over "separation of powers" and agency
autonomy considerations.' The justifying logic may lie in allowing "an
administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence,"2
and in affording the reviewed body the chance to discover and correct its own
errors z
Still, there are real dangers inherent in unacknowledged transference of these
principles to the adjudicatory environment. Unlike administrative agencies (and
federal courts for that matter), state and tribal courts usually enjoy general
subject matter jurisdiction. The competence of such courts does not lie in some
specialized expertise with which they might focus the issues, or to serve as a
fact-finding agency for the convenience of federal district courts. In other
words, there is a clear rationale to awaiting the outcome of an administrative
decision that does transfer well to the adjudicative functionings of a quasi-
sovereign. For example, if a federal court requires a state court's expertise on
a point of state law, it does not urge that court to decide the matter - intending
all the while to retry the controversy with the knowledge gained through the
state court's futile exercise. Instead, the federal court may simply call a
jurisprudential "time out" and then ask that state's courts what they would do
under the same circumstances.!"
267. But compare McKart, 395 U.S. at 195 ("[F]requent and deliberate flouting of
administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to
ignore its procedures") with Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) ("A federal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over matters relating to reservation affairs can also impair the
authority of tribal courts").
268. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) ("[T]he reason why only
habeas corpus can be used to challenge a state prisoner's underlying conviction is the strong
policy requiring exhaustion of state remedies in that situation -to avoid the unnecessary friction
between the federal and other court systems that would result if a lower federal court upset a state
court conviction without first giving the state court system an opportunity to correct its own
constitutional errors').
269. Compare Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,37 (1972) with National Farmers Union, 471
U.S. at 857 ("Exhaustion of tribal court remedies ... will encourage tribal courts to explain to
the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the
benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review").
270. Compare McKart, 395 U.S. at 195 ("[Nlotions of administrative autonomy require that
the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors.") with National Farmers
Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57 ("The risks of the kind of 'procedural nightmare' that has allegedly
developed in this case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal
Court has had a full opportunity to... rectify any errors it may have made").
271. See, e.g., Mont. R. App. P. 44(a) Certification of questions of law (allowing the
Montana Supreme Court to answer a certified question pertaining to Montana law to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opinion in an action pending in a United States court and
where adjudication by the supreme court of Montana will materially advance ultimate termination
of the federal litigation); Mich. Ct. R. 7.305(B)(1) ("When a federal court or state appellate court
considers a question that Michigan law may resolve and that is not controlled by Michigan




Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has beat a steady retreat from strict
application of administrative exhaustion rules. And in Darby v. Cisnerostm the
Court "virtually eliminated the requirement of administrative exhaustion for
those... seeking judicial review of agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 2" And so we are faced with something of an anomaly: that
while the federal courts seem to have extracted an entire body of procedural law
from the rules governing judicial review of administrative decisions and habeas
review, and then applied those rules in the tribal adjudicative setting, they have
simultaneously relaxed those requirements markedly in the parent settings.
Still, some observers argue in favor of adapting something like administrative
review rules to the tribal court setting."4 Indeed, in this post-Chevron275 era
of expansive deference to administrative agency decisions, the notion is
undeniably seductive. But in what would amount to a tail-wagging-the-dog
arrangement, to adopt the whole of the administrative review regime simply
because the exhaustion rule was spawned there seems unconstructive at best,
destructive at worst. And there is yet another black fly in the chardonnay 76
- such a shift might just unravel what little is left of tribal sovereignty!'
the question to the Michigan Supreme Court"); N.D. R. App. P. 47(a) (allowing the North Dakota
Supreme Court to answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United
States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district court, or the highest
appellate court or the intermediate court of any other state).
272. 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
273. Barto, supra note 256, at 3.
274. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 57, at 194-95 (upon finding a "striking similarity" between
the reasons behind the exhaustion rule in both administrative and tribal venues, arguing that the
"exhaustion requirements in federal Indian law should generally conform to the principles set out
in administrative law," grounded in the tribal courts' "expertise in determining whether control
of a certain activity is essential to tribal self-government"); see also Wilkinson, supra note 23,
at 114-15 (suggesting liberal federal post-exhaustion review on an "arbitrary and capricious
standard" modeled on the Administrative Procedure Act).
275. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (asserting that policy choices are best left to the political branches of the government
rather than the courts - that "[iln contrast [to judicial interpretation], an agency to which
Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments").
276. See ALANis MORISSE re, Ironic, on JAGGED LnitLE PILL (Maverick/Reprise Records
1995).
277. Consider the discussion of the "Duro-fix" at supra note 37. In dicta, Justice Kennedy
noted that Congressional recognition of tribal jurisdiction could only come by delegation from
Congress - "subject to the constraints of the Constitution." See Laurence, Memorandum, supra
note 31, at 12 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 110 U.S. at 2060-61). Congress' care in addressing that
prospect when it overturned Duro notwithstanding, Professor Laurence hypothesizes that a litigant
challenging tribal jurisdiction before an unsympathetic Supreme Court on federal grounds, and
in objection to the theocratic nature of that tribal government, could "certainly destroy these tribal
theocracies that are very much older than the Constitution itself." Id. Then consider the
implications of an open embrace of the double-edged sword of Chevron - of agency deference
grounded so thoroughly in notions of authority delegated by Congress. In would be small
consolation to have won a lot of small battles only to discover that the war - the quest for
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In short, while the National Farmers Union Court failed to note the
exhaustion doctrine's full history, it did recognize the policy rationales that
always animated that history. Exhaustion was, after all, always aimed at
ordering the administration of justice in the federal courts.' 5 Thus, while
virtually every federal court confronted with a challenge to tribal jurisdiction
expressed some sentiment regarding support for the sovereignty, self-
determination and self government of the tribes, a close reading of the pre-Santa
Clara Pueblo cases makes clear that the overriding concern was, often as not,
the economical use of the federal courts - even at the expense of tribal
sovereignty. r' It is also now clear that there was always an unacknowledged
nexus between the tribal exhaustion doctrine, and habeas and administrative
review -- a procedural posture that never places the reviewer and the reviewed
on an equal footing. So in the end, Justice Marshall seemed to have the best
perspective - that in light of the inherent difficulty of balancing the policy
benefits and drawbacks of any exhaustion scheme, Congress is simply better
qualified than the courts to deal with these problems.'
IV. Exhaustion's Progeny
One United States Attorney claims that of ninety-eight "final" tribal court
judgements challenged in federal court, all ninety-eight challenges have
failed ' And hearing that statistic, one could reasonably ask, "So what's the
problem?"
The short answer is, of course, that this statistic evidences ninety-eight
sovereignty - is already lost.
278. Compare McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969) (a defendant's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies after failing to report for induction into the armed forces did not
bar a chellenge to validity of his classification as a defense to his criminal prosecution;
nevertheless, the Court noted that "practical notions of judicial efficiency come into play ....
A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process.
If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene.")
with Clark v. The Land and Forestry Committee of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 380
F. Supp. 201 (D.S.D. 1974) (because it anticipated a great surge in the number of civil actions
arising on the reservations, the court refused to become a general clearing house for tribal cases).
See alro Brown & Desmond, supra note 13, at 249-50 (citing National Farmers Union, 451
U.S. at 856-57). The Court's "develop a full record" discourse seems to drive home the idea that
Justice Stevens contemplated further federal judicial review as a matter of course. Certainly a
reviewing tribal appellate court would not need the expertise of the court below to explain the
tribal law.
279. See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968), where the court made its
concern for the federal docket abundantly clear.
280. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term: !!. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: 2. The
Exhaustion Doctrine in Section 1983 Actions, 96 HARv. L. REv. 207, 210 (1982) (citing Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982)).
281. See Ford, supra note 27, at 1278 (citing Mr. Herbert Becker, Esq., Assistant U.S.




inchoate or fully-realized affronts to tribal sovereignty. It also stands for ninety-
eight disappointed appellants, ninety-eight actions where seemingly vindicated
plaintiffs had to defend a judgement in yet another forum, ninety-eight federal
actions in an already overburdened system, and ninety-eight actions requiring
that tribal governments expend scarce legal resources to defend their own
jurisdictional powers.'
The record, however, is probably not even as harmonious as the
government's attorney suggests - even if many courts have tried to follow the
tribal exhaustion doctrine' The reason may simply be that "inconsistent
interpretations of the tribal exhaustion doctrine stem not only from the courts'
differing attitudes about the competency of tribal courts ... and the proper
delineation of tribal court jurisdiction, but from uncertainties created by the
Supreme Court's opinions themselves."' Accordingly, a federal court seeking
guidance will find conflicting and crosscutting rulings based on myriad
substantive and procedural rules, as well as in exceptions to those rules. Thus,
courts generally hold that exhaustion of tribal remedies is inapposite when the
dispute does not involve internal tribal affairs' or where a party raises a
282. One of the few consistencies in exhaustion cases is that tribes, tribal courts or tribal
court officials are usually named as co-defendants in federal challenges to tribal court jurisdiction.
See, e.g., National Farmers Union, Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
(naming the Crow Tribe as defendant); A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 939 (8th Cir.
1996) (en banc), affid, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (naming Tribal Court Judge William Strate, as well
as the tribe itself); State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455 (1996) (naming the Tribal Court of the
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes, as well as Tribal Judge Joseph Van Walraven).
Another common feature is that after National Farmers Union, jurisdiction is no longer a
side-show - it is often the main event. Under the Supreme Court's exhaustion rule, federal
actions are filed precisely for the purpose of challenging a tribe's adjudicative authority. And in
yet another affront to tribal sovereignty, in order to defend its jurisdiction before the federal court,
a tribe must first waive its sovereign immunity. See, e.g., A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 933; Hicks,
944 F. Supp. at 1459. But see Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to reach the issue of tribal sovereignty on the ground that the tribal court was not an
indispensable party to the proceedings).
283. Professor Reynolds observes that uncertainties concerning the scope and application of
the Supreme Court's exhaustion doctrine notwithstanding, there are "illuminating beacons" within
the lower court decisions. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1107-08. The reported cases
unanimously hold that the tribal exhaustion rule adheres where a tribal ordinance authorizes a
tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction in actions arising on the reservation and filed by either an
Indian or non-Indian plaintiff against a tribal entity or Indian defendant for alleged breaches of
contract, or for actions alleging damage in tort or in trespass. Id. at 1107-08 nn.88-92.
284. Id. at 1112-13 (internal citations omitted).
285. Id. at 1109-10 n.96 (citing Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton
Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 463 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to require exhaustion
where the sole tribal remedies were those created in the tribe's own nuclear radiation control
ordinance, and where those remedies were preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act - leaving Northern States Power with nothing to exhaust); Crawford v.
Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (exhaustion not required when the
disputed issue is not a "reservation affair" or did not "ar[i]se on the reservation" (quoting Stock
West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 1991)); Burlington N.R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe,
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preliminary challenge to the tribes jurisdictional power.2 Nor is the rule
deemed absolute when the parties have contractually drafted around the
issue.' And some federal courts find no ground for exhaustion when no tribal
court proceeding is pending.' On the other hand, some courts would require
exhaustion to allow the tribal court to rule not only on its own jurisdiction, but
on the scope of the tribe's regulatory power as well.' Some courts will even
order exhaustion when a tribal court's claimed jurisdiction seems simply
"colorable" or "plausible."'  But policy-driven concerns for tribal self-
924 F.2d 899, 901 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (B.N.'s failure to exhaust was no bar to jurisdiction where
the complaint presented only issues of federal rather than tribal law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013
(1992). Cf United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987)
(exhaustion "especially appropriate" where the facts alleged a purely internal tribal controversy)).
286. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1110 & n.97 (citing United States v. Yakima Tribal
Court, 806 F.2d 853, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1986) ("In National Farmers, the Court required exhaustion
because the tribal court's power to exercise jurisdiction was 'not automatically foreclosed.' Where
the tribal court lacks jurisdiction, however, exhaustion is not required." (citation omitted)).
Professor Reynolds notes that under this approach, virtually any astute litigant could seemingly
avoid the exhaustion requirement through careful drafting. Id. at 1110 (citing Alaska ex rel.
Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)).
287. See, e.g., Nenana Fuel v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 12299 1233 (Alaska 1992)
(refusing to order exhaustion where tribal entity agreed to be sued in state court)
288. See, e.g., Altheimer& Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814-15 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1019 (1993) (endorsing the Weeks view that tribal exhaustion is required only
in challenges to jurisdiction of a pending tribal court case); Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d at 901 n.2
(B.N.'s failure to exhaust did not bar jurisdiction where no proceeding was pending in any tribal
court); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986).
Contra Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding it irrelevant
whether proceedings are actually pending in tribal court in determining the federal courts' duty
to require exhaustion).
289. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1110 & n.99 (citing Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Crow
Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1240-42, 1245 (9th Cir. 1991) (ordering exhaustion in a challenge
to a -tribal ordinance purporting to regulate railroads crossing the reservation)); see also
Middlemi;t v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Mont. 1993),
affid 19 F. 3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring exhaustion in suit seeking to invalidate a tribal
ordinance where the matter was unquestionably a "reservation affair"); Kaul v. Wahquahboshkuk,
838 F. Supp. 515, 516-18 (D. Kan. 1993) (requiring exhaustion to allow the tribal court to
determine the tribe's taxing and licensing authority over a non-Indian conducting business on the
reservation).
290. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1111-12 nn.102-03 (citing Stock West Corp. v. Taylor,
964 F.2d 912,919-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("By colorable we mean that on the record before
us, the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is plausible and appears to have a valid or genuine
basis.... Whether Colville Tribal law applies to a tort that involved certain acts committed on
reservatioa land and other acts committed outside its territorial jurisdiction to induce another to
perform a contract on tribal lands presents a colorable question that must be resolved in the first
instance by the Colville Tribal Courts .... ")). Stock West may be especially significant since it
is one of the few cases that involves non-Indians as both plaintiff and defendant. In that case, an
Oregon corporation brought an action in federal district court against a tribal attorney, also a
non-Indian, alleging the attorney committed malpractice in drafting an opinion letter. The district




governance and self determination notwithstanding, every federal court is finally
faced with the realization that it is inextricably caught in a kind of jurisdictional
feedback loop - of the three-pronged requirement to honor tribal sovereignty,
the needs of litigants rightly before the court, and to most economically allocate
the federal forum resource. In that regard, one observer argues that ironically,
the tribal exhaustion rule itself became necessary in part because of the Supreme
Court's broad definition of federal question jurisdiction. That is, by concluding
that the scope of a tribe's adjudicatory and legislative power constituted a federal
question, every civil dispute involving a tribal court or other tribal entity was
thereby transmogrified into a federal case. As if to lessen the negative impact
of that holding, the Court then added the requirement that all of these newly
created federal cases first go through the tribal court system.
Thus, the Court first exacerbated the conundrum of federal plenary power by
adopting a broad definition of federal question jurisdiction in the context of
tribal court affairs, and then, perhaps feeling guilty about the blow it had just
dealt to tribal sovereignty, proceeded to defer all of those questions to the tribal
forum, while carefully preserving federal jurisdiction for subsequent review. In
essence the tribal exhaustion doctrine is needed, not because the Supreme Court
gives more weight to the sovereignty of the tribe than to the sovereignty of a
state, but rather because the Court has defined federal question jurisdiction so
broadly that without exhaustion the federal courts could almost completely usurp
the jurisdiction of the tribal courts."'
If that view is correct - and it seems to be - the modem formulation of
the tribal exhaustion doctrine only adds insult to the rule's ignominious origins.
Furthermore, a general confusion left in the doctrine's wake seems to be spilling
over into the state courts. For while Williams v. Lee still appears to be good
law, a state appellate court recently asserted that its obligation to restrict tribal
matters to adjudication within the tribal justice system is grounded in matters of
comity rather than in its own curtailed subject matter jurisdiction under
Williams. Compounding all this, of course, is the proposition set out at
the corporation should first exhaust tribal remedies. The Ninth Circuit, en bane, affirmed,
determining that the corporation's non-Indian status did not preclude tribal civil jurisdiction. Stock
West Corp., 964 F.2d at 918; see also Espil v. Sells, 847 F. Supp. 752, 758 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(equating "colorable" and "plausible") (quoting Stock West, 964 F.2d at 919).
291. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1139-40 & nn.248-50 (internal citations omitted).
292. See Klarnmer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (as a matter of comity, allowing a non-Indian customer unconditional access to state court
in action against a tribal business would undermine the role of the tribal court which, in turn, is
vital to the tribe's self-governance of reservation of affairs; the non-Indian plaintiff must exhaust
tribal remedies and allow the tribal court to address the question of its own jurisdiction and of
sovereign immunity in the first instance). The Minnesota court's rather disconcerting language
also suggests that it anticipates a kind of subsequent "appellate" review not unlike that asserted
by federal district courts under the- federal exhaustion doctrine. Id. at 384; see also Maxa v.
Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 924 P.2d 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (the state court's assumption of
jurisdiction would not interfere with tribal self-government and the state's civil jurisdiction is not
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length above - that the actual origin of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is itself
an affront to the very principles that the doctrine claims to support. And
looming over the entire proceeding is the Supreme Court's mandate, its
forthcoming ruling in A-] Contractors, and A-] Contractor's Ninth Circuit
contrary, Hinshaw v. Mahler. Accordingly, A- Contractors and Hinshaw
must be surveyed in some depth.
A. Hinshaw v. Mahler
Christian Mahler was struck and killed by an automobile while riding his
motorcycle on U.S. Highway 93 on the Flathead Indian Reservation.2" The
driver, Lynette Hinshaw, was not an enrolled member of the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, but she did live within the boundaries of the
Flathead Reservation. Nor was Christian Mahler an enrolled tribal member,
although he too was a reservation resident. However, Christian's mother, Gloria
Mahler (with whom Christian resided) was an enrolled member.2 The
Mahler's filed an action for damages for wrongful death and a survivorship in
expressly preempted by the federal requirement that courts abstain or dismiss when a tribal court
asserts civil jurisdiction).
293. 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994). It ought to be noted
that the Ninth Circuit's more recent decision in Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1175
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing the en banc opinion in A-I Contractors with approval and rejecting the
notion that Montana and its progeny are limited to cases involving fee lands owned by
non-Indians), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691- (1997), seems to directly contradict Hinshaw, But
Pease carefully distinguished Hinshaw from A-] Contractors, calling Hinshaw consistent with
Montana on the ground that Hinshaw in "no way supports the Tribe's adjudicatory/regulatory
distinction." Id. at 1175. Hinshaw also differed from A-I Contractors inasmuch as the tribal court
plaintiff in Hinshaw was a tribal member residing on the reservation. Id. at 1176 (citing Hinshaw,
42 F.3d at 1180). The Hinshaw court, wrote the Pease court, implicitly concluded that state and
tribal authorities coupled with the tortfeasor's "specific contacts" with the reservation created the
requisite "tribal interest" under Montana. Id. Thus, tribal ordinances and Montana state court
decisions explicitly provided that the tribe had concurrent jurisdiction with the state over an
automobile accident on public roads on the reservation. Id. (citing Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1180).
The Crow Tribe did not "enjoy specific authority to exercise jurisdiction over the propriety of a
county's property tax scheme." Id. Furthermore, the non-Indian here (i.e., Yellowstone County,
Montana) "neither resided on the reservation nor violated an enforceable tribal ordinance." Id.
At rock bottom then, it appears that Pease preserves for the Ninth Circuit the notion that, at
least in some circumstances, non-Indians may still be held liable in tribal court for torts
committed on an Indian Reservation. Unfortunately, Pease does not tell us whether the perceived
"specific contact" in Hinshaw was the tortfeasor's residency on the Flathead Indian Reservation,
or her act of negligently causing the death of the (non-member) son of a tribal member in an auto
accident occurring on the reservation.
294. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1179-80.
295. Id. at 1180.
296. 1d. It should be noted that this seemingly convoluted fact pattern regarding residency,
kinship and.membership is not at all unusual. Indeed, as tribal bloodlines are increasingly diluted
and intermixed, the Supreme Court's continued reticence regarding a geographic view of tribal




tribal court, and the tribal court accepted jurisdiction because the accident
occurred on the reservation and because Gloria Mahler was an enrolled
memberY The Mahlers prevailed at trial, and the tribal appellate court
affirmed. Ms. Hinshaw filed a complaint in federal district court, and that court
concurred in the tribal courts' finding of jurisdiction.'
The Ninth Circuit Court'of Appeals affirmed.' Writing for the panel,
Judge Hug set out a detailed analysis of the tribal court's subject matter and
personal jurisdiction in both the wrongful death and in the survivorship claims.
In Judge Hug's view, Montana stands for the proposition that the "Tribes have
not surrendered their authority to exercise jurisdiction over civil actions
involving nonmembers.""3 Moreover, the wrongful death controversy clearly fell
within the tribe's Law and Order Code.3"' The tribes' jurisdiction had not been
limited by treaty or statute.' Nor had the tribes given up their authority to
exercise jurisdiction over such actions.' Ms. H-inshaw's claim that only the
State of Montana had subject matter jurisdiction over the survivorship action
also failed.1  Additionally, the tribal court's finding of personal jurisdiction
297. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1180.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1181. But see A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 939 (8th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) ("To the extent that Hinshaw supports the appellees'
arguments that tribal courts have jurisdiction over a tort claim arising between two non-Indians
on a highway running through an Indian reservation, we respectfully decline to follow it. Such
a broad interpretation of civil tribal jurisdiction is, we believe, inconsistent with Montana").
300. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1180 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66
(1981) (tribe retains civil authority over matters affecting the tribe) (parenthetical as cited by the
court)).
301. Id. On the Flathead Reservation, there is concurrent jurisdiction over certain civil
matters occurring on the reservation between the tribal court and tribal government. Id. (citing
Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) (May 5, 1965); TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 1, §§ 2-3
(1985)). The code also governs the operation of motorvehicles on public roads, and provides that
all jurisdiction not expressly transferred remains with the tribes. Id. "The accident occurred within
the boundaries of the reservation." Id. Gloria Mahler, Kenneth Mahler, and Hinshaw all resided
on the reservation and were thus "found" on the reservation. Id. (citing TRIBAL LAW & ORDER
CODE ch. II, § 1(2)(a)(1) & (2)(b) (1985)). "Hinshaw owned, used, and possessed a motor vehicle
within the reservation." Id. (citing § 1(2)(a)(2)(ii)). "Hinshaw's actions injured Gloria Mahler, a
tribal member." Id. (citing § l(2)(a)(2)(iv)); see also Larivee v. Morigeau, 602 P.2d 563, 566-71
(Mont. 1979) (jurisdiction over torts arising from automobile accidents on the Flathead
Reservation is concurrent between the state and the tribes), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980).
302. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1180.
303. Id.
304. Id. While the tribal court does not share concurrent probate jurisdiction with the state,
the Mahlers' tort action for personal injuries had nothing to do with administration of the estate.
Id. (citations omitted). In Montana state court, a party wishing to bring both a wrongful death
claim and a survivorship claim must initiate a separate action unrelated to the probate action. Id.
at 1180-81 (citing In re Estate of Pegg, 680 P.2d 316, 322 (Mont. 1984) (wrongful death claim
is not part of decedent's estate); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-513, 27-1-501(2) (1992) (a wrongful
death claim and a survivorship claim must be combined in one legal action and brought in a
representative capacity)). Thus, initiation of the state probate action did not initiate a concurrent
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survived Ms. Hinshaw's challenge under the "minimum contacts" test as set out
in International Shoe.' Judge Hug agreed with the tribal appellate court -
that simply by living on the reservation, Ms. Hinshaw had "purposefully availed
herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum."' Since this
claim arose out of Ms. Hinshaw's forum-related activities, the tribal court's
exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable because tribes have a "special interest in
exercising jurisdiction over those who have committed tortious acts within the
reservatin."' Finally, the tribal court's interpretation of tribal law was
binding on a federal court in the Ninth Circuit.
B. A-i Contractors v. Strate"
The Eighth Circuit's most recent statement on the reach of the tribal courts
arose from remarkably similar circumstances to those in Hinshaw. In 1990, Ms.
Gisela Fredericks was involved in an automobile accident with a gravel truck
that was being driven by Lyle Stockert and that was owned, by A-1
Contractors.3 " A-1 Contractors, a domestic North Dakota corporation, was
under contract with a tribally owned corporation.3" The accident occurred on
North Dakota State Highway 8, within the exterior boundaries of the Fort
Berthold Reservation. Ms. Fredericks was not an enrolled member of the
tribes,312 but she owned property on the reservation. However, her deceased
husband was an enrolled member, as were her five children."1 Mr. Stockert's
tort action in state court. li at 1181. Absent some citation to authority showing that the tribal
court does not have jurisdiction over the survivorship claim, the court believed that "to hold
otherwise would, in the words of the district court, 'undermin[e] the authority of the Tribal Court
to hear the wrongful death claim by effectively chilling Gloria Mahler's right to proceed in Tribal
Court for that claim."' lid (quoting the district court's unreported opinion).
305. ki4 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
306. 14L (citations omitted).
307. ld.
308. Id. at 1180 (citing Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630,633 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1110 (1989)). Judge Hug did not, however, discuss what that might mean in light of
the fact that "[tihe question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian...
to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to
federal law and is a 'federal question' under § 1331." National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
309. 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
310. A-I Contractors v. Strate, CV-N-A1-92-24, 1992 WL 696330 at *1 (D.N.D. Sept. 16,
1992), reh'g granted, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc,
76 F. 3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S. CL 1404 (1997).
311. I1 The Eighth Circuit suggests a factual dispute on this point: "There is no proof (as
opposed to allegations) that we can find in the record to support the district court's finding of fact
that A-1 was in performance of the contract at the time of the accident. The district court made
its fact-findings based on the pleadings in this case, not upon the evidence." See A-I Contractors
v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
312. The Fort Berthold Indian Reservation is shared by the Three Affiliated Tribes: the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara. All are federally recognized and organized under the IRA.




residency was not discussed, but he was clearly not a tribal member."4
Ms. Fredericks suffered extensive injuries, for which she and her five
children brought an action in the courts of the Three Affiliated Tribes. The
tribal court found personal and subject matter jurisdiction under the tribal
code 15 Both the tribal court and the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of
Appeals agreed that since a "tort committed on the reservation, in the course of
a performance of a contract with the tribe, has a direct effect on the welfare of
the tribe," the second exception to Montana was satisfied t6
666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
314. Id.
315. Id.; see also Fredericks v. Continental Western Ins. Co., No. 5-91-A04-150, slip op. at
1.24(d) (Fort Berthold Tribal Ct. Sept. 4, 1991). The tribal Judge based this decision on Ms.
Fredericks' residency on the Fort Berthold Reservation, and on the reasoning that A-I Contractors
voluntarily entered upon and transacted business within the territorial boundaries of the
reservation. A-I Contractors failed to identify any federal law, treaty provision or provisions of
the United States Constitution which would preclude exercise of jurisdiction by the tribal court.
A-I Contractors, 1992 WL 696330, at *1. The applicable tribal statutes included:
THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION TRIBAL CODE ch. I, § 3(3.2)
(1980) ("Jurisdiction -Territorial"). "The jurisdiction of the court shall extend to any and all lands
and territory within the Reservation boundaries, including all easements, fee patented lands, rights
of way; and over land outside the Reservation boundaries held in trust for tribal members or the
tribe." Id.
Id. ch. 1, § 3(3.3) ("Jurisdiction - Personal"). "Subject to any limitations or restrictions
imposed by the constitution or the laws of the United States, the Court shall have civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all persons who reside, enter, or transact business within the territorial
boundaries of the reservation; provided that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians shall extend
as permitted by case law." Id.
Id. ch. 1, § 3(3.5) ("Jurisdiction - Subject Matter"). "The Court shall have jurisdiction over
all civil causes of action arising within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation, and over all
criminal offenses which are enumerated in this Code, and which are committed within the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation." Id.
Id. ch. 2, § 3(f) ("Long Arm Statute").
Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal court during any of the
following acts:
1) The transaction of any business of the Reservation;
2) The commission of any act which results in accrual of a tort action within
the Reservation;
3) The ownership, use or possession of any property, or any interest therein,
situated within the Reservation.
Id.
316. A-] Contractors, 1992 WL 696330 at *3. The exceptions to implicit divestiture as set
out in Montana are: (1) a tribe may regulate, through taxation and licensing, activities of
non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with the tribe and its members; and (2) the tribe
may "retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non- Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). This all assumes, of course, that Montana actually applies to tribal
adjudicative jurisdiction.
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Like the National Farmers Insurance Company of a decade earlier, these
defendants decided they preferred their chances in federal court. So rather than
return to tribal court for trial, they filed an action in federal court, seeking
declaratory judgement that the tribal court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction and to enjoin further proceedings in that forum.3 7 District Court
Judge Conmy concluded that A-] Contractors had complied with the exhaustion
requirement pursuant to the rule in National Farmers Union."'
On A-] Contractors's summary judgement motion, Judge Conmy found the
purported factual dispute regarding whether or not Ms. Fredericks lived on the
reservation - an issue A-1 Contractors first raised in federal court - to be
"irrelevant to the issue of whether the tribe retains jurisdiction over a dispute
between two non-Indians." ' 9  If the tribal court could properly assert
jurisdiction over A-i Contractors as a nonresident, the same analysis should
apply to the tribal court's jurisdiction over Ms. Fredericks ?' Moreover, the
residency issue had no bearing on either the tribe's contention that tribal
jurisdiction is primarily a geographic territory, or A-] Contractors's principal
argument that tribal jurisdiction only lies if at least one party is a tribal
member.32' In Judge Conmy's opinion, more significant was the Supreme
Court's mandate set out in Iowa Mutual that in the interest of tribal sovereignty,
civil jurisdiction presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute?'
Nevertheless, A-1 Contractors contended that Montana precluded tribal court
jurisdiction over this personal injury action because there was no consensual
relationship between itself and Ms. Fredericks, and because the alleged tort
arising b.tween non-Indians did not have a direct effect on the health or welfare
of the tribe." Conversely, the tribal defendants distinguished this case on the
ground that Montana applies only in disputes arising out of non-Indian fee
lands, while the instant dispute involved an accident that occurred on the
317. A-1 Contractors, 1992 WL 696330, at *2.
318. Id. Of course, the federal court's most preliminary conclusion points to one of the
biggest problems with the exhaustion rule. While most observers would not view A-I
Contractors' preliminary challenge to the tribal court's jurisdiction as constituting exhaustion of
tribal remedies - indeed, in the seminal cases, the Supreme Court remanded the matters to tribal
court for full trial and appeal within the tribal courts - the entire controversy being heard in the
federal courts in this case seems to have ignored that aspect of the rule altogether.
319. Id. at *2.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at *3 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); National
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985) (refusing to extend
Oliphant to a case involving tribal civil jurisdiction)); cf. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
(citing Montana) (tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians typically arises in cases of property
ownership within the reservation or "consensual relationships with the tribe or its members
through commercial dealing, contracts or other arrangements.").




reservation 4 Even if Montana applied, the tribe argued, both prongs of
Montana were met.3 That A-i Contractors was performing under a contract
with the reservation satisfied the first prong, while the serious nature of the
alleged tort satisfied the second?'
Noting the absence of any Supreme Court ruling on the issue of tribal civil
jurisdiction over two non-Indian parties, Judge Conmy adopted the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Stock West.3" Personal jurisdiction over Fredericks,
Stockert, and A-1 Contractors was clearly warranted under the tribal code: Ms.
Fredericks properly chose the tribal forum, Stockert entered the reservation and
then committed a tort there. A-1 Contractors knowingly entered the Reservation
and transacted business.3 The code also provided subject matter jurisdiction
over the tort action.3 At the bottom of it, Judge Conmy believed that tribal
courts clearly have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians unless specifically limited
by treaty or federal statute?3" While tribal jurisdiction was not exclusive, it
was properly invoked here by Ms. Fredericks' choice of forum?3'
The defendants appealed, and a divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed. 32
The majority rejected A-i Contractor's argument that the tribal court's
jurisdiction was limited by the implicit divestiture holdings set out in Montana,
Wheeler, and Brendale? Those cases, wrote Judge McMillan, stand for the
proposition that while Indian tribes possess attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory, they have lost a great deal of that sovereignty
through their original incorporation into the United States and through the
operation of various treaties and statutes.3" But they also stand for the view
that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands.'335 Judge McMillan believed that the "general divestiture of tribal civil
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. A-I Contractors agreed by contract to be bound by the tribal building codes,
employment rights codes and "the laws regulations and directives of applicable governing
authorities." Id.
327. Id. (citing Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(where a non-Indian owned corporation brought an action in federal district court against a non-
Indian tribal attorney, tribal civil jurisdiction was not precluded)).
328. Id. at *5.
329. Id.
330. Id. (citing Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)).
331. Id.
332. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994),
rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
333. Id. at *3.
334. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 563; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).
335. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). The tribe may retain the inherent sovereign
power to "regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id. The tribe may also retain the inherent power to
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jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians recognized in Montana is
applicable only to fee lands owned by non-Indians."3 Thus, the district court
correctly found tribal court jurisdiction where the alleged tort occurring on the
reservation had a direct effect on the welfare of the tribe. Under those
circumstances, tribal court jurisdiction is presumed and exists "unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute." '37 And,
alternatively, even if Montana did apply, both the first and second Montana
exceptions were well-met under these facts." Ultimately, Judge McMillan
"exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe." d. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
336. Id. at *4 (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2316-17 (1993) (tribe
could not regulate activities of non-tribal members on non-Indian fee lands on reservation, that
is, land taken for dam project and then opened for public use as recreation area); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1989) (the
issue was "whether, and to what extent, the tribe has a protectible interest in what activities are
taking place on fee land within the reservation and, if it has such an interest, how it may be
protected.... [that] "in the special circumstances of checkerboard ownership of lands within a
reservation, the tribe has an interest under federal law, defined in terms of the impact of the
challenged uses [of fee land] on the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe"); United States ex reL Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901, 906
(9th Cir. 1994) (Montana exceptions are "relevant only after the court concludes that there has
been a general divestiture of tribal authority over non-Indians by alienation of the land"); Stock
West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d at 920 (tortious acts committed on reservation land, business
transactions commenced on tribal lands gave rise to tribal jurisdiction)). But see Red Fox v.
Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 645-47 (S.D. 1993) (a plaintiff failed to establish tribal court had
jurisdiction over tort claim which occurred on state highway within reservation).
337. A-I Contractors, 1994 WL 666051, at *3 (quoting Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 14, 18 (1987) ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands
is an impo-tant part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies
in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.")
(citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66)); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S.
134, 152-53 (1980) (tribes may tax transactions occurring on tribal trust lands); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382,387-89 (1976); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)
(a tribe may impose taxes on business operated by non-Indians on basis of tribe's inherent
sovereign authority to control economic activity within its jurisdiction); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
at 223 (state court did not have jurisdiction over civil suit by non-Indian against Indian where
cause of action arose on reservation). Finally, "[blecause the Tribe retains all inherent attributes
of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from
silence... is that the sovereign power... remains intact." A-I Contractors, 1994 WL 666051,
at *4-5 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 149 n. 14).
338. A-] Contractors, 1994 WL 666051, at *4. Under the first Montana exception, there was
a voluntary consensual relationship between A-I Contractors and the tribe within the subcontract
between the tribal corporation, LCM Corp., and A-I Contractors for work to be performed solely
on the reservation. Id. Under the second Montana exception, the allegedtort committed on the
reservation directly affected the economic security and health and general welfare of the tribe.
Id. Moreover, "territorial control is a fundamental component of inherent tribal sovereignty." Id.
at *5. And under federal law, rights-of-way are part of "Indian country." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.




believed that "the tribe, like a state, has an important and legitimate interest in
protecting the health and safety of its members and residents on the roads and
highways on the reservation.""33 And a tribe, "like a state, also has an
important and legitimate interest in affording those who have been injured in
accidents on those roads and highways with a judicial remedy."'  Since
"[t]ribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property
interests of both Indians and non-Indians,"' and since refusing to recognize
that interest would have a "demonstrably serious, adverse effect on the political
integrity of the tribe,""2 the district court was correct in reserving resolution
on the merits for the tribal court.
In response, Judge David Hansen filed an outspoken dissent.' He believed
that the majority's opinion was grounded in a theory of "tribal territorial
jurisdiction wholly unsupported by authority."' Rather, Judge Hansen
believed that Montana controls - that a tribal interest must be involved to
justify any tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians."' In Judge Hansen's
opinion, Montana stands for the much broader proposition that a tribe's
jurisdiction over non-Indian parties does not extend beyond what is "necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations."' Anything
more would be "inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes, and so cannot
survive without express Congressional delegation."' 7 Judge Hansen believed
the majority's view of Montana and Brendale as cases involving only a tribe's
authority over non-Indians activities on non-Indian owned fee land to be
"artificial. " ' Judge Hansen took special exception to the majority's reliance
on the "concept that Indian tribes retain unfettered territorial civil jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation")).
339. Id. at *6.
340. Id.
341. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978)).
342. Id.
343. Id. at *6-10 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
344. Id.
345. Id. at *6.
346. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
347. Id.
348. Id. at *7. Judge Hansen believed that Brendale "expressly adopted the Montana
rationale without further qualification." Id. (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 426-27). Judge Hansen
also felt that a number of other cases have relied on Montana for guidance in civil jurisdictional
issues arising in non-fee land disputes. Id. (citing Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912,
918-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Montana in a non-fee land jurisdictional dispute); FMC
v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Montana in non-fee
land case as "the leading case on tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians"); Tamiami Partners,
Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 999 F.2d 503, 508 n. I1 (1 th Cir. 1993) (citing
Montana in recognizing that tribal courts have power to exercise civil jurisdiction in conflicts
affecting the interests of Indians on Indian lands)).
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unless that jurisdiction has been affirmatively limited by federal law" - a near
"statehood-like" status grounded in "isolated language" found in Iowa Mutual,
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, and Williams v. Lee.' Rather, Judge
Hansen believed that Iowa Mutual must be read alongside Montana?"'
Likewise, Merrion and Williams depend upon Montana for their correct
interpretation."' Finally, Judge Hansen advanced a questionably-reasoned
conclusion from Cohen's Handbook - that "[tiribal courts probably lack
jurisdiction over civil cases involving only non-Indians in most situations, since
it would be difficult to establish any direct impact on Indians or their
property."3 The resulting meld of these various authorities, according to
Judge Hansen, would be one "comprehensive and integrated" rule.3 That rule
would require that there must first exist a "valid tribal interest" before a tribal
court may exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over any non-Indian or
nonmember.3" If a valid tribal interest is established, a presumption in favor
of tribal court jurisdiction arises unless it is affirmatively limited by federal
law.
355
Applying that rule to the present case, Judge Hansen believed that no tribal
349. Id. at *7-8. Judge Hansen was also unimpressed with counsel for the tribal defendants
who stated in oral argument that the tribe wants "'to have jurisdiction over things that happen on
the reservation,' including things that involve non-Indians, because 'that's what sovereign
governments do, they control things that happen within their territory.'" Id.
350. Id. at *9. For instance, Judge Hansen believes that when Justice Marshall stated that
"[tiribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of
tribal sovereignty," he was implicitly referring to the kinds of activities set out in the Montana
exceptions. Id. Likewise, when Justice Marshall wrote that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over such
activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute," he actually meant that the tribe's civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
arises by virtue of the non-Indian's activities as defined by Montana. Id.
351. Id. Judge Hansen posits that in Williams, the plaintiff, a storekeeper on the Navajo
Reservation who sued his Indian customers for an alleged breach of contract that occurred on the
reservation, was engaged in a "consensual agreement" that "fits squarely" with Montana.
However, insofar as Williams involved a private transaction between the storekeeper and
individual tribal members - not with the tribe itself as Judge Hansen would require - this
supposed distinction between Williams and A- Contractors is non-obvious. As in Williams, the
injured party here was an individual. In the alternative, Judge Hansen may be implicitly accepting
the tribe's contention that an injury to a member of the tribal community is in some sense an
injury to the tribe itself. If so, this entire line of reasoning seems suspect.
352. A-] Contractors, 1994 WL 666051 at *9 (quoting COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 4, at
342-43). But note that while purporting to address civil jurisdiction, the Handbooks editors cite
only a law review article that principally addressed criminal jurisdiction, Richard Collins, Implied
Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479, 479-508 (1979), and
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882), a century-old criminal jurisdiction case that
upheld state criminal jurisdiction over an Indian country crime committed by a non-Indian against
a non-Indian victim.






interest supported the tribal court's jurisdiction. This "run-of-the-mill"
automobile accident on a North Dakota state highway implicated no "consensual
relationship" within the meaning of Montana. The issue was not A-1
Contractor's contract with the tribe. Nor was it Lyle Stockert's employment with
A-1. Those relationships, wrote Judge Hansen, had nothing to do with this
simple personal injury tort claim." Since Gisela Fredericks was not a party
to the tribe's contract with A-I, the tribe was a "stranger" to the accident.3"
For the same reason, Judge Hansen believed that Ms. Fredericks' injury had
nothing to do with the tribe's political integrity and welfare, nor with its ability
to govern its own affairs or protect its own people's rights under tribal laws and
customs - i.e., the subject of the second Montana exception.35 Rather, it
concerned only the conduct of non-Indians and nonmembers, and the tribe's
"self-asserted ability to exercise plenary judicial authority over a decidedly
nontribal matter." ''
But of course, having disposed of Justice Marshall's troubling language in
Iowa Mutual - that "[clivil jurisdiction ... presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
statute"'a - Judge Hansen would leave it solely in the hands of the federal
judiciary to adjudge the proper scope of tribal jurisdiction under National
Farmers Union's somewhat less restrictive language."' Nevertheless, Judge
Hansen believed that the "principled approach" of Montana guarantees the tribe's
ability to govern itself because the tribal courts will still have jurisdiction any
time a tribal interest is established.'
A-1 Contractors and Lyle Stockert next requested rehearing en banc 30 The
panel opinion was vacated, and Judge Hansen's dissent in the panel decision
formed the basis of the en banc judgement.' However, Judge Hansen
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at *10.
359. Id.
360. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
361. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857
(1985) ("Our conclusions that § 1331 encompasses the federal question whether a tribal court has
exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction, and that exhaustion is required before such a claim
may be entertained by a federal court, require that we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the Tribal Court
system.., it would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief.").
362. A-1 Contractors, 1994 WL 666051, at *10.
363. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
364. The general rule for granting rehearing is set out in Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Under that rule, a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service
may order that an appeal be reheard en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). However, such a rehearing
is not favored. Id. Ordinarily, such a request will not be granted except when consideration by
the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, Fed. R. App. P.
35(a)(1), or when a question of exceptional importance is raised. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2).
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narrowel his attention somewhat, focusing on the district court's decision that
"the tribe had full geographical/territorial jurisdiction over this dispute."'
Under that view, the crucial point that so many courts have apparently been
missing is that "Montana specifically extended the general principles underlying
Oliphant to civil [adjudicatory] jurisdiction."'3 Seemingly then, all those
courts that have recognized a principled difference between regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction under the Montana formulation have simply been
wrong. Never mind that this is a contention upon which the Supreme Court
itself remains divideda and upon which there is no consensus among the
The Eighth Circuit takes an even sterner view of such requests. See 8th Cir. R. 35A. The
local rule further restricts the general rule, requiring that a suggestion for rehearing en bane
"should b filed only when the attention of the entire court must be directed to an issue of grave
constitutional dimension or exceptional public importance, or to an opinion that directly conflicts
with Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit precedent." 8th Cir. R. 35A(a). Mere assertions of error
in the determination of state or federal law, in the facts of the case, or in the application of
precedent to the facts of the case are matters for panel rehearing, but not for rehearing en banc.
Unless the case meets the "rigid standards" of Fed. R. App. P. 35(a), the duty of counsel is
discharged without suggesting such a rehearing. Id. Rehearing en banc may also be requested
by ajudge who was a member of the panel that rendered the prior decision, 8th Cir. R. 35A(b),
but that was not alleged here. See A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 932.
In light of the gravity afforded such a procedure in the Eighth Circuit, one might have
expected an explanation of the ground upon which this case met such a strict standard. None is
provided. The closest the court comes is its observation that "[iln our view, the appellees' reading
of this isolated language from Iowa Mutual is unnecessarily broad and conflicts with the
principles of Montana." A- Contractors, 76 F.3d at 936.
Those voting in favor of A-1 Contractors's position included Chief Circuit Judge Richard
Arnold, and Judges Morris Arnold, Pasco Bowman, George Fagg, James Loken, Frank Magill,
Roger Wollman, and David Hansen, who authored the majority opinion. Judge Arlen Beam filed
a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Judges Floyd Gibson, Theodore McMillan, and
Diana Murphy joined. Judge Gibson filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges McMillan, Beam
and Murphy joined. Finally, Judge McMillan filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges Gibson,
Beam, and Murphy joined.
365. A- Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938 ("While the distinction [between adjudicatory and
regulatory jurisdiction] the appellees propose appears in some commentaries, the distinction does
not appear explicitly, or even implicitly, anywhere in the case law.") (citing Dussias, supra note
16, at 43-78). But see infra notes 147, 367, 466 (citing case law that does draw just such a
distinction).
366. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 934 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 ("Though Olipant
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe") (footnote omitted)). However, Montana did
not extend the full impact of Oliphant to the civil adjudication question. Id. That would have
"completely prohibited civil jurisdiction over nonmembers." Id. Instead, the Court set out the
Montana exceptions under which a tribe may still exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66). This reading of the cases, instructs Judge Hansen,
explains the apparent discrepancy between Oliphant, Montana, and National Farmers Union. Id.
at 937. Thus, National Farmers Union's statement that civil tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers
is not foreclosed by Oliphant is "perfectly consistent with Montana, which provides for broader
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians than does Oliphant." Id
367. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
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lower courts.' And, reasoned Judge Hansen, even if Montana does draw the
(recognizing a distinction between tribal adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction); Bryan v. Itasca
County 426 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1976) (interpreting § 4 [of Public Law 280] to grant States
jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court, but not to
grant general civil regulatory authority; noting that "Public Law 280 relates primarily to the
application of state civil and criminal law in court proceedings, and has no bearing on
[regulatory] programs set up by the States to assist economic and environmental development in
Indian territory") (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm.
on Interior & Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. 136 (1968) (testimony of Sen. Sam Ervin, principal
sponsor of Title IV)); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 456 n.6 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the only citations that I have
found of Montanas rule governing tribal sovereignty appear in the dissent to our decision
upholding tribal taxing authority over non-Indians in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 171 (1982), and in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in a case where the Court of
Appeals upheld tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. City of Poison v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 459 U.S. 977 (1982)."); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Legislative jurisdiction] refers to the authority of a state
to make its law applicable to persons or activities and is quite a separate matter from jurisdiction
to adjudicate.").
368. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1324 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("The distinction
between adjudication and regulation may have some application in this area of law. Adjudicatory
jurisdiction is often broader than regulatory jurisdiction, because a forum's authority to adjudicate
a controversy does not depend on its authority to regulate the underlying subject matter.... But
this distinction goes to the merits. It'involves the propriety of the tribal court's assertion of
jurisdiction. It does not affect the existence of a federal question."); State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp.
1455, 1465 (1996) ("Because Montana, Brendale, and Bourland involved challenges to a tribe's
power to regulate, and National Farmers and Iowa Mutual involved challenges to a tribe's power
to adjudicate tort claims against a non-member, the different formulations of the 'general rule'
may be a result of the Supreme Court's implicit recognition of a principled distinction between
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction and tribal regulatory jurisdiction"); Lyon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 923
P.2d 350, 353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) ("In the absence of controlling federal law, such as a
specific treaty provision or a federal statute, tribal courts presumptively have jurisdiction over
disputes involving Indians and non-Indians in the territory known as 'Indian country.' This
includes all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government."). But see, e.g., Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing the en banc opinion in A-] Contractors with approval, noting that Montana as the
leading case on tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, and holding that under Montana, the
Crow Tribe lacked authority since a valid tribal interest must be at issue before tribal court could
exercise any civil adjudicatory or regulatory jurisdiction); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d
912, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1992); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir.
1990) (calling Montana the "leading case on tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians"); Sanders
v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1181
(D. Mont. 1995) rev'd, No. 96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) (where member
of Blackfeet Indian Tribe sought recognition and registration of tribal judgment against
non-Indian truck driver, the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact
that "tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, like tribal regulatory jurisdiction, emanates from a tribe's
retained inherent authority"; Montana did not intend a distinction between a tribe's regulatory
jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction.) (citing AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 131 (1993);
Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 642 (S.D. 1993) (in collateral action by tribal member tribe
to gain enforcement of tribal court tort judgement against nonmember for damages that resulted
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suggested distinction between regulatory jurisdiction and adjudicatory
jurisdiction, he believed that any such distinction here would be "illusory. '
Thus, a tribal court trying this suit would have virtually limitless power to
decide what substantive law applies - defining the "legal relationship and the
respective duties of the parties on reservation roads and highways." m In that
case, a tribal court rendering such a decision would in effect be "regulating the
legal conduct of drivers on the roads and highways that traverse the
reservation."37'
Strate's dissenting opinions illustrate just how much disagreement exists over
this issue. For example, Judge Beam concurred in the majority's "comprehensive
and integrated" rule.3 Nevertheless, he dissented from the court's implication
after member struck nonmembers dead horse on a state highway within the reservation, holding
that "without legislative authority to regulate Hettich's conduct, the tribal court [had] no case [to]
adjudicate"); see also Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 999 F.2d
503, 508 n.1 1 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Montana in finding that tribal courts have power to
exercise civil jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands).
In Red Fox, the court went on to set out a "mathematical" analysis of the jurisdiction
dilemma. Red Fox, 494 N.W.2d at 642 n.4. To wit, a tribal court's adjudicative authority =
judicial jurisdiction + legislative jurisdiction. This is further broken down:
I) Judicial jurisdiction = territorial jurisdiction + subject matter jurisdiction + personal
jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction = Montana's regulatory authority.
2) Therefore: (A tribal court's adjudicative authority) = (territorial jurisdiction + subject matter
jurisdiction + personal jurisdiction) + (Montana's regulatory authority).
According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the important thing to remember is that if any
part of this equation is missing, and regardless of what else exists, it still equals something less
than a tribal court's adjudicative authority. (And this court's algebra almost makes one miss a
good old-fashioned "subjective" analysis under Montana).
369. A- Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938.
370. Id.
371. Id. Judge Hansen did, however, recognize the legitimacy of tribal law in a general
sense. He noted that the Three Affiliated Tribes "exercise their sovereignty under a federally
approved constitution adopted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479.' Id. at 933 n.2. The Three Affiliated Tribes have also adopted a tribal code which
"outlines civil court jurisdiction within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and which, in
the absence of federal law to the contrary, imposes tribal law and custom, not North Dakota
statute or common law, as controlling precedent for torts occurring within the reservation." Id.
at 943 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing TRIBAL CODE OF THE THREE AFFILIATED
TRIBES OF THE FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION ch. I, § 2 (1980); see also COHEN, 1982 ED.,
supra note 4, at 334-35).
In an attempt to foreclose any remaining arguments, Judge Hansen did note that if the court,
arguendo, did apply a regulatory-adjudicatory distinction, the fact that the case involves a tribal
court's civil jurisdiction over an accident involving non-Indians, Montana's principles applied to
this "open question of inherent authority to exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction" would render
the same result. Id. at 938.
372. Id. at 941 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938-
39 ("[A] valid tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction
over a non-Indian or nonmember, but once the tribal interest is established, a presumption arises
that tribal courts have jurisdiction over the non-Indian or nonmember unless that jurisdiction is
affirmatively limited by federal law")).
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that a tribal court can have no jurisdiction in a civil case unless an Indian or a
member of the tribe is involved.3 Such a view, wrote Judge Beam, "appears
to be a free-floating theory wholly detached from geographic reality"" - and
a view contrary to Brendale, Iowa Mutual, National Farmers Union, and
particularly to Montana.37 Recognizing that, "[h]istorically, the connection of
Indians to the land has shaped the course of Indian law,"'376 and that many of
the modem cases are similarly supportive of the geographic view,3" Judge
Beam believed that Montana's exceptions must be applied on a "case-by-case"
basis, ever mindful of the geographic component of tribal court jurisdiction.3"
Moreover, by oversimplifying Montana's focus on tribal membership, Judge
Beam believed that the majority's reliance on North Dakota's state court
jurisdiction exposed Ms. Fredericks to the risk of no forum at all.3"
373. Id. (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 942 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) ("It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took
place there"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (recognizing Indian nations
as "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States")). For a comprehensive discussion of this
land-based/jurisdictional nexus, see Harring, supra note 7.
377. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 942 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Brendale,
492 U.S. at 429 (requiring a case-by-case approach to deciding whether Montana's second
exception confers tribal regulatory jurisdiction); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982) (exploring a tribe's historic power to exclude others from tribal lands); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,557 (1975) (noting that the Court's own cases had consistently recognized
that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory")).
378. Id. at 942 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65
(Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory and retaining inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands)).
379. Id. at 943 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting). First, the majority's characterization
of the effect of Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, in this case was incorrect. Id. North Dakota
elected to assume civil jurisdiction under Public Law 280 before the 1968 amendments restricting
its application to only Indians were adopted. Id. However, the state voluntarily conditioned its
jurisdiction upon consent of the tribes. Id. (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 27-19-01 (1991)). The
Three Affiliated Tribes did not consent. Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng'g I, 467 U.S. 138 (1984)). Thus, North Dakota has no jurisdiction over
the Fort Berthold Reservation under Public Law 280. Id.
Second, Williams v. Lee still limits state court jurisdiction over causes of action arising in
Indian country. Id. While, absent federal jurisdiction, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over
some civil actions, Williams's "infringement" test depends upon "whether the state action
infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id.
(quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220). Valid state court jurisdiction may not be disclaimed absent
another forum in which to bring an action. Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng'g II, 476 U.S. 877 (1986)). Moreover, state courts generally have
subject matter jurisdiction over suits by non-Indians against non-Indians, even in actions arising
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Judge McMillan - author of the panel decision overruled by the Eighth
Circuit en banc - agreed with Judge Beam's analysis regarding the importance
of geography and territory in issues of tribal sovereignty?" But "he also
expanded on notions of the tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction over this
action between non-Indians. First and foremost, the tribal code established
personal and subject matter jurisdiction and specifies the application of tribal
law and custom?" That, when taken together with the longstanding
presumption in favor of inherent tribal sovereignty,3" Montana's applicability
in Indian country, so long as Indian interests are not affected. A-i Contractors, 76 F.3d at 943
(citing COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 4, at 352) ("The scope of preemption of state laws in Indian
country generally does not extend to matters having no direct effect on Indians, tribes, their
property, or federal activities. In these situations, state courts have their normal jurisdiction over
non-Indians and their property, both in criminal and civil cases.")); see also Sandm Hansen,
Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 346 (1991).
Nevertheless, where, as in this case, a tribe has adopted a tribal code outlining civil court
jurisdiction within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and which imposes tribal law and
custom rather than North Dakota statutory or common law as controlling precedent for torts
occurring within the reservation, id. (citing TRIBAL CODE OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF
THE FORT BERTHOLD RESERVATION ch. 1, § 2 (1980)), the ability of a North Dakota state court
to provide a forum still must turn upon whether state jurisdiction would infringe upon the tribe's
right to self government). A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 943.
380. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 945 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
381. Id. Significant here is that rights-of-way such as the highway where the subject accident
occurred are considered to be part of Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994) ("Indian
country" includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation"). Section 1151, a criminal statute, has long been
accepted as applicable to civil matters as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 427 n.2 (1975).
382. A- Contractors, 76 F.3d at 946 (maintaining the principled conviction that there is
presumptive tribal jurisdiction over the activities of non-members, and relying primarily on Iowa
Mutual Inv. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Civil jurisdiction over such activities
presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision
or federal statute."); Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178, 1180-81 (9th Cir.) (the Flathead Tribal
Court properly asserted jurisdiction in wrongful death and survivorship action brought by tribal
member on behalf of non-member child against non-member who allegedly caused the child's
death in automobile accident on the reservation), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994)). Judge
McMillian also cited White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980)
(emphasizing that "there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty," and that
state authority over non-Indians acting on a tribal reservation were preempted); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (Indian tribes possess "inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished") (citing COHEN, 1942 ED., supra note 33, at 122);
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory' to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn
by federal statute or treaty"); and Dussias, supra note 16. A-i Contractors, 76 F.3d at 946.
Thus, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not expressly withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or implicitly withdrawn as a "necessary result" of their "dependent status." A-I
Contractors, 76 F.3d at 946 (McMillan, J., dissenting) (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323). Cf.




"lonly to issues involving fee lands,"3" the correct view of the tribal exhaustion
rule," the ambiguity of Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law regarding
the subject of civil jurisdiction,3" and the irrelevance of concurrent state court
divestiture of inherent sovereignty is only necessary "where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government, as when the
tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal
consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the
Bill of Rights"). Conversely, mere silence on the issue means that the tribe's inherent sovereignty
remains intact. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 946-47 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (citing Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 n.14 (1982)).
383. Judge McMillian distinguished Montana, Brendale, and Bourland on the fact that all
those cases clearly involved tribal regulatory actions on lands conveyed in fee to non-Indians, or
former trust and fee lands taken by the United States. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 947
(McMillian, J., dissenting). Particularly, in Montana where the competing regulatory authorities
were the Crow Tribe and the State of Montana, the Court expressly framed the issue in terms of
"the sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians." Id. (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 547). Thus, Judge McMillian would apply Montana and its derivative
exceptions "only to fee lands owned by non-tribal members." Id. at 947 (McMillian, J.,
dissenting). Judge McMillian also relied on Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687-89, 695-97 (holding that
where a tribe endeavored to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands taken by the United
States for a flood control project, Congress, in enacting the flood control legislation, had
abrogated the tribe's right to exclude non-Indians, but remanding for further consideration of
whether the tribe retained inherent sovereignty to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the
taken area under the two Montana exceptions). Judge McMillian discussed Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Bourland and focused on his contention that "the tribe had the authority to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area because the relevant statutes did not affirmatively
abrogate either the tribe's treaty rights or inherent tribal sovereignty." Id. at 948; see also
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (the issue at controversy was, within the scope of the second Montana
exception, "whether, and to what extent, the tribe has a protectible interest in what activities are
taking place on fee land within the reservation and, if it has such an interest, how it may be
protected"); see also United States ex rel. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d
901, 906 (9th Cir. 1994) (Montana exceptions are "relevant only after the court concludes that
there has been a general divestiture of tribal authority over non-Indians by alienation of the
land").
384. Judge McMillan notes that National Farmers Union not only requires exhaustion of
tribal remedies, but it implicitly acknowledges tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants
in civil actions as well. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 949. And Iowa Mutual not only reaffirmed
the exhaustion rule established in National Farmers Union, it also expressly stated that "[t]ribal
authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty" and that "[clivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute." Id. (citing
Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18). This, wrote Judge McMillian, is an "affirmative recognition that
tribal court civil jurisdiction over reservation-based tort actions against non-Indians is part of
inherent tribal sovereignty." Id. To hold otherwise would vitiate any exhaustion rationale, and
consequently, any need for tribal courts to evaluate challenges to their jurisdiction in the first
instance. Id. Under the majority's view, tribal courts would "never have jurisdiction." Id.
385. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 949 ("The landmark treatise does not definitively resolve
this issue"). While Judge McMillan correctly notes that Cohen's Handbook seems, at best,
contradictory on the subject of tribal civil jurisdiction, more interesting is the possible source of
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that treatise's contradictions.
Interior Department Solicitor Felix Cohen, writes Professor Barsh, brought "order and light
into what Justice Frankfurter called the 'mish-mash' of Indian affairs law." Barsh, supra note 4,
at 799. Originally published by the Interior Department as a guide for Indian Bureau employees,
Cohen's Handbook quickly took on the trappings of undisputed authority. Id.; cf. Wilkinson,
supra note 23, at 57-59. The treatise "attracted almost biblical reverence," and Cohen became
something of a "Prosser in a rather arcane sub-discipline." Barsh, supra note 4, at 799. But,
observes Professor Barsh, treatises like Cohen's Handbook can
jeopardize critical thinking when they reconcile what judges have said and
rationalize complexity into neat rules. This danger is greatest where the intellectual
turf is truly perplexing, the subject political, and the bench and bar relatively
unmotivated and ignorant. In such instances treatises become more than scholarly
summaries. They become the law.
Id. Moreover, Cohen was a "man with a mission." Id. at 800. His was a "fervent confidence in
the watchdog role of law in democracy, and a faith that lawyers could lead Indians out of political
bondage." Id. That confidence was grounded in Cohen's belief in the New Deal proposition that
"reason and enlightened central planning could remake and improve the social order." Id. And
the law, like any other instrument of human progress, "worked best if well understood add
properly used." Id.
Nevertheless, Cohen's faith in the forward evolution of the law seems a bit misplaced, When
the Roosevelt Administration's dedication to rebuilding tribal institutions, see, e.g., Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)),
gave way to President Eisenhower's termination policy, see, e.g., Act of August 13, 1954, ch. 732,
68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1994)) (terminating Oregon's Klamath Tribe); see also
Laurence, Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4 & n.10 (ascribing personal responsibility for
termination to President Eisenhower), the Handbook became a "political pawn." Barsh, supra note
4, at 801. The treatise was purged of troubling references to tribal sovereignty and reissued in
1958. Id. Then, when the pendulum swung back in the late 1960s, yet another edition of the
Handbook was commissioned - a version which "predictably restore[ed] the conceptual
framework of the 1941 original." Id.
But, writes Professor Barsh, "much has happened in the world since 1941, and the new edition
seems unaware of it all." Id. Where the United States was once a "paragon of human rights" with
arguably enlightened aboriginal policies, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights announced
a new era of international law. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doe. A/777 (1948). When
viewed in light of the evolving international standard, "U.S. Indian administration is woefully
archaic, a throwback to an earlier era in the struggle for human dignity," Id. at 802.
Just as "Blackstone's opus became a conceptual straightjacket once its novelty had passed,
rooting nineteenth-century English law in the morality and political dogma of the eighteenth
century." id. (noting that early American lawyers fought bitterly to "extirpate Blackstone from
the literature because of its great power to perpetuate implicitly monarchist thinking under the
guise of neutral common-law rules"); see also Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law 1780-1860 44, 114-19 (1977) (noting that Blackstone's comments on property law were
compelling and elegant, but entirely inappropriate in a new nation that lacked a landed peerage
.and anciert manorial titles), Cohen's Handbook may be
destined to be admired by scholars as an historical milestone, but quickly
surpassed in practice by more progressive thinking. Like the Commentaries, the
Handbook may be viewed by coming generations as more of an excuse for the
status quo of its time than a contribution to the growth of the living law.
Barsh, supra note 4, at 802. The 1982 Handbook, argues Professor Barsh, "begs the fundamental
political and moral issue: the legitimacy of federal power to limit tribal sovereignty." Id. at 803.




Justice John Marshall for the notion that "all Indian tribes are dependent nations in regard to the
United States, rendering such provisions legally unnecessary." Id. at 804 (quoting COHEN, 1982
ED., supra note 4, at 65 n.37). The Handbooks editors cite Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), for this "sweeping proposition but refer to no particular page at which it
is to be found. Nor could they, for the Supreme Court said no such thing." Id. In fact, the
Cherokee Nation had expressly accepted U.S. protection by treaty. That the Cherokee treaty, and
not the Cherokees' race, was the source of the relationship was confirmed by Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546-47, 553-54 (1832). Significantly, the entire "accepted political
theory and international law concerning dominance of weaker by stronger nations" is an
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century view of protectorates or dependencies grounded in consent -
not nature, race, or status. Id. at 803 (citing H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 33-34 (1866), reprinted in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (J. Scott ed. 1936). Thus,
writes Professor Barsh, the
revised Handbook perpetuates the most invidious conceit of nineteenth-century
European imperialism, that brown nations necessarily and inevitably come under
the suzerainty of white nations. Documents of consent are immaterial; for their
own good the poor savages are to consent.
Id. at 804. Professor Barsh also takes the Handbook's editors to task for failing to forthrightly
address the trust relationship, id. at 808-09 (arguing that under authority derived from cases like
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982). Interior Department officials may
"balance tribal interests with the interests of non-members" and gauge tribal actions against
"'national policies"' - a view that renders "'trusteeship' meaningless except as an excuse for
unbridled federal discretion at both the legislative and executive levels"), implicit divestiture, id.
at 809-10 (the 1982 Handbook, which cites implicit divestiture as one of Indian law's "basic
principles," promises to do for that concept what Cohen singlehandedly did for plenary power)
(citing COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 8, at 231-32, 244-45), and plenary power itself, id. at 810
("'Plenary power' was i fairly novel idea in Felix Cohen's time, and his 1942 Handbook played
a large role in establishing it").
Finally, it should be noted that Professor Wilkinson, Cohen's "heir apparent," see supra note
23, and Managing Editor of the 1982 Handbook, seems to have a clear predilection for
justifications that deny tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In what is probably his most
comprehensive treatment of the subject of Indian law, see Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 21-23,
Professor Wilkinson devotes much attention to the settled interests of good-faith non-Indian
settlers who took land on the reservations during the allotment era. But in his even-handed
approach - obviously grounded in a deeply held regard for tribal sovereignty - Professor
Wilkinson fairly concludes that
[t]hese expectations cannot harden automatically into a right to be free of all tribal
laws. The tribes had expectations, too, and they were merged into treaties and
treaty substitutes that protected historic tribal government prerogatives within
reservation boundaries. Yet neither can the expectations of the non-Indian
residents, themselves premised upon open invitations tracing to federal law, fairly
be ignored. The recurrent, essential task for the judiciary in Indian law has been
to construct a reconciliation of the laws to which the two sets of expectations
trace.
Id. at 23; see also supra note 33 (discussing the unacknowledged source of Felix Cohen's view
of tribal sovereignty); supra note 352 (discussing the Handbook's anomalous citation to criminal
law authority for the proposition at tribal court civil adjudicatory jurisdiction generally will not
lie). At bottom then, citations such as those by Judges Hansen and McMillan that adopt the
Handbook's analyses (albeit while drawing from different notations and applying widely divergent
interpretations), it may simply be time for an entirely new Handbook from the "ground up." But
it may also be that, in an area of law as necessarily dynamic and rapidly evolving as is the Indian
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jurisdiction in determining the validity of tribal court jurisdiction,M Judge
McMillan would have held in favor of tribal jurisdiction. Moreover, even should
Montana properly apply to such analyses, the result should almost always favor
tribal jurisdiction. Simply providing a forum for reservation-based injuries -
even where both parties are non-Indian - satisfies both Montana
exceptions."s'
Finally, Judge Floyd R. Gibson dissented, expressing "dismay" at the
majority's "unduly narrow view of 'limited sovereignty.""'  Such a "limited
sovereignty" as was contemplated by the majority, wrote Judge Gibson, is, "in
fact, no real sovereignty at all. 3" But regardless of whether sovereignty is
viewed through the filter of inherent authority under Iowa Mutual,"9 or
residual tribal interests under Montana,' Judge Gibson believed that the
"power to adjudicate everyday disputes occurring within a nation's own territory
is among the most basic and indispensable manifestations of sovereign
power."'" Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall set out that
proposition in no uncertain terms - that
law, a purported restatement like the Handbook, expedient as it may be for the harried or the
inexperienced, is simply out of place at best - and counterproductive at its worst.
386. the existence of state court jurisdiction does not preclude tribal court jurisdiction. A.1
Contractos, 76 F.3d at 950 (McMillian J., dissenting) (citing Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d at
1180 (approving tribal jurisdiction where concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction existed)).
However, the inverse is not automatic: existence of tribal court jurisdiction may well preclude
state court jurisdiction under Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Id. This is particularly the
case, wrote Judge McMillian, where a tribe has "established tribal courts and... a tribal code
which provides for personal jurisdiction over non-Indians, subject matter jurisdiction over torts
arising on the reservation, and application of tribal law." Id. In such cases, a tribe's attempt to
assert its civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation is usually upheld. Id.
(citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 ("hT]he exercise of state jurisdiction [under the circumstances]
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves"); City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the "narrow" definition of Indian
country set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156, and applying 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to find that the
"geographic scope of state and tribal authority extends to a reservation's four corners" where non-
Indian liquor sellers on fee lands within Indian reservation sought to enjoin tribal enforcement
of liquor control and business license ordinances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2741 (1994); cf. Cowan
v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D.S.D. 1975) (finding concurrent state and
tribal jurisdiction where non-Indian lessee of tribal land sought to escape tribal court jurisdiction,
but rejecting notion that such concurrent jurisdiction "necessarily preclude[s] tribal jurisdiction"
in matter concerning regulation of tribal lands).
387. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 950-51 (McMillian, J., dissenting); see also Brown &
Desmond, supra note 40, at 250-51 n.206 (quoting Sage v. Lodge Grass Sch. Dist. No. 27, Civ.
No. 82-287 (Crow Tribal Ct. Sept. 12, 1985)) ("[T]he establishment of a court system to resolve
civil disputes is 'an inherent and an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty.'').
388. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 944 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
389. Id.
390. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
391. 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).




[n]o government ought to be so defective in its organization, as not
to contain within itself, the means of securing the execution of its
own laws against other dangers than those which occur every day.
Courts of justice are the means most usually employed; and it is
reasonable to expect, that a government should repose on its own
courts, rather than on others.3
Anything less, suggested Judge Gibson, "interferes with the tribe's ability to
manage its affairs by compromising its ability to deal with non-tribe members
who happen to wreak havoc on tribal land."3
Furthermore, Judge Gibson was unconvinced that Montana has any
"relevance outside the narrow context of a tribe's ability to regulate fee lands
owned by non-Indians."3 S And if, for the sake of argument, Montana is
controlling, this case still implicated tribal interests as defined under either of
the Montana exceptions.3" Besides the tribe's obvious interest in adjudicating
disputes within its territory, Judge Gibson also believed that the case met the
"consensual relationship", test set out as the first Montana exception.3"
C. Oliphant's Other Shoe?
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Strate, agreeing to entertain two
questions."' First, did the court of appeals err in applying the rule of
Montana - that the inherent sovereign civil regulatory jurisdiction of Indian
tribes over the activities of non-Indians has been generally divested as to lands
alienated from Indian titie by Congress, to a question of tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction over a civil tort action between two non-Indians arising on a state
highway crossing Indian trust land within an Indian reservation, rather than
applying Iowa Mutual's rule that tribes have retained their civil jurisdiction over
non-Indian conduct on Indian land unless that jurisdiction has been expressly
393. ld. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387-88 (1821)).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 944 and n.1 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 557-67). See also, Iowa Mutual, 480
U.S. at 18 (tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important
part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute. Because the
Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal
Government, the proper inference from silence is that the sovereign power remains intact).
396. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 944.
397. Id. Judge Gibson believed that A-I Contractors's subcontract to perform work on the
reservation was on all fours with the "consensual commercial contacts with the tribe" exception
set out in Montana. Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66). That subcontract was the sine qua
non of the controversy: without it, the accident would never have occurred. Id. at 944-45.
Finally, Judge Gibson convincingly disposed of the majority's focus on the claim that there was
no proof to support the district court's finding of fact that A-I Contractors was performing its
contract when the accident occurred. Id. at 945.
398. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); see infra text accompanying notes 462-
No. 1]
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limited by Congress? Second, and assuming, arguendo, that the Montana rule
applies, does the Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation have civil jurisdiction over a personal injury claim brought
by a non-Indian resident of the Reservation with strong ties to the tribe, against
a non-Indian contractor that had a subcontract with the tribe's corporation to
perform work on the Reservation, to recover for damages suffered in an
automobile accident on a state highway on a federal right-of-way crossing
Indian trust land on the Reservation?"
But even as we await the Supreme Court's judgment, A-] Contractors has
already created quite a stir. Some courts have used A-i Contractors to support
a limiting view of tribal jurisdiction. Other courts seem to see A-]
399. United States Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief at *i (1996 WL 656356).
400. See, e.g., Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing with
approval the Tenth Circuit's en banc opinion in A-1 Contractors, then proceeding to analyze -
and abrogate - Crow Tribal Court jurisdiction under the Montana rule where Pease, a tribal
member landowner, challenged Yellowstone County's authority to collect state property taxes on
fee land within the reservation); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing A-] Contractors and Montana for the proposition that "[I]imitations on tribal
authority are particularly acute where non- Indians are concerned ... The Supreme Court has
recognized that tribal 'inherent sovereign powers . . . do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe'); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d
Cir. 1996) (tribes have a recognized power to "adjudicate civil disputes arising on their territory
(with certain limitations on the power to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians)") (citing A-
Contractors and Montana)).
Even b'efore the Tenth Circuit issued its en bane decision, however, A-i Contractors was
influencing other federal decisions. In Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D.
Mont. 1995), rev'd, No. 96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) (citing the
Montana factors as the correct basis for determining the Blackfeet Tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction
over a non-Indian defendant in personal injury suit in Blackfeet Tribal Court and holding that
"when an Indian tribe invokes its inherent sovereignty as the basis of its authority over
non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands, there is a presumption against tribal authority"), Chief Judge
Hatfield justified his view that the principles articulated in Montana are applicable to challenges
to a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction because "tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, like tribal regulatory
jurisdiction, emanates from a tribe's retained inherent authority." Id. (citing AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK 131 (1993); Michael J. Dale, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Reservation- Based
Claims: The Long Walk to the Courthouse, 66 OR. L. REV. 753, 796-98 (1987)). Judge Hatfield
adopted Judge Hansen's "well-reasoned" (and Montana grounded) dissent in the vacated panel
decision in A-1 Contractors v. Strate. But in doing so, the judge was forced to confront his own
circuit's recent opinion in a very similar case. See Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1186 (citing Hinshaw
v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994)). Hinshaw also
concerned an action against a non-member residing on the Flathead Indian Reservation, seeking
damages resulting from the death of another non-member who was killed in a traffic accident
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Id. The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the
tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. Judge Hatfield grudgingly accepted that holding,
assuming 6iat the Hinshaw court must have found implicitly that the Hinshaw' contacts with the
Flathead Indian Reservation constituted the requisite "tribal interest" under the Montana
exceptions. Id at 1187. "To hold otherwise," wrote Judge Hatfield, "would require turning a
blind eye towards the development of tribal sovereignty as articulated by the Supreme Court."
Id. Accordingly, Judge Hatfield affirmed the Blackfeet Tribal Court's assertion of jurisdiction in
[Vol. 22
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Contractors as support for a more benign view.' Still other courts approve
of A-i Contractors's approach, but have upheld tribal jurisdiction
nevertheless. And as is so common within the treacherous eddies and back
currents of federal Indian law, similar reasoning has found its way into
Executive Branch decision making.' But most troubling of all - and despite
the important interests at stake in A- Contractors - it now appears quite likely
that the Court may again dodge the jurisdictional bullet completely.'
the case at bar. Id.
401. See, e.g., Gaming Corp. Of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 550 (8th Cir.
1996) (A-] Contractors affirms that tribes have a "recognized interest in connection with parties
who have explicit consensual dealings with it).
402. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996) (jurisdictional
challenge to tribal court by a state game warden acting in his official capacity, noting that "[ilf
the rule in A-) Contractors is now indeed the law of the Ninth Circuit, it certainly provides a
helpful framework). The court, nevertheless, recognized a "principled distinction between tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction and tribal regulatory jurisdiction." Id. at 1465.
403. See Cross, supra note 162, at 24-25. While not implicating A-1 Contractors, the EPA
has nevertheless justified its rule-making decisions regarding tribes-as-state status under section
518(e) of the Clean Water Act on the same Montana rule factors that animate A- Contractors.
Professor Cross suggests that the EPA has put its entire Indian environmental policy at risk in
the bargain. Id.
404. This "vexing question," understates one commentator, "may have an easy answer." See
Lash, supra note *. During oral arguments on January 7, 1997, Justice Souter focused, not on
the contours of tribal adjudicatory power, but on what he termed a "a simple highway rule." Id.
Under such a rule, if an injury occurs on a "state" road, then state courts should have jurisdiction.
Id. Conversely, tribal courts would have authority over tribal roads. Id. Justice Souter's reasoning
turned on his view that drivers should be able to depend upon a uniform body of law state
highways - uniformity that would be upset if all of a sudden the rules changed by driving
through a reservation on that thoroughfare. Id.
Justice Breyer expanded on Justice Souter's reasoning, suggesting that adjudicatory jurisdiction
should flow naturally from a determination of whose law applies. "If it's the tribal law, go to the
tribal court," Justice Breyer said. "If it's North Dakota law, go to North Dakota court." Id. Of
course, this would simply rephrase the jurisdictional question - substituting challenges to a
tribe's adjudicatory with challenges to its regulatory jurisdiction. And under the Court's current
view of tribal regulatory authority - Montana, as well as its progeny Brendale and Bourland,
grew out of just such challenges to tribal regulatory authority - there seems little doubt that the
gradual shift already evident in the circuits would quickly turn into a veritable stampede for the
tribal courthouse exits.
At any rate, attorneys for the tribal court and for the United States attempted to explain that
the answer is not that easy - that a state highway, although regulated largely by the state, is
nevertheless still on the reservation. Id. Melody McCoy, representing the tribal court, argued that,
just as states settle conflicts between nonresidents arising within their borders, a tribe must be
able to resolve disputes arising within the reservation's boundaries - even when they arise
between non-members. Id. But the Court was apparently unmoved by this geographic view of
tribal sovereignty. Id. Justice Ginsburg reiterated that the instant controversy occurred on a state
road which was "on" the reservation but not a "part" of the reservation. Id. Under the "most basic
choice-of-law" principle, Justice Ginsburg suggested that courts trying to resolve a civil dispute
would rely on the law governing the site where the accident occurred - in this case North
Dakota Highway 8. Id.
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D. Beyond Exhaustion: Towards an Integrated Territorial View of Tribal
Sovereignty
So what have we learned so far, poised as we are on the eve of a
potentially monumental Supreme Court decision? Sadly, it seems, very
little. We do know that many judges and advocates, concerned more with
the rights and settled interests of individuals, than with the far older
interests of Indian tribes, would likely opt to establish jurisdictional rules
that blunt the scant deference the tribal exhaustion doctrine now concedes.
Those actors would lay down bright lines - lines that would surely
dissuade tribal courts from asserting jurisdiction in the face of almost
certain reversal in federal court. We also know that another group - the
clear minority, judging from the trend in federal appellate decisions -
would urge a broader view of tribal sovereignty and greater deference
towards the tribes' rights vis-h-vis self determination and self-government.
But these two factions share one unfortunate trait: each seems to possess
a remarkably myopic view of the issues - a hair-splitting vision grounded
in the judicially-framed dispute over whether cases like Montana, Brendale,
and Bourland have so changed the face of the legal landscape that little
tribal sovereignty survives."' What is too often missing is any discussion
When asked by Justice Souter whether she had any doubt whether a North Dakota court might
choose to apply tribal law in this controversy, Ms.. McCoy admitted that the tribe had no
substantive law governing this particular personal injury case. Id. The Assistant U.S. Solicitor
General, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, then played the exhaustion card, arguing that the tribal court,
rather than its state counterpart, should decide in the "first instance" whether the tribe's interest
in the case warrants tribal jurisdiction. Id. Nuechterlein suggested that, at least in this case, the
tribe does have such a "particularized interest." Id. In response, Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared
to favor state court jurisdiction. Id
Patrick J. Ward, Counsel of Record for both A-I Contractors and Lyle Stockert, stressed that,
here, the tribal court lacks jurisdiction because the essence of tribal sovereignty is the authority
to regulate the behavior of its members. Id. And even, noted Ward, where a tribe does have an
interest in resolving disputes between nonmembers, "that interest can adequately be presented in
state court" - presumably because, as he asserted, the state courthouse was closer to this accident
site than tie tribal court was. Id. According to Ward, the state's jurisdiction follows its highway
"into the reservation." Id. Holding otherwise would be unfair to non-residents, who would have
no notice that an accident on the state highway would result in their being haled into tribal court.
The Chief Justice thereupon suggested that the same could be said for motorists who drive
across state lines. Ward responded that, while motorists generally understand the concept that
state laws differ, they should not realize or expect such a difference when they enter a reservation.
Quickly seizing on the absurdity of that proposition, Justice O'Connor replied, "You're just
defending the ignorant." Justice Breyer restated the Chief Justice's comment regarding interstate
drivers, and Justice Antonin Scalia offered some (hopefully) tongue-in-cheek advice for motorists
who do not want to end up in tribal court - that you should "[j]ust stay on the good roads, and
you've got nothing to worry about." Id.
405. My experiences thus far in law school suggest a likely wellspring of that species of
myopia. But we will not start down that particular path when the light at the end of the tunnel




about what ought to be the proper scope of tribal sovereignty. And in one
respect, that should not be surprising: such debates are probably the rightful
business of political bodies rather than of courts of law. But the absence of
that debate is still significant where, as in the case of tribal sovereignty,
Congress is so often spectacularly silent.'
No matter whatever else the Eighth Circuit has accomplished, A-]
Contractors has nicely framed the issue of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
in matters involving non-Indians. Simply put, it is either that: (1) simply
because the Montana decision is discussed in both National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual, the Court must have meant to bring tribal court
jurisdiction within the ambit of the Montana rule;' or (2) geography matters.'
406. See, e.g., Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (citing with approval
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 ("[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them"). Primarily because of congressional silence, the Supreme Court has set out
what would appear to be a clear rule - that because "[t]ribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty ... [c]ivil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a
specific treaty provision or federal statute." Id. at 18 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66); see
also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982) ("Because the Tribe retains
all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the
proper inference from silence... is that the sovereign power... remains intact").
Clearly, Congress is not incapable of addressing these troubling issues. A modern example
of a federal statute that expressly limits tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is Public Law 98-290, 98 Stat. 201 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 668 (1994)).
Enacted in 1984, the statute was intended to resolve uncertainty over the boundaries of the
Southern Ute Indian Reservation and the status of unrestricted land on the reservation.
Recognizing that certain land within the reservation is owned in fee simple by non-Indians, the
statute specifically limited the tribe's jurisdiction over those non-Indians on their fee lands. It
provides that "[s]uch territorial jurisdiction as the Southern Ute Indian Tribe has over persons
other than Indians and the property of such persons shall be limited to Indian trust lands within
the reservation." 25 U.S.C. § 668 4(a) (1994). Furthermore, "[a]ny person who is not an Indian
and the property of any such person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under
section 1152 of title 18, United States Code, only on Indian trust land. Id. § 668 4(b).
407. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affd, 117
S. Ct. 1404 (1997) ("When the Court observes in Iowa Mutual that '[t]ribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty,' 480 U.S.
at 18, the Court cites Montana and thus is referring to the types of activities, like consensual
contractual relationships ... that give rise to tribal authority over non-Indians under Montana.
Likewise, when the Court goes on to say '[c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively
lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
statute,' Id. (emphasis added), the Court again is referring to a tribe's civil jurisdiction over
tribal-based activities that exists under Montana"). Judge Hansen then proceeded to set out a
remarkable paradox. In 1985, the "Court in National Farmers Union stated that 'the question
whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians
in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of Oliphant would require.'"
Id. (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 855). That fact notwithstanding, Judge Hansen
believed that, when, in 1981, the Court set out the Montana rule, it preemptively vitiated its own
subsequent language in National Farmers Union. Thus, "[t]he appellees [in A-1 Contractors]
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And perhaps nowhere as in matters of sovereignty do notions of territory
and geography sit so squarely. The wholly geographic notion of
extraterritorial rights, for example, can be traced as far back as the
thirteenth century B.C., when Egypt granted permission to the merchants of
Tyre to establish factories on the Nile, to live under their own laws, and to
freely practice their own religion. During the pre-Christian era of the
Roman Empire on through the Dark and Middle Ages, many foreigners
lived under their own laws in Egypt, Rome, the Byzantine Empire, the Latin
kingdoms of the Levant, and China."' "While the origins of this
extraterritorial jurisdiction may have differed in each country, the notion
that law was for the benefit of the citizens of a country and its advantages
not for foreigners appears to have been an important factor."4t In the 15th
century, with the Turkish conquest of the Byzantine Empire and the
subsequent establishment of the Ottoman Empire, political relations between
Christian Europe and the Near East were substantially altered. Nevertheless,
in 1535 Francis I of France negotiated a treaty with Turkey providing, inter
alia, French criminal and civil jurisdiction over French subjects in
Byzantium. In 1830, the United States negotiated similar treaties with the
Turks."" ' However, the emergence of the European nation-state and the
simultaneous development of notions regarding absolute territorial
sovereignty significantly changed the operation of extraterritorial rights.'
Under that evolving view, sovereigns granted foreigners access to the
advantages of local law, and sovereignty came to mean the exercise of
sovereignty over all residents within the borders of the state.1 4 Thus,
longstanding customs such as extraterritorial consular jurisdiction largely
died out among "Christian nations" in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 4" Nevertheless, a new justification was found for such
fail[ed] to recognize the fact that Montana specifically extended the general principles underlying
Oliphant to civil jurisdiction." Id. at 937 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 ("Though Oliphant
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe")). Therefore, according to Judge Hansen,
"when National Farmers Union states that civil tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is not
foreclosed by Oliphant, that observation is perfectly consistent with Montana, which provides for
broader tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians than does Oliphant." Id.
408. Id. at 941 (Beam, J., dissenting and concurring) ("The concept of 'tribal interest' as
advanced by the court appears to be a free-floating theory wholly detached from geographic
reality except in a most attenuated way.").
409. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 (1957).
410. Id. at 58-59.
411. Id. at 59.
412. Id.






jurisdiction in "those countries whose systems of justice were considered
inferior," such as in Moslem and Far Eastern countries." 6
The point, of course, is that the United States Government has long
understood the geographic nature of sovereignty - that, in the course of
negotiating treaties with sovereigns, a desire to retain extraterritorial
jurisdiction over its own citizens requires express agreement. Clearly, the
United States understood these rules in the late nineteenth century, when it
was still in the practice of negotiating treaties with the Indian nations."7
That neither negotiators, nor the Senate sitting in confirmation, typically
demanded extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-Indians ought to at least give
pause to present-day critics of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
That view always underlies the seminal federal Indian law cases as well.
In Worcester v. Georgia,4t8 Chief Justice Marshall noted that the state
416. Id.; see also John Quincy Adams, JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION 73. Speaking on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of George Washington, ex-President Adams
expressed his thoughts on "non-Christian" nations of the world - that
[t]he Declaration of Independence recognized the European law of nations, as
practiced among Christian nations, to be that by which they considered themselves
bound, and of which they claimed the rights. This system is founded upon the
principle, that the state of nature between men and between nations, is a state of
peace. But there was a Mahometan law of nations, which considered the state of
nature as a state of war - an Asiatic law of nations, which excluded all foreigners
from admission within the territories of the state .... With all these different
communities, the relations of the United States were from the time when they had
become an independent nation, variously modified according to the operation of
those various laws. It was the purpose of the Constitution of the United States to
establish justice over them all.
Id. at 73. Until 1842, China asserted control over all foreigners within its territory. Reid, 354
U.S. at 60. But because of the Opium War, Great Britain and the United States negotiated treaties
that obtained extraterritorial rights over their citizens via consular offices. Id Writing to Secretary
of State Calhoun, the United States representative to China explained that "I entered China with
the formed general conviction that the United States ought not to concede to any foreign state,
under any circumstances, jurisdiction over the life and liberty of a citizen of the United States,
unless that foreign state be of our own family of nations, in a word, a Christian state." Id. A
1903 treaty reiterated that sentiment - that
[t]he Government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform its judicial
system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, the United States
agrees to give every assistance to such reform and will also be prepared to
relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws,
the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in
doing so.
Id. at 60-61. While Commodore Perry's first treaty with Japan did not include any exercise of
judicial powers by United States officials over American citizens, a subsequent treaty did. Id. at
61. That claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction was finally abandoned in 1894, when Japan - even
though still a "non-Christian" nation came to occupy the same status as Christian nations. Id.
417. Treaty-making was unilaterally terminated by Congress in 1871 in a rider to the Indian
Appropriations Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
418. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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legislation at issue improperly interfered with relations between the United
States and the Cherokee Nation - relations that the Constitution entrusted
exclusively to the federal government, and with treaties
which mark[ed] out the boundary that separate[d] the Cherokee
country from Georgia; guaranty[ing] to them all the land within
their boundary; solemnly pledg[ing] the faith of the United
States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and
recogniz[ing] the pre-existing power of the [Cherokee] nation to
govern itself."9
In the Chief Justice's view, the offensive Georgia legislation was clearly
"extra-territorial."4" And to Justice McLean, the geographic nature of
sovereignty was even more significant - that
[a] state claims the right of sovereignty, commensurate with her
territory; as the United States claim[421] it, in their proper
sphere, to the extent of the federal limits. This right or power,
in some cases, may be exercised, but not in others. Should a
hostile force invade the country, at its most remote boundary, it
would become the duty of the general government to expel the
invaders. But it would violate the solemn compacts with the
Indians, without cause, to dispossess them of rights which they
possess by nature, and have been uniformly acknowledged by
the federal government!'
In 'the modem era, however, the Court's dedication to territorial
sovereignty has clearly waned. Oliphant certainly suggests a rejection of the
geographic view. Nevertheless, many of the modem decisions refuse to
discard territorial sovereignty outright. Indeed, "[t]he Court has repeatedly
emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal
sovereignty."4  In Williams v. Lee,"4 the dispositive issue was the
plaintiff non-Indian storekeeper's mere presence on the reservation, not
419. Id. at 561-62.
420. Id. at 561.
421. This is no misspelling. As the wonderful Civil War historian Shelby Foote has noted,
in the yeaTs before the rebellion, it was quite normal for people to say "the United States are."
Only after the war did the usage take the form of "the United States is." For what it's worth, that
minor semantical difference dramatically illustrates a monumental shift in thinking regarding state
sovereignty.
422. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 591 (McLean, J., concurring); see also Jane M. Smith,
Republicanism, Imperialism, and Sovereignty: A History of the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty,
37 BuFF. L. REv. 527, 547 (1988-89) (equating Justice McLean's view of sovereignty with de
facto control of territory).
423. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).




tribal membership. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache" - decided less than
a year after Montana - the Court warned that "[n]onmembers who lawfully
enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe's power.., to place conditions
on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct . . . [a]
nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to the
risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign power."'' In the end,
however, the significance of territorial sovereignty may be most important
in terms of concerns over the settled interests of non-Indians, who, for
whatever reason, find themselves in Indian country. For as Judge Pregerson
noted a few years back, these claims can be - morally, at least - quite
weak.
It may well be that non-Indians who acquired land inside the
reservation never expected to be subjected to regulation by the
Indians. But likewise the Indians themselves never expected,
when the Hell Gate Treaty set aside the Flathead Reservation
"for the[ir] exclusive use and benefit" and barred non-Indians
from living there without Indian assent, that reservation land
opened without their consent to non-Indians would be removed
from their jurisdiction. The Indians' expectations rest on the
explicit guarantees of a treaty signed by the President and
Secretary of State and ratified by the Senate. The non-Indians'
expectations rest not on explicit statutory language, but on what
is presumed to have been the intent underlying the allotment
acts - a policy of destroying tribal government to assimilate
the Indians into American society. It is difficult to see why
there should be an overriding federal interest in vindicating only
the latter expectations ......
425. 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982).
426. Id. at 144-45. But we must be ever-mindful ofjust what the Court means when it uses
a term like "tribal land." For while a discussion on the subject of state jurisdiction would rarely
implicate only State-owned property in describing a State's territorial reach, it seems quite
probable that "tribal land" here means something less - perhaps "tribally owned land, or trust
land, or land not held in fee simple by anyone but a tribal member."
427. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Namen, 665 F.2d
951, 964 (9th Cir. 1982). Professor Wilkinson suggests a possible source of this (sometimes
surprising) recurring theme - that
(i]t is far more complicated than a sense of guilt or obligation, emotions frequently
associated with Indian policy. Somehow, these old negotiations - typically
conducted in but a few days on hot, dry plains between midlevel federal
bureaucrats and seemingly ragtag Indian leaders - are tremendously evocative.
Real promises were made on those plains, and the Senate of the United States
approved them, making them real laws. My sense is that most judges cannot shake
that. Their training, experience, and, finally, their humanity - all of the things
that blend into the rule of law - brought them up short when it came to signing
opinions that would have obliterated those promises.
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And when the courts depart from this logic, they quickly find themselves
entangled in an intractable jurisprudential thicket. In short, the fiction that
geography is somehow severable from sovereignty is an illusion peculiar to
federal Indian law.4"
E. Observations and Suggestions
Clearly, there seem to be (at least) three major interests at stake in any
possible improvement upon the Hovenkamp cites, demonstrating that Scalia
the "textualist" makes a strong appeal to tradition while ignoring the text of
our Eleventh Amendment tribal exhaustion doctrine. First and foremost is
the issue of tribal sovereignty. Second is the matter of the civil rights of all
individuals that are subject to that sovereignty42 - although arguably, that
issue might logically be collapsed into the first.4" Finally, there are the
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 121-22.
428. For an exhaustive and enlightening discussion of the geography-Indian law connexion,
see generally Dussias, supra note 16.
429. This, in fact, seems to be the issue that animated the pre-National Farmers Union
formulation of the exhaustion doctrine. In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (the ICRA does not create a federal cause of action and
the only remedy available under the ICRA is the writ of habeas corpus), there have been several
attempts to effect legislative reform. See, e.g., S. 2747, 100th Cong. (1988) (granting federal
district courts jurisdiction over suits alleging violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act.), revised
and reintroduced as S. 517, 101st. Cong. (1989).
In a similar vein, Professor Laurence has argued that tribal governments ought to have the
power to "do what governments do" - to "exercise power over people, not all of whom consent
to the precise exercise of the power." Laurence, Memorandum, supra note 31, at 14. He would
permit jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians in both civil and criminal cases. Id. However,
Professor Laurence would also allow review of that power by the "dominant sovereign"
(presumably in U.S. district court) in light of the tribes' limited sovereignty and their [physical]
proximity. Id. Professor Laurence proposes that such review would be effected through habeas
corpus in criminal cases, id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1303), and through collateral attack in civil
matters, id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302; 28 U.S.C. § 1983). Professor Laurence does qualify his
suggestion, however, asserting that such review should be carried out with a great "amount of
deference to tribal tradition" and to the tribes' interest in "modem evolution." Id.
Professor Clinton has proposed a seemingly less invasive remedy - of statutorily-created
certiorari jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court over final tribal court decisions under
the ICRA in lieu of any proposal for federal district court jurisdiction to relitigate post-exhaustion
cases. See Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the United States Comm n
on Civil Rights, 100th Cong. 81-82 (1988) [hereinafter ICRA Enforcement Hearing] (remarks of
Professor Robert N. Clinton). In the alternative, Professor Clinton has suggested that an lntertribal
Court of Appeals would also satisfy demands for review of ICRA cases already tried in the tribal
courts. Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 57, at 892.
Finally, Professor Reynolds suggests an expansion of Professor Clinton's suggested certiorari
jurisdiction to "encompass not merely tribal court decisions interpreting the Indian Civil Rights
Act, but also tribal court rulings that involve any federal question." See Reynolds, supra note 18,
1153-54.
430. The notion of admitting the existence of tribal sovereignty and then proceeding to a
discussion of individual rights within that sovereign jurisdiction couched in terms culled from the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
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so-called settled expectations of non-Indians in Indian country43' - even
if a sea change in that respect would not be altogether unprecedented. 432
At any rate, enlightened opinions range from qualified approval of the
tribal exhaustion doctrine,433 to a kind of resigned acceptance of the status
quo,4" to calls for a roots-up rethinking of the entire rule.4 3' As a
United States Constitution seems, at best, odd. Consider the idea of how France would react to
suggestions that it entertain a discussion of the rights of its citizens premised on the rights set out
in the United States Constitution.
431. As already discussed, this issue was crucial to the development of the National Farmers
Union-Iowa Mutual formulation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. Given the import Anglo-
American jurisprudence places on upholding settled interests in property, it seems highly unlikely
that any solution that does not adequately address the interests of non-Indians in Indian country
will ever receive widespread acceptance. In Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), the Court
stated that proposition in no uncertain terms, noting that
[i]n no context is this more true than with respect to rights in real property.
Abraham Lincoln once described with scorn those who sat in the basements of
courthouses combing property records to upset established titles. Our reports are
replete with reaffirmations that questions affecting titles to land, once decided,
should no longer be considered open.
Id. at 620. For an enlightening discussion of some of the expectations of non-Indians in Indian
country, see Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 19-23.
432. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (irrespective
of claims of statutes of limitation or abatement, a 1795 transaction that purported to transfer
approximately 100,000 acres in upstate New York was invalid where the requisite federal
approval was not obtained). Professor Wilkinson notes that in that case, Arlinda Locklear, a
"brilliant oral advocate" and the first Indian woman to argue before the Court, "stood alone at the
Bar and marshaled a congeries of law, history, and morality" in an ultimately successful struggle
to counteract nearly two centuries of inequity. Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 41; see also
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 964
(9th Cir. 1982); Laurence, Memorandum, supra note 31, at 14 (suggesting that legitimate
expectations of those who have not "granted" consent to be so governed notwithstanding, that
tribal courts ought to be vested with jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians in both civil and
criminal cases).
433. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 57, at 194-95, 222 (upon finding "striking similarity"
between the reasons behind the exhaustion rule in both administrative and tribal venues, arguing
that the "exhaustion requirements in federal Indian law should generally conform to the principles
set out in administrative law," and grounded in the tribal courts' "expertise in determining whether
control of a certain activity is essential to tribal self-government"); Wilkinson, supra note 23, at
114-15 (suggesting liberal federal post-exhaustion review on an "arbitrary and capricious
standard" modeled on the Administrative Procedure Act, and characterizing the exhaustion
doctrine as a "major step toward meeting the legitimate interests of non-Indians"). But see
discussion of the troubling sovereignty ramification of such a policy at supra notes 57, 256-62
and accompanying text.
434. See, e.g., Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts
After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal
Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REv. 259, 286-93 (1993) (describing the
doctrine as an opportunity for the development of the tribal courts); Laurence, Memorandum,
supra note 31, at 13-14 (arguing against the jurisdictionally restrictive results in Montana and
Brendale but supporting federal court review of "complaints about the exercise of that civil
jurisdiction"); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
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second-year law student and self-taught novitiate in Indian law, I will not
be so axrogant as to propose a proper solution to the current state of
affairs! "' However, certain consistent themes do begin to emerge from a
review of the decided cases and academic observations.
First, the exhaustion doctrine clearly reverberates beyond the federal and
tribal courthouses. Although the state courts often become lost in the fray
once a defendant files a challenge to tribal jurisdiction in federal court,
these controversies are really jurisdictional disputes between state and tribal
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1234 (1990) (characterizing the doctrine
as a happy melding of "Anglo-American procedural and substantive values" and "Indian traditions
of dispute resolution" that give tribal courts the chance to "show that they can fairly and
effectively litigate civil disputes involving non-Indian defendants"); Pommersheim, supra note
121, at 329 (approving of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual for their recognition of the
importance of the tribal courts, and for their "special force" - their explicit rules that "curb the
most prevalent attempts to undermine and circumvent tribal court jurisdiction"); Laurence,
Algebra, supra note 162, at 422 (suggesting that plenary power with some tribal sovereignty is
better than no tribal sovereignty at all).
435. See, e.g., Phillip Win. Lear & Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies:
Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmaative Action, 71 N.D. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (1995) (arguing
that "[blright-line tests result from tortured reading of the seminal cases by federal district and
appellate courts," that "protectionist attitudes favoring mandatory exhaustion .. . debase any
notion of equal dignity of [tribal] courts," and which result in "nothing less than affirmative action
for tribal courts"); David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent,
and Comnunity in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 408-416 (1994) (challenging the
courts to find a workable justification for federal plenary power that will help shape a model of
statutory interpretation in federal Indian law); Clinton, Redressing the Legacy, supra note 37, at
150 (calling the tribal exhaustion doctrine a reflection of "the ultimate colonialist distrust of
leaving the final resolution of such questions to tribal governance ... all the more remarkable
since the lederal Full Faith and Credit Act, [28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988)], seems to require all courts
within the United States to give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments"); Resnik, supra
note 162, at 692-96 (generally condemning the plenary federal power doctrine); Collins, supra
note 162, at 370, 382-84 (suggesting that tribal sovereignty may be protected from Congressional
interference through principles of international law as well as through the Supremacy Clause, but
noting that the most important structural protection of tribal sovereignty is the allocation of
paramount power to the federal government rather than to the states); Robert A. Williams Jr.,
Documen's of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 237, 276 (1989) (calling proposals
for authorization of federal court review of tribal decisions the "legacy of European racism and
imperialism"); Williams, Indian Jurisprudence, supra note 162, at 258-67 (characterizing plenary
federal power as a lawless force exerted on a conquered people); Williams, Eurocentric Myopia,
supra note 162, at 439 (arguing that the discovery and plenary power doctrines deny Indians true
self-determination); see also Newton, supra note 162, at 261-67 (suggesting that tribal sovereignty
may be protected from Congressional interference through the Due Process Clause); See generally
ICRA Enforcement Hearing, supra note 429, at 77, 80 (remarks of Professor Robert N. Clinton)
(stating that federal review of tribal court decisions is unnecessary since tribal court abuses of
power are "episodic" exceptions to the norm).
436. I also expect to be labelled naive, overly idealistic, simplistic, and/or unrealistic. That




courts.437 When National Farmers Union expressly converted all such
disputes into section 1331 federal questions, it also interposed an
"unnecessary . . . federal overlay" in those disputes.438 So in effect,
National Farmers Union simply provided another avenue by which litigants
might challenge tribal courts.439 And the National Farmers Union/Iowa
Mutual formulation, for a time at least, seemed to create an automatic
preference for the tribal forum when state court jurisdiction might be
proper.'
Second, the altogether muddled relationship between tribal regulatory/
legislative jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction needs to be settled with
clarity and finality. Assuming, for a moment, the validity of the existing
plenary federal framework, the former seems likely to remain a fixture of
federal law. Accordingly, the federal courts have been exercising
jurisdiction over challenges to tribal regulatory authority under notions of
tribal "quasi-sovereignty" since the early nineteenth century."M' Conversely,
437. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1136.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. Professor Reynolds documents the ongoing post-Williams v. Lee struggle between
the state and tribal courts to "delineate the contours of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction." Id.
(citing Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the
Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MoNT. L. REv. 211,250-304 (1991) (describing
the evolution of state and tribal court jurisdiction in Montana)); Frank R. Pommersheim,
Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REv. 239, 248-76 (1991) (examining
attempts by tribal and state courts to address the nature of the legal relationship between tribes
and states)). Moreover, the once-bright Williams v. Lee line has become blurred by the rise of
tribal business activities conducted with non-Indian, non-reservation based partners. REYNOLDS,
supra note 18, at 1137. In such cases, there may be a good case for finding concurrent state and
tribal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 466 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("[T]he Court has recognized
coextensive state and tribal civil jurisdiction where the exercise of concurrent authority does not
do violence to the rights of either sovereign"); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Smith
Plumbing Co., 856 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1988) (the state court properly asserted jurisdiction
in a suit between non-Indians where "no Indian assets or other property situated in Indian country
could be directly affected"). Cf. Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338 (D.S.D.
1975) (the tribal court had jurisdiction in controversy concerning the regulation of tribal land).
Finally, Professor Reynolds argues that the tribal exhaustion doctrine ignores a legitimate state
interest in adjudicating disputes involving significant off-reservation contacts - that under the
exhaustion doctrine's "virtually unlimited reach, the federal courts are now able to channel into
tribal courts many cases that under a Williams v. Lee analysis would not fall within the tribal
courts' exclusive jurisdiction." Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1137.
441. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Indian tribes had no power
to confer title to land); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (striking down
the tribe's purported power to regulate non-Indian hunting on non-tribal lands located within the
reservation's borders); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989) (the tribe had no regulatory power over land use in the "opened" area of its
reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (denying the Crow Tribe's
power to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers within the borders of the reservation on
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the Supreme Court has long recognized that the tribal courts are an essential
element of the tribest inherent sovereignty. Moreover, they are an element
not subject to the United States Constitution. 2 In that respect, Iowa
Mutual's recognition that civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation
lands "presumptively lies in the tribal courts" was simply a continuation of
that long-standing policy. 43 And "[j]ust as the federal courts are powerless
to disagree with a state court's interpretation of its own laws, so too should
the tribal court be the final arbiter of the scope and meaning of its
legislative enactments."' ' Professor Reynolds argues convincingly that the
logical outcome of this line of reasoning should be the complete removal
of challenges to tribal adjudicatory power from federal question jurisdiction,
while simultaneously eliminating the tribal exhaustion rule in federal court
challenges to tribal regulatory power."
fee land owned by nonmembers in light of the "general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe").
442. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Indian tribe was not constrained by
grand jury requirement sincq tribal powers existed before the Constitution, or the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
443. Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). Professor Singer discusses the
detrimental results of the failure to distinguish adjudicatory jurisdiction from legislative
jurisdiction, noting that the AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK'S citation to the legislative
jurisdiction cases such as Montana and Brendale to support the editors' narrow view of tribal
court adjudicatory jurisdiction, is, at best, misleading. See Singer, supra note 217, at 324-25.
Professor Singer's assertions certainly seem borne out in a recent case heard in Montana's
federal district court. See Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Mont. 1995), rev'd, No.
96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997). Chief Judge Hatfield followed the
DESKBOOI,'S recommendations and applied Montana to conclude that "when an Indian tribe
invokes its inherent sovereignty as the basis of its authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee
lands, there is a presumption against tribal authority." Id. at 1181. But see State v. Hicks, 944
F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996) (citing A-1 Contractors with approval but recognizing a
principled distinction between tribal adjudicatory and legislative authority under Montana).
Professor Reynolds goes so far as to suggest that the root cause of this confusion may lie in
National Farmers Union itself. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1140-41 (citing National Farmers
Union, 471 U.S. at 854). In National Farmers Union, Justice Stevens, in attempting to explain
why exhaustion had not been an issue previously, chose to distinguish Leroy Sage's case from
the criminal action in Oliphant. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854 (citing Oliphant v,
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). Exhaustion was not at issue in Oliphant because
federal legislation seemed to reserve exclusive criminal over non-Indians in Indian country to the
federal courts. Thus, absent any hint of tribal jurisdiction, exhaustion would have been pointless.
Tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction in civil matters, however, was not "automatically
foreclosed." Id. at 855. But in drawing that distinction, Justice Stevens "unnecessarily equated
disputes involving tribal legislative jurisdiction with disputes involving tribal court adjudicatory
power." Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1141.
444. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1147.
445. ,d. at 1149-52. In such cases, the tribal courts would retain concurrent jurisdiction in
an analogue to the "unremarkable" situation wherein state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to
decide issues of federal law. Id. Professor Reynolds notes, however, that this would in turn




Third, because this result would create a class of cases unreviewable
under any existing formulation, Professor Reynolds argues for expansion
of the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction to include not just ICRA
actions, but any tribal court decision that involves a federal question.m 7
While this suggestion is not ideal - it would, at minimum, still impinge
upon tribal sovereignty - such a change would at least end the untenable
circumstance under the current rule where a tribal court may be relegated
to the role of little more than fact-finder for a federal district court." It
would also be a pragmatic recognition that, given the tribes' political status
within the federal scheme, an autonomous tribal justice system is not
currently a viable option."9
Finally, Professor Reynolds suggests that the limited number of cases the
Court accepts on certiorari would support claims that only certiorari review
would be an inadequate deterrent to abuses of adjudicatory power. But her
federal courts. Id.
446. Essentially an expansion of the rule set out in Santa Clara Pueblo - that tribal court
decisions under the ICRA are final and unreviewable.
447. See, Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1153-56. Presumably, this suggestion builds upon her
earlier suggestion that challenges to tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction should no longer pose
a federal question under section 1331.
448. Id.
449. Id. Professor Reynolds observes that, regardless of the underlying motivation, neither
Congress nor the federal courts are apt to allow any significant expansion of tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent some form of subsequent federal review.
Perhaps even more importantly, an unrestrained tribal judiciary might discourage at least some
business development between Indian and non-Indian enterprises. (This does not necessarily
suggest any racist motivation, but rather only recognizes the inherent desire of many business
people to conduct their affairs in a familiar and somewhat predictable environment). The Seventh
Circuit addressed this problem in a recent case between an Illinois law firm and its tribal client.
See Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Manufacturing Corp., 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1019 (1993). In light of a choice of law provision expressly designed to avoid the tribal
forum, the Seventh Circuit upheld the provision and refused to order exhaustion of tribal
remedies. Id. at 814. Exhaustion was held inappropriate because the tribal court would have had
to interpret Illinois law, because no tribal court proceedings were pending, and because no tribal
ordinance was challenged. Id Moreover, the Seventh Circuit believed that refusing to enforce
the explicit choice of law provision in this contract could result in disadvantaging a tribes'
economic activities in regional or national markets, and thus, "the Tribe's efforts to improve the
reservation's economy may come to naught." Id. at 815.
But read with just a slightly different intonation, of course, this is simply another case of
paternalistic tutelage - of a federal court instructing a tribe in what it ought to do for its own
good. Presumably, the tribal court would be cognizant of these factors even without the Seventh
Circuit's instruction. Professor Reynolds similarly notes that "[i]f concern for tribal sovereignty
is really the motivating factor behind the exhaustion doctrine ... perhaps the Seventh Circuit
should have allowed the tribal court to determine the validity and scope of the contract's choice
of law provision." Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1134 (citing Fuller v. Blaze Constr. Co., 20 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6011, 6011-12 (Rosebud Sioux Ct. App., Jan. 14,
1993) (remanding to the tribal court for an opinion on the enforceability of a contract provision
that purported to give the defendant unrestricted power to choose the federal or tribal forum)).
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appraisal - essentially that Supreme Court review would not operate in a
political vacuum - is less than satisfying. Professor Reynolds essentially
suggests a carrot-and-stick approach - that ongoing Interior Department
supervision, together with the tribes' desire to continue receiving federal
monies and to placate potential non-Indian business contacts, and the need
to obtain collateral enforcement of tribal court judgements in state court
would all operate as effective checks on tribal court abuses.4"' In light of
those comments, mention of a few other possibilities seems apropos.
First and foremost, funding of tribal justice systems ought not to be tied
to subjective expectations of competence and "fairness" based on Anglo-
American notions of due process4 ' As sovereigns, the tribes have an
inherent right to apply their own brand of substantive and procedural
law.4 And tribal court competence can only be hindered by denial of
adequate funding for tribal court training and operations.4" In other words,
450. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1155-56.
451. Cf State v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1467 & n.22 (D. Nov. 1996) (accepting that
some tribal councils act as appellate bodies and as executive decision makers, and that tribal court
proceedings may "vary substantially from what practitioners have come to expect in federal
courts").
452. Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 204-05 (1895) (The mere fact the procedures
employed by a foreign court do not embody the same safeguards recognized as inherent in the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is not, in and of itself, "a sufficient ground
for impeaching the foreign judgment").
453. In 1993, Congress acted to support the tribal justice system by enacting the Indian
Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-76, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C, §§
3601-3631 (1994)). This Act was, in part, a response to calls for federal court review of tribal
court decisions. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on Tribal Sovereign
Immunity, available in 1996 WL 10831369 (Sept. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Endreson Statement]
(statement of Douglas B.L. Endreson of the law firm of Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson).
The Act e:pressed strong support for the tribal judiciary by providing resources and funding
essential to the development of tribal justice systems. Id. It also reaffirmed Congress' goal that
"Indian tribes possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of government, including
tribal justice systems" and that "tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving
tribal Justice systems is essential to the accomplishment of the goals of this Act." Id. (citing 25
U.S.C. § 3601(4)). The Indian Tribal Justice Act authorizes appropriations of $58.4 million
annually over a seven-year period - with $50 million to be used for the basic operations of tribal
judicial systems - in the expectation that tribal court systems will be increasing their workload
and expanding their jurisdictional scope at a substantially more rapid pace. Id. Moreover,
Congress recognized that "the lack of available funds places severe constraints on the
development of tribal justice systems." Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1157 & n.l (citing HR. Rt!P.
No. 205, 103d. Cong. 9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2425, 2430). However, the
Indian Tribal Justice Act notwithstanding, funding for tribal courts has, in fact, declined.
Endreson Statement, supra, at n.32 and accompanying text. The amount actually expended for
tribal judicial systems in Fiscal Year 1996 was $10.443 million - $4 million less than in FY
1995. Id. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Canby has testified that the current funding
scheme for tribal courts is at crisis stage, and that "[a] collapse of the tribal court system for lack
of resources would be a major judicial disaster, not just for the tribes and their courts, but for our
whole system of civil and criminal justice." Oversight Hearing on the Indian. Tribal Justice Act
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while more money alone would provide no guarantee that tribal courts
would equal the expectations of every federal or state court judge - or
even of most Indian and non-Indian defendants - the absence of adequate
funding can virtually assure that they never will.
Nor should the specter of denied enforcement of tribal court judgements
be an available "stick" with which state and federal courts can impose their
own standards on tribal governments. In light of the unique status of Indian
tribes within the federal scheme,4" it is "imperative, not only that a
uniform body of law develop in relation to the recognition and enforcement
of civil judgments rendered in the various tribal courts, but that issues
relating to the recognition and enforcement of the judgments be resolved in
accordance with federal law." 55 Accordingly, it might be time that
Congress brings tribal court judgements within federal full faith and credit.4
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1995 WL 457394, at *14 (Aug. 2,
1995) (statement of the Hon. William C. Canby, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit).
454. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
455. Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1187, 1191-92 (D. Mont. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-
35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997).
456. See also Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 57 (arguing that existing policy bolsters the
negative aspects of tribal-governmental relations while doing little to foster positive developments,
and urging adoption of an inter-governmental relationship modeled upon international law
ideals - but applying full faith and credit rather than mere comity); Clinton, Redressing the
Legacy, supra note 37, at 150 ("[T]he federal Full Faith and Credit Act [28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1988)] seems to require all courts within the United States to give full faith and credit to tribal
court judgments"); AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN
LAW E-8 n.22 (1976) (citing COHEN, 1942 ED., supra- note 33, at 145 and cases for the
proposition that several states seem to recognize full faith and credit for tribal court judgements).
Full faith and credit can be a two-edged sword however. While it would certainly ensure a
tribal court the ability to enforce its judgements, it would also require reciprocity. Hence, a tribal
court might find itself obliged to enforce the order of a distant court with no cognisance of a
tribal member's cultural, social or economic circumstances. Professor Laurence seems to share
that concern. See, e.g., Laurence, Enforcement, supra note 31, at 685-86 (arguing that bilateral
full faith and credit would be too rigid and would sweep too broadly). But under similar grants
of flexibility, the courts have long been permitted to determine the existence and extent of a tribal
court's jurisdiction based on "a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or
judicial decisions." National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 855-56. Moreover, Professor Laurences
vision relies, I fear, too much on negotiations between state and tribal governments that would
be predicated on a "mutual desire to create a system that does the job, and the mutual respect for
differences that drives comity and makes it work." Laurence, Enforcement, supra note 31, at 686-
87. It appears that jurisdictional jockeying in both adjudicatory and regulatory controversies
seems simply too ingrained to trust in that kind of optimistic view. Cf. Cross, supra note 162
(discussing the State of Montana's recent challenge to the EPA's approval of the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribe's application for treatment as a state for purposes of enforcing portions
of the Clean Water Act).
Of course, some pretty dicey situations could arise where a court refuses to honor a tribal
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court's judgement on a showing that the tribal forum is biased, incompetent or otherwise unfit.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (authorizing refusal to recognize a foreign
judgement where the domestic court is convinced that there was no opportunity for a full, fair and
impartial trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon "regular" proceedings). While it
would be nice to hold unqualifiedly that all tribal forums are equal in that respect, the reality is
that they are not yet so.
Mindful of the foregoing, I would add to the full faith and credit recommendation, a three-
pronged approach: (1) ensuring that tribal justice systems receive the funding they need to carry
out their missions; (2) tribes at least considering the benefits of permitting non-Indians to sit on
juries that concern non-Indian issues or parties; and (3) expanding the role of intertribal courts
of appeal.
The first prong has been discussed at length. The second - more inclusive juries - would
surely appeal to those who worry most about impartiality and due process issues. Of all the
possible ontributions citizens can make to governance, jury participation is widely considered
a most vital barrier to governmental arbitrariness.
The institution of the jury ... places the real direction of society in the hands
of the governed, or of a portion of the governed, and not in that of the
government. . . . He who punishes the criminal is . . . the real master of
society .... All the sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own
authority, and to direct society instead of obeying its directions, have destroyed
or enfeebled the institution of the jury.
ALEXIs Di" TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83 (1948 ed.). Few (politically possible)
developments would do as much to mitigate nonmembers' concerns. This would, of course, have
to be decided by each tribe individually. However, there is a model in place - nonmember
citizens of the Navajo Nation already serve on civil juries in Navajo Tribal Courts. See Hearings
on Section 329, H.R. 3662 Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Concerning Civil
Jurisdiction Within Indian Country, 1993 WL 10831410 (Testimony of Herb Yazzie, Attorney
General of the Navajo Nation).
An expanded intertribal appellate body - modeled on the existing regional intertribal courts
of appeal or on international adjudicative tribunals - might serve to certify tribal courts under
the amended Full Faith and Credit Act. It could also serve as a clearinghouse for tribal court
training programs, and provide a rich source of caselaw for the Indian Law Reporter. Perhaps
that body could provide intermediate review, situated between the tribal courts and the Supreme
Court under something like Professor Reynolds's proposal for broadened certiorari jurisdiction.
The only stumbling blocks would seem to be how a consensus would be reached on funding,
staffing and appointing judges to such a body. The process, however, could itself prove a
enriching experience for those involved.
There is one other potential problem. A shift such as described here could precipitate another
significant challenge to tribal court jurisdiction - this time under the federal diversity statute.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). Professor Pommersheim notes that diversity jurisdiction is
essentially a method of filling in jurisdictional voids as well as a means of assuring litigants a
neutral forum. See Pommersheim, supra note 121, at 348-51. He worries, however, that
application of the diversity doctrine in federal courts today "is also clearly at odds with current
federal Indian policy supporting tribal court development." Id. at 350. Professor Pommersheim
believes the biggest problem with diversity is that it "breaks down in the context of diversity in
the tribal court situation because no plaintiff has access to a state forum." Id. at 350-51 (citation
omitted). Professor Reynolds suggests, however, that these concerns can be addressed simply by
substituting the term "a non-federal forum" in place of "a state forum." See Reynolds, supra note
18, at 1103. By viewing diversity more broadly - as a choice between not just a state and
federal court, but also as between a federal and a "non-federal" court - the fact that there might
be no available state forum is irrelevant. Id. In cases where a matter is properly cognizable in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/3
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tribal court, the tribal court simply "stands in the stead of the state court." Id.
Currently, individual Indians are considered citizens of their home states, and are subject to
the same diversity rules as non-Indians. See, e.g., Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311
(9th Cir. 1982) (where each Indian plaintiff was citizen of different state from each defendant
mining company, the individual Indians properly invoked the district court's diversity jurisdiction
in action alleging that Indian uranium miners were exposed to substantial amounts of radiation,
causing lung cancer and other severe radiation-related injuries and death);' Schantz v. White
Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (Federal diversity jurisdiction did not exist in action
arising out of accident on Indian reservation where the defendant Indians were members of tribes
located in North Dakota and the non-Indian plaintiffs were also residents of North Dakota). Cf.
Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1996) (where cashier of tribal casino who
was a citizen of Rhode Island brought personal injury suit against Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Nation after falling in an off-reservation tribally owned parking lot, the tribal officials were
citizens of Connecticut but the Indian Nation was not a citizen of any state for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction). However, tribes are generally not considered citizens of a state except
unless incorporated under either the IRA or tribal law. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New
York State v. Oneida County, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 927, rev'd
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (where the Oneida Indian Nation brought action in federal
court against two New York counties to challenge an eighteenth century sale of tribal lands under
the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, the nation was not a citizen of a state different from New York
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under statute conferring jurisdiction in actions between
citizens of different states); Whiteco Metrocom Div. of Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 902 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.D. 1995) (the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction in action
arising from alleged breach of contract where the tribe was not incorporated under the IRA and
was therefore not citizen of any state for purpose of diversity jurisdiction); Snowbird Const. Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Idaho 1987) (an incorporated tribal housing authority
with its principal place of business in Nevada was citizen of Nevada for diversity purposes); R.
C. Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Hous. Auth., 521 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont. 1981) (a defendant
tribal housing authority, established as a corporate entity pursuant to a tribal ordinance, was a
citizen of the state of Montana for diversity purposes even though the Indian tribe itself was not
considered a citizen of Montana or of any other state; it was not the tribe which was being sued,
but the housing authority established by the tribe as a legal entity susceptible to suit on its
contracts in any court of competent jurisdiction). Cf. Enterprise Elec. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 353 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Mont. 1973); accord Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726 (10th
Cir. 1993) (fact that an Indian tribe's constitution referred to tribe as being "in the nature of a
non-profit corporation" did not establish the tribe or its ski resort as a corporation for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction with respect to plaintiffs suit for injuries received when he was struck
in back of his head by chairlift at ski resort); R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth.,
509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981) (the diversity statute does not confer federal jurisdiction over
a tribe or tribal court). But see Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1993) (a tribe
may charter a corporation pursuant to its own tribal laws, and such a corporation will be
considered a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction) (citing Stock Vest, Inc. v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1223 n.3, 1226 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Thus, it seems plausible that statutory full faith and credit for tribal courts could lead to well-
argued calls for treating tribes as states for purposes of removal to federal court. There is no great
logical chasm between recognition that under some circumstances an Indian tribe is not a citizen
of any state, to a recognition of Jndian tribes as quasi-foreign states for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. And as Professor Singer notes, the Supreme Court very often treats tribes as
sovereigns when the tribes would benefit more from being treated as property owners, but often
treats tribes as voluntary associations when they would benefit instead from being treated as
sovereigns. Singer, supra note 16, at 55-56. Even under the current formulation of the diversity
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Conclusion
Out of the political turmoil and social unrest of the 1960s, two
significant developments occurred in the federal Indian law. The Supreme
Court, through Williams v. Lee's progeny, reasserted the long-dormant
concept of tribal sovereignty. Later in that decade, Congress, in an attempt
to ensure the civil rights of individual Indian people, enacted the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968. And through the complexities of Anglo-American
law and jurisdictional wrangling, these two grand movements transmogrified
into what we now know as the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
This article has argued that this tribal exhaustion doctrine was largely
derived from existing legal rules that governed the review of inferior forums
in administrative and habeas corpus actions. Perhaps in part due to the less
than candid approach regarding both process and goals, the result is an often
confused and inconsistent body of law. Moreover, this view of tribal courts
at once *demeans the tribal courts and, more significantly, could lead to a
serious erosion of tribal sovereignty generally.4" Finally, the tribal
exhaustion doctrine has afforded Congress enough breathing room that it
could ignore serious problems concerning the Indian justice system -
problems caused both by the doctrine itself, as well as by insufficient
funding.
Ultimately, the question goes beyond merely whether the body of
decisions that have resulted from the tribal exhaustion doctrine have been
correct or even just: rather, it goes to the essential question of whether that
body of law accords the proper respect to modern tribal governments. In
light of Congress's clear responsibility to ensure that respect, it is time for
a long-overdue legislative response to this unsettled state of affairs. The
fundamental interests of the tribes and of individual Indian peoples issues
are likely just too complex for adequate treatment under common law
principles.45 There are also settled interests of non-Indian landowners and
residents of Indian reservations to consider.45 Even an unwary tourist's
statute, the result could be removal to federal court of virtually any controversy between a
reservation resident and nonresident - and even where the parties are residents of the same state,
and even of the same county! That, in turn, could interpose federal involvement in tribal court
proceedings far beyond the impact National Farmers Union has ever had. Moreover, since that
argument would be grounded in territorial sovereignty, it might prove even more difficult to
counter. Finally, since a federal court sitting in diversity (absent contractual agreements to the
contrary) must apply the substantive law of the forum "sfate" - and since it is fairly
inconceivable that federal district courts will be established on reservations any time soon - non-
Indians would enjoy yet another advantage.
457. See supra notes 37, 277.
458. Cf Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 118-19 (noting that when courts justly act to rectify
individual abuses, all tribes' rights are necessarily implicated).




simple act of traveling through Indian country on a federal or state highway
might result in their very real and immediate interest in the scope of tribal
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, simply staying on the "good roads" is no
solution.4" And if the Supreme Court again avoids the important questions
in its forthcoming decision in A-] Contractors, it seems clear that only
when Congress addresses this problem forthrightly and clearly can the tribal
courts finally "go about their business of conflict resolution and the
development of judicial standards.""'
Epilogue
As this article goes to press in the fall of 1997 - almost a year after the
preceding material was researched and written - the landscape of federal
Indian law has indeed changed significantly. On April 28, 1997, the
Supreme Court handed down its unanimous decision in Strate v. A-i
Contractois,' and the result could hardly be more disturbing. In a
plainly-worded opinion, Justice Ginsburg has made one thing quite clear:
this Court does not cotton to tribal courts passing judgement on non-Indians
merely because of those persons' presence or acts within reservation
boundaries. Indeed, it is as if much of the federal Indian law has been time-
warped to a time predating National Farmers Union.' In the process, the
inaction in this area. It is, after all, "a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process of
inclusion and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is not allowed to end with its
enunciation and that an expression in an opinion yields later to the impact of facts unforeseen."
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
460. See supra note *.
461. Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1157.
462. 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1407-08 (1997) (when an accident occurs on a portion of a public
highway maintained by the state under a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation
land, the resulting civil action falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance;
pursuant to the general rule and the two exceptions set out in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981), tribal courts presumptively may not entertain claims against nonmembers in such
cases).
As an added bonus - an unexpected prize in the cereal box as it were - the Court also
seems to suggest a brand new algebra for determining jurisdiction. Henceforth - and territorial
borders notwithstanding - the proximity of the situs of a claim to a courthouse may actually be
relevant. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409 n.4. Thus, a party engaged in an accident on, say, the Idaho
side of Lolo Pass on U.S. Highway 12, ought to be able to - purely for the sake of convenience,
mind you - file their case in Montana District Court in Missoula. I have driven that highway
many times, and I know for a fact that the Missoula County Courthouse is much closer to this
hypothetical accident than any Idaho courthouse. And if one of the parties raises a jurisdictional
objection? Why, simply cite Strate's truly novel Convenience Doctrine (and pray for the best).
463. District Court Judge Battin has once again - this time posthumously - been
vindicated by the Supreme Court. His belief that Montana is the proper measure of tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction has finally found purchase. Compare National Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp 213, 215-16 (D. Mont. 1983) with Strate, 117 S. Ct. at
1411 ("The Court's recognition in National Farmers that tribal courts have more extensive
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Court has resoundingly clarified many ambiguities attending the exhaustion
doctrine. Indeed, it appears that, while not expressly overruling National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, the Strate Court has not only clarified
what the exhaustion doctrine means, it has surgically eviscerated that
doctrine in the bargain.'5
Still, it lies beyond the scope and timing of this article to fully examine
the implications of the Supreme Court's unfortunate new stance. Indeed, it
seems quite likely that others will write more than enough about Strate in
the coming months. Still; I feel compelled to note Strate's most worrisome
implications. First, the Strate Court has sided with an expanding roster of
federal jurists who would place tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over
nonmembers within the same outer contours as tribal regulatory
jurisdiction." Second - and building on the first proposition - this
jurisdiction in civil matters than in criminal proceedings, and of the need to inspect relevant
statutes, treaties, and other materials, does not limit Montana's instruction .... In sum, we do
not extract from National Farmers anything more than a prudential exhaustion rule, in deference
to the capacity of tribal courts 'to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting [or
rejecting] jurisdiction').
Furthermore, to justify its current stance, the Court has dusted off notions rarely seen since
the pre-National Farmers Union exhaustion cases. Compare Necklace v. Tribal Court of the
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 554 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977) (while,
as a matter of comity, tribal remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before a claim is asserted in
federal court, that is not an inflexible requirement); Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.
1975) (exhaustion is a matter of comity, not an inflexible requirement; exhaustion of "futile"
remedies is not required); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.
1973) (exhaustion is not an "inflexible requirement"; a reviewing court must balance
strengthening the tribal courts, and through that, preservation of the tribe's cultural identity,
against the needs of individual litigants), with Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1411 n.7 ("[E]xhaustion is not
an unyielding requirement").
464. A cynic might argue that the Court carefully left National Farmers Union intact to
ensure that no question arises about the power of federal district courts to review tribal court
decisions as a federal question within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
465. In addition to the Tenth Circuit court's en bane ruling in A-I Contractors, see, e.g.,
Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressing skepticism about the
existence of any meaningful difference between adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction); State
v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1464 (D. Nev. 1996) (resolution of challenges to tribal court
jurisdiction "requires an examination of the nature and applicability of the Supreme Court's
holding in Montana."); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F.Supp
213 (D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845, 852 n.12 (1985)
(citing Montana as relevant to an analysis of tribal court jurisdiction); Wilson v. Marchington,
934 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D. Mont. 1995), rev'd, No. 96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept.
23, 1997) (where member of Blackfeet Indian Tribe sought recognition and registration of tribal
judgement against non-Indian truck driver, the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction
notwithstanding the fact that "tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, like tribal regulatory jurisdiction,
emanates from a tribe's retained inherent authority"; Montana did not intend a distinction between
a tribe's regulatory jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction.) (citing American Indian Law
Deskbook 131 (1993); Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 642 (S.D. 1993) (in collateral action




Court implies that Montana always governed not just tribal regulatory
authority over nonmembers, but tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction as well.
Third - and in spite of Iowa Mutual's clear preference for tribal
jurisdiction4M - Strate teaches us that the exhaustion rule set out in
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual is far from any "unyielding
requirement.""467 Rather, exhaustion is just a prudential speed-bump on the
road to federal or state court: nothing more than a nod in passing to the
tribal court which, at best, can only explain the basis of its own
jurisdictional ruling.' Finally, Strate purports to offer itself up as a clear
example of what the National Farmers Court was thinking of when it
discussed the inapplicability of exhaustion where a jurisdictional assertion
is motivated by a desire to harass, or is conducted in bad faith, where the
action violates express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion
would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge
the tribal court's jurisdiction.4
In other words, in condoning the very kind of jurisdictional end run to
federal court that precipitated both National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual, the Court sends a new and clear message to all non-Indian
defendants in tribal civil actions. Relying on Strate, a good-faith claim in
damages that resulted after member struck nonmember's dead horse on a state highway within
the reservation, holding that "without legislative authority to regulate Hettich's conduct, the tribal
court [had] no case [to] adjudicate"). But see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987) (recognizing a distinction between tribal adjudicatory and regulatory
jurisdiction); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1323
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (suggesting that under Montana, a challenge to
the tribe's regulatory jurisdiction presents a federal question, while an assertion of adjudicatory
jurisdiction should not). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Legislative jurisdiction] refers to the authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities and is quite a separate matter from jurisdiction to adjudicate
"); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 456
n.6 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the only citations that I have found of Montana's
rule governing tribal sovereignty appear in the dissent to our decision upholding tribal taxing
authority over non-Indians in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 171 (1982), and
in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in a case where the Court of Appeals upheld tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians"). What we do not know is how Justice Scalia would reconcile his
earlier opinions on this subject in non4ndian law cases. See supra notes 147, 367, 466.
466. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1412 (quoting Iowa Mutual Ins. Cos. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 18
(1987)) ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important
part of tribal sovereignty."). Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute. But in Iowa
Mutual, the Court refused to hold that even a specific federal statute - the federal diversity
statute found at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) - was sufficient justification to wrest away the
Blackfeet Tribal Court's jurisdiction over the nonmember defendants.
467. Strate, 117 S. Ct at 1411 n.7.
468. Id. at 1411.
469. Id. at 1416 n.14 (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 4-71
U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985)).
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federal court that Montana would preclude tribal court jurisdiction will
probably be enough to condone federal court review of the tribal court's
preliminary jurisdictional ruling. Nor will there be any reason to await full
trial and appeal in the tribal justice system: any federal district court may
now unashamedly sit as a quasi-appellate court over tribal courts of first
impression. If the unhappy defendant can find a property-based peg like the
one in Strate from which to hang her case, in the end, not only will the
tribal appellate court never see her case, the tribal trial court can probably
kiss the action goodbye as well.47 For Strate, more than anything,
effectively and efficiently provides a ready tool with which to preempt full
hearing in tribal court in any case involving anyone other than a tribal
member plaintiff and a tribal member defendant.47'
470. In addition to recasting the tribal court jurisdictional question in terms of Montana, see
infra note 463, and narrowing the definition of Indian country in civil actions, see infra note 477,
the Court has apparently disposed of a long-standing belief that rights-of-way on Indian
reservaticns do not generally abrogate tribal property interests in that land. Compare Strate v. A-I
Contractcrs, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1414 (1997) (when a state highway right-of-way is open to the
public, the highway's traffic is subject to state control, the Tribe has consented to the State's use
of the property, the Tribe has received payment for use of the property, the Tribe has retained no
gatekeeping right, and the property is maintained as part of the State's highway, the Tribes cannot
assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude, and the land is, for purposes of analyzing tribal
court jurisdiction, the same as land alienated to non-Indians), with United States v. Soldana, 246
U.S. 530, 532-33 (1918) (where criminal defendants sought to escape charges for introducing
intoxicating liquor onto the Crow Indian Reservation on ground that railroad station constructed
on railroad right-of-way at Crow Agency was not in Indian country, it was "clear that it was not
the purpose of Congress to extinguish the title of the Indians in the land comprised within the
right of way" - that such a reading would have divided the reservation in two, and "rendered
it much more difficult, if not impossible, to afford that protection to the Indians which the
provisions quoted were designed to insure"); Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994) (Flathead Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
claim between tribal nonmembers arising on U.S. highway passing through the reservation);
Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Mont. 1995), (Blackfeet Tribal Court had subject
matter jurisdiction over claim between tribal nonmember and member arising on U.S. highway
passing through the Blackfeet Indian Reservation), rev'd, No. 96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th
Cir. Sept. 23, 1997); Burlington N. R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation,
701 F. Stpp 1493, 1503 (D. Mont. 1988) (Tribes retained beneficial title to the land comprising
railroad right-of-way on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, and thus the "territorial component
essential to the valid exercise of the Tribes' taxing authority is satisfied"), ajfd in part,
924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv. Regulation, Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 267, 269 (Mont. 1986)
(rejecting B.N.'s assertions that its interest in the right-of-way on the Crow Reservation was in
the nature of a fee interest, and reaffirming the Crow Tribe's property interest in the land
underlying the right-of-way); Wyoming ex rel. Peterson v. District Court, 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo.
1980) (action between owner of horse and owner of truck damaged in collision with the horse
was within exclusive jurisdiction of tribal court even though the accident occurred on U.S.
highway passing through the reservation). But see Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d
868 (9th Cir.), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997) (reserving review of tribal court jurisdiction until
after exhaustion of tribal remedies).




No. 96-35145, 1997 WL 583704 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997), the Ninth Circuit's newest jurist, the
Hon. Sidney Thomas of Billings, Montana, wrote at length about the notions of 'full faith and
credit' and 'comity.' Id. at *1-6. Judge Thomas concluded that comity should apply when a
plaintiff seeks to enforce a tribal court judgement in a collateral action in federal court. Id. at *1.
Moreover, a grant of comity should be contingent upon mandatory factors (lack of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction; lack of due process), id. at *4, and discretionary factors (fraud; conflict
with another final judgment also entitled to recognition; inconsistency with the parties' contractual
choice of forum; offence to public policy). Id. In the case at bar, where the tortfeasor was a
nonmember, the accident occurred on a state highway, and there was no statute or treaty
authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on that highway, Ms. Wilson's claim
failed for lack of tribal court subject matter. jurisdiction. Id. at *7 (citing Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997)).
In another emotionally charged case, the Supreme Court has hinted strongly that its 'good
roads' rule ought to be extended to railroad rights-of-way as well. In Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997), the heirs of two tribal members
killed by a Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) train at a crossing on the reservation were awarded
$250 million by a jury in Crow Tribal Court. Id. at 869. BN sought relief from the Crow trial
court, and also in the Crow Court of Appeals. Id. Without waiting for a final ruling from the
appellate court, BN obtained temporary restraint in federal court enjoining enforcement of the
tribal court judgment. Id. Tribal proceedings became stalled by Burlington Northern's activities
in federal court, and the federal district court then granted BN a preliminary injunction against
execution or enforcement of the tribal court judgment, intending to "maintain[ ] the status quo
and preserv[e] the court's jurisdiction should future federal litigation occur in this matter." Id.
The judgement creditors appealed to the Ninth Circuit from the preliminary injunction. Id.
Writing for a divided Ninth Circuit panel, Judge Eugene A. Wright, a principal architect of
the National Farmers exhaustion rule, see supra note 177 and accompanying text, applied a
straightforward exhaustion analysis, ordered the district court to dissolve the preliminary
injunction, and to either dismiss this action without prejudice or stay BN's action until after
exhaustion of tribal court remedies. Id. at 871.
Circuit Judge Andrew Kleinfeld of Fairbanks, Alaska, considered a "prominent conservative[
]" on a court generally viewed as among the nation's most liberal, see David G. Savage, Getting
the High Court's Attention: Liberal-leaning 9th Circuit Is Often Reversed, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997,
at 47, authored a stinging dissent. See Red Wolf 106 F.3d at 871 (Kleinfeld, Judge, dissenting).
Judge Kleinfeld took exception to the Crow court's lack of accountability to the United States
Constitution, id., and implied that there was inadequate due process in the Crow court system -
that "[h]ad Burlington Northern lost its case in a court of a foreign country which did not accord
due process, the judgment would not be enforceable in the United States." Id. (citing Bank Melli
Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1995); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06
(1895). Judge Kleinfeld went on to express his concerns about what comity or full faith and
credit might require in a collateral enforcement action outside the reservation, Red Wolf, 106 F.3d
at 871 (Kleinfeld, Judge, dissenting) (citing WILLtAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 155-56
(1981); COHEN, 1942 ED., supra note 33, at 145, and about what might result should the tribe tear
up BN's tracks and sell them for scrap to satisfy some portion of the $250 million judgement.
Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 871 (Kleinfeld, Judge, dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld was also disturbed by
his understanding of the case below - that the accident occurred at a well-marked crossing, that
there had been no accident at that crossing for fifty years, that the train was not speeding, and
that both decedents were apparently intoxicated. Id. at 872. And even if BN was negligent,
reasoned Judge Kleinfeld, the jury award far exceeded the "reasonable" $500,000 verdict
estimated by an "experienced" personal injury lawyer on BN's behalf. Id. But Judge Kleinfeld
seemed most offended by the "wave the bloody shirt" tone of the trial itself, id., evidenced by
the purported - albeit uncredited - transcript of Judge Ron Arneson's address in the Crow
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language to the jury panel before voir dire. Id. That address, reproduced as incoherent pidgin
English, suggested that the jury was to ensure redress not just for this accident, but for the
"bodies scattered along the railway." Id. Moreover, the inference was that the verdict was based
as much on the jurors' blood relatedness to the decedents as it was to BN's legal culpability. Id.
To justify his view that BN should have been afforded a federal remedy, Judge Kleinfeld
suggested that exhaustion was in fact complete, or in the alternative, that exhaustion in this case
would be futile. Id. at 872-873 (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U,S.
845, 856 n. 21 (1985) ("We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where ...
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's
jurisdicticn."). Judge Kleinfeld also argued that, even if there was a genuine difference of opinion
between the district court and the circuit court on the exhaustion issue, the district court's
application of that "correctly recognized legal principle" could be reversed only for abuse of
discretion. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 873 (Kleinfeld, Judge, dissenting). The district court's decision
was not subject to review de novo. Id. (citing Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F,3d 1002, 1004 (9th
Cir. 1995); Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1982)). Finally,
the judge came full-circle to the notion of the tribe ripping uji BN's tracks - worrying about "a
very great public interest' in the potential interference with interstate commerce. Red Wolf, 106
F.3d at 873 (Kleinfeld, Judge, dissenting).
With all due respect tcl Judge Kleinfeld, however, it must be noted that there are other
opinions about what happened in the Crow Tribal Court. The plaintiffs' attorney, John C. Holt
of Great Falls, Montana, reports that the jury considered a number of factors in reaching its
verdicts. First, plaintiffs alleged that the railroad negligently maintained a dangerous crossing,
in violation of an 1889 agreement which gave railroads the right to operate on Crow lands in
exchange for the promise to "operate trains with due regard for the rights of Indians." Crash
History Boosts Plaintiffs' Case in Wrongful Death Trial, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1596, at 4. Because
of a narrow crossing which dipped significantly on one side, and an approach which required
vehicles to approach at a severe angle, the driver of the ill-fated auto ran off the timber crossing
and became stuck on the tracks. Id. The crossing allegedly violated all national safety standards.
Id. As a result, there had been 25 crossing crashes and 17 fatalities at the same site in the
previous nine years. Id. Nevertheless, Red Wolf was the first claim filed against a railroad for an
injury or death in the area. Id. at 5.
Second, Hoyt refuted the defense's suggestions that the decedents were intoxicated. Id. The
blood samples, said Hoyt, were not tested for eight or nine months. Id. at 4. When they were
tested, initial results showed one victim's blood alcohol level to be 6 - a "level which could not
sustain life." Id. Faced with these problematic test results, BN tried, unsuccessfully to link the
blood alcohol data to the decedent's alleged "drinking problem." Id.
Third, Hoyt presented evidence that the train crew made no attempt to stop or slow the train
before it struck the vehicle - even though the crew could have seen the car almost a quarter mile
from the crossing. Id. One BN employee testified he had seen the car stuck on the crossing, with
rocks flying up, and the car rising and settling as if trying to move. Id. Nevertheless, the crew
failed, in contravention of state and federal law, to sound the train's horn, ring its bell, or to apply
the emergency brake. Id. at 4-5. BN employees only made matters worse by exhibiting contempt
for Indians. Ld. at 5. When the BN superintendent was asked at deposition whether the railroad
showed "dud regard" for Indians, he stated that whether the railroad sounded its whistles was not
the point: The railroad showed due regard "to everyone it ran over everywhere." Id.
Finally, Hoyt suggests that "the constant deception of Burlington Northern attorneys was more
than any jury could handle." Id. Lead counsel for the railroad claimed to be from Billings,
Montana when he was really from Seattle, Washington. ld. BN's attorney also told the jury that
there would be a conductor from the train sitting at the defense counsel's table to act as BN's
representative. Id. The conductor did not, however, appear in court until after the plaintiffs had
presented their case. Id. Evidence later showed that BN had never asked the conductor to appear
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In the process, the Supreme Court's own tribal exhaustion doctrine - a
doctrine which is the disingenuous result of anything but deference to tribal
courts - is finally revealed to be the empty husk many always suspected
it to be. Short of congressional action, it seems virtually assured that tribal
courts will soon find themselves facing a swelling tide of expensive and
distractive preemptive actions in federal courts. And after an excruciatingly
long wait, it seems just as clear that the "other shoe" that Oliphant" left
so perilously poised has finally dropped. For what Oliphant did to divest
tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction within their territories, Strate v. A-I
Contractors has now resoundingly achieved in the civil arena. At minimum,
Strate seems to promise a windfall of filing fees for state courts.4  At
worst, Strate's inevitable chilling effect may mark the beginning of the end
for tribal courts: while a plaintiff may have a sincere desire to bring their
action in tribal court, no reasonable person is going to seek unnecessarily
protracted jurisdictional disputes, the need for dual filings to protect a cause
of action from expired State statutes of limitation, and interminably delayed
remedies.
As interactions between Indians and non-Indians increase in number and
in complexity, and as non-Indian populations within Indian country
flourish,474 it is now clearer than ever before that only Congress - by
finally stepping up to the plate and putting some legislative teeth into its
in court. Id. BN also had a Native American sit at the defense counsel's table - allegedly to
translate - even though there was no non-English testimony presented. Id.
Regardless of which of these versions comes nearer the truth, the Supreme Court has
remanded Red Wolf to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to reconsider in light of Strate v. A-]
Contractors. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
37 (1997). Thus it now seems all too likely that these plaintiffs will soon find themselves, four
years after the deaths of their kin, with an unenforceable tribal court judgement - the rip-up-the-
tracks scenario notwithstanding - and facing a new trial in either state or federal court.
472. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (striking down tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians).
473. Fortunately for Ms.Fredericks, she had the foresight to file a redundant lawsuit in the
North Dakota state courts "to protect her rights against the running of the State's six-year statute
of limitations." Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409 n.4 (citing Reply Brief 6 n.2). After Strate, it would
probably amount to legal malpractice to not counsel such a filing.
474. Far too typical is the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana. In 1984, the reservation's
population totaled 19,750. Bryan, supra note 38, at 120-21. Of that number, only 3,271 were
members of the Salish and Kootenai tribes. Id. Moreover, about one-half of the reservation's land
was then owned by non-Indians. Id. A similar situation then existed on the Ft. Peck Reservation,
where, in 1983, only about 5,000 of the reservation's 9,898 residents were members of the
Assiniboine, Yanktoni Sioux and Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Tribes. Id.
No. 1]
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oft-asserted desire to support tribal self-government and self determina-
tion - can save the tribal justice system from gradual devolution into an
insignificant forum for petty internecine disputes.475 The Muses, it seems,
would be pleased.
475. For example, a clear statutory definition ofjust what constitutes tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction would be good. Of course - and as already suggested several times above - tribal
criminal jurisdiction based on territorial sovereignty would be even better. But one fantasy at a
time.
Collaterally, a clear exclusion of tribal jurisdiction as a section 1331 federal question is
necessary. State courts are never subject to such challenges in the lower federal courts, and
neither should the sovereign courts of recognized Indian tribes be.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Strate raises a relatively novel issue that up till now had
not caused much trouble. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413 & n.9. It was once fairly well settled that
the term Indian country for purposes of civil jurisdiction was that definition provided for criminal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F,3d 554, 558 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("By specifically referring to the broad definition of Indian country in § 1151 ... the
Court in Rice also made clear that the geographic scope of state and tribal authority extends to
a reservation's four comers. The appellees' reliance on the narrow definition of Indian country
in §§ 1154(c) and 1156 is simply misplaced. . . . mhe narrow definition of Indian country
contained in §§ 1154(c) and 1156 applies only to the reach of those federal criminal liability
statutes, and the broad definition in § 1151 applies to all other sections in the chapter"); Ute
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 935 F. Supp. 1473, 1486 & n.23 (D. Utah 1996) ("As the Tenth
Circuit has recently observed, 'both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded § 1151
defines Indian country for both civil and criminal jurisdiction purposes."') (citing Pittsburg &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540-1541 & n. 10 (10th Cir. 1995).
However, Justice Ginsburg now suggests that a few other statutes may also be invoked when it
suits the litigant's purposes. Thus, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154(c), 1156 (1994) (defining Indian country
for purposes of dispensation and possession of intoxicants as not including rights-of-way running
through a reservation) now seem to provide general purpose alternative definitions of Indian
country.
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